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THESIS SUMMARY 
This thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of the relationship between institutional 
change and entrepreneurship development while maintaining across countries perspective. The 
focus of each chapter is to examine institutional change from a distinct perspective across the 
following three dimensions: (1) change that occurs incrementally over time, (2) discontinuous 
change that occurs due to conflict (revolutions, wars etc.), and finally, (3) social change as captured 
by migration.  
Following the introductory chapter, in the second one, an institutional perspective is used 
to investigate the ways in which change in formal political institutions influences change in Total 
Early-Stage Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) rates, utilising a large panel of 77 countries. This 
chapter stresses that changes in political institutions play an essential role as factors in the 
development of entrepreneurship (TEA). Additionally, this chapter also extends research in 
comparative entrepreneurship that hitherto has largely overlooked the issue of stability of political 
institutions even though this can be a key source of (or a constraint on) entrepreneurial behaviour. 
Chapter 3 examines how host country institutional environments influence intentions and 
motivations of immigrants about self-employment and their growth intentions with respect to their 
new ventures. Consistent with this, in this chapter, the focus is on macro level institutional factors 
that influence immigrant entrepreneurship activity compared to nonimmigrants in recipient 
countries. In its policy conclusions, the chapter also contributes to the economic growth debate 
through recommending targeted policies that aim to attract immigrant entrepreneurial efforts and 
enhance the economic dynamism.   
Finally, in chapter 4, seeks to understand how radical institutional change affects 
entrepreneurship. The empirical counterpart is related to the Arab Spring revolutions, and how 
those influenced decisions to start a business in three distinct Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region countries. This chapter contributes to the existing literature by exploring how radical 
institutional change after conflict (revolutions, war, and uprisings) both directly and in conjunction 
with the personal characteristics of individuals influence entrepreneurial activity. 
 
 
Keywords: Institutional Theory, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, Institutional Change, 
Immigration, Entrepreneurship 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION, RATIONALE, AND CONTRIBUTION OF RESEARCH  
1.1 Introduction  
In this thesis, I set out to examine how (1) formal institutions influence decisions made by 
potential native and immigrant entrepreneurs to start businesses, and (2) how changes in these 
formal institutions, including political, economic and social change, impact changes in 
entrepreneurial activity. Despite the fact that a considerable amount of research has been conducted 
on the types of institutions supporting entrepreneurship in both developed and emerging countries, 
some questions remain unanswered, particularly with regards to the understanding of institutional 
change. My contribution to the research is therefore in its examination of institutional change 
across three dimensions: (1) change that occurs incrementally over time, (2) change that occurs 
due to conflict (revolutions, wars etc.) and (3) finally, social change as captured by migration. For 
example, past examinations of entrepreneurship activity and institutional change were challenging 
because the types of institutions which were meant to support entrepreneurship were known to be 
characterized by weak and fragile structures. This, in turn, warrants special attention as such 
fragilities in structures can have negative effects on entrepreneurship and the economic 
development of the countries in question  (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Table 33 in the final 
appendix of this thesis illustrates all variables used in the thesis, how they are measured and their 
sources. 
This chapter introduces the conceptual framework for the thesis and discusses the role of 
institutional change. Additionally, I review the concept of institutions in general and formal 
institutions in detail. Within institutions, the influence of change in these formal political and 
economic institutions is discussed in depth as they are the concepts pertinent to the empirical 
chapters. More so, the contributions of this thesis are highlighted in this chapter. Lastly, I provide 
a summary of the empirical chapters and how they relate to the main framework of the thesis. 
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1.2 Defining entrepreneurship  
The thesis considers entrepreneurship to be an economic behaviour influenced by both the 
macro level (e.g. institutional, country level environment) (Bygrave, 1989, Bygrave and Hofer, 
1991, Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007) and the micro level (e.g. personal characteristics of 
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs). The role of entrepreneurship in economic development is a 
subject of significant importance to global economic development strategies both at policy and 
academic levels (Desai, 2009, Wennekers and Thurik, 1999, Wennekers et al., 1997).  
Entrepreneurship has been shown to have a positive effect on developing, emerging and 
developed economies as it provides a source of income for an individual, creates job opportunities 
and provides a catalyst for innovation (Parker, 2009, Van Praag and Versloot, 2007, Venkataraman, 
1997). In addition, Small and Medium Sized enterprises (SMEs) and entrepreneurial activity play 
a key role in fostering overall economic performance in developing and emerging countries 
(Loveman and Sengenberger, 1991, Birch, 1987); thus, a strong entrepreneurship sector is linked 
to a strong economy. However, this positive link between entrepreneurship and growth is achieved 
with the existence of a robust institutional environment that supports productive entrepreneurial 
activity (Schumpeter, 1951). 
 Later in the thesis, I will define entrepreneurial activity in two ways and then examine 
change in these two measures when interacted with institutional variables. First, I use the total early 
stage entrepreneurial activity (TEA) rate which illustrates the prevalence rate of individuals in the 
working age population who are actively involved in business start-ups, either in the phase of 
starting a new business as a nascent entrepreneur or in the phase of owning or managing a firm 
which spans 42 months after the start of the venture. Second, I use nascent entrepreneurial rate 
which describes the percentage of the 18-64 population who are currently actively involved in 
setting up a business they will own or co-own; this business has not paid salaries, wages, or any 
other payments to the owners for more than three months (Bosma et al., 2012). These two 
constructs measure entrepreneurial activity in two different ways. I will also sub-categorize these 
13 
 
measures to test the quality of the entrepreneurial activity and the motivation behind this activity 
(i.e. high aspirations vs. low aspirations; opportunity vs. necessity). 
1.3 Defining institutions  
Only recently have researchers started to examine how entrepreneurship behaviour is 
dependent on formal national institutions (Stephan and Uhlaner, 2010, Estrin et al., 2012, Efendic 
et al., 2011, Scott, 2008, Van Stel et al., 2005). Furthermore, recent research has highlighted the 
importance of institutional change for entrepreneurship, particularly in emerging countries, see for 
example (Aidis et al., 2008, Mickiewicz, 2005, Mickiewicz and Aidis, 2006, Mickiewicz et al., 
2014, Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2011a, Johnson et al., 1997).  
Drawing on institutional theory (North, 1990, North, 1997, Baumol, 1996) I define 
institutions as the structures which provide rules, constraints, and incentives that act as tools of 
governance for exchanges (North, 1990, North, 1997, Baumol, 1996, Baumol, 1993). These 
institutions can be subdivided into formal and informal institutions. Formally written rules and 
regulations such as property rights, rule of law and the legal and organizational framework 
(Smallbone and Welter, 2012, North, 1990, North, 1997) are formal institutions that play an 
important role in supporting entrepreneurship. A plethora of entrepreneurship scholars advanced 
the understanding of the impact of formal institutions on entrepreneurship (Estrin et al., 2012, 
Bowen and De Clercq, 2008, Djankov et al., 2002, Hessels et al., 2008). 
Development and growth literature has stressed that the importance of political institutional 
stability as a key barrier to economic growth and development of a nation (Dutta et al., 2013, Aisen 
and Veiga, 2006). Several streams of literature found that more socio-political instability can lead 
to lower investments, higher inflation and lack of appropriate financial development in financial 
institutions which in hand are negatively associated with economic growth (Dutta et al., 2013, 
Aisen and Veiga, 2006, Alesina and Perotti, 1996). Moreoever, unstable, underdeveloped and weak 
political institutions can lead to greater risk and uncertainty, enforcement of rule of law and 
protection property rights (Dutta et al., 2013). On the contrary, stable political institutions reduce 
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uncertainty and decrease transaction costs allowing individuals to capture gains from exchanges in 
market transactions (Boettke and Coyne, 2003). Baumol (1990) emphasizes that the productivity 
of a country’s entrepreneurial activity and processes depends highly on the quality of its institutions, 
of which political ones present an important type.  
What we already know about political institutions and entrepreneurship is related to the 
effect of these institutions on different types of entrepreneurial actions such as strategic vs. non-
strategic (e.g., Levie & Autio, 2011), high-aspiration vs. low-aspiration (e.g., Stenholm et al., 2013), 
and opportunity vs. necessity (e.g., Djankov, Qian, Roland, & Zhuravskaya, 2006); however, there 
is limited research on the influence of change in political institutions on entrepreneurship (Autio 
and Fu 2015).  
The concepts of political institutions and regimes are relatively challenging in their 
conceptualization as the intuitions associated with the concepts of democracy and autocracy are 
not always all-inclusive in determining whether a particular country operates according to one or 
the other at a given time  (Przeworski 2000). Therefore, the concepts of democracy and autocracy 
need to be validated in terms of rules and constructs that can be identified as either complementing 
and/or unique distinctions between the constructs. According to (Przeworski 2000), this process 
requires going back and forth between historical observations of nations and conceptual analysis.  
An important distinction to consider in my discussion of political institutions is one 
between political freedom as captured by political rights/civil liberties and democracy as captured 
by the democracy/autocracy dynamic. Both constructs have important similarities but also some 
observable differences (Przeworski 2000). The concept of political freedom is identified by a 
combination of factors that represent political rights and civil liberties as crucial pieces of this 
construct. Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process: the right to 
vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political 
parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies 
and are accountable to the electorate. Whilst civil liberties represent freedom of expression and 
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belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without 
interference from the state. The amalgamation of political rights and civil liberties defines political 
freedom. However, the construct of democracy requires further conceptualization. Three major 
particularities direct modern political thought vis-à-vis forms of government. These are: 
Montesquies 1748 distinction between limited regimes and autocratic; Rousseau and Kant’s 
differences between “autonomy (systems in which norms are determined by those whom they apply) 
and heteronomy (systems in which the legislators are distinct from those are subject to the laws)” 
(Przeworski 2000); and Schumpeter’s destructive innovation (Schumpeter 1951) which 
emphasized conestation (competition) as a critical element of democracy. The main focus is on 
contestation.  
A democratic regime, for example, can be defined by the interactions and allocation of 
decision-making rights between a presidential system that strictly separates the powers between 
the executive and the legislature, or a parliamentary system, where a legislative majority elects the 
executive and there is less power separation (Przeworski 2000). This therefore demonstrates an 
important relationship between the democracy construct and its elements in political system 
construct. 
As Weingast (1995: 1) pointed out: “A government strong enough to protect property rights 
and enforce contracts is also strong enough to confiscate the wealth of its citizens.” Mechanisms 
that impose credible restraints on government behaviours while incentivizing government officials 
to comply with rules and regulations need to be in place. A well-designed political system protects 
property rights and political freedoms, thereby encouraging citizens’ participation in the economic 
life. Attention to these relations is therefore important to understand the effect of political 
institutions on different forms of entrepreneurship. 
In addition, the institutional qualities of a society and its economy—such as economic 
freedom (Hasan, Quibria, & Kim, 2003), the presence of policies that condition the operation of 
private sector, and institutions regulating the balance of political power and the structure of the 
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bureaucratic system—play an important role in either facilitating or inhibiting economic growth 
and alleviating poverty (Lakshman, 2003). Non-inclusive political and economic institutions can 
engender and perpetuate inequality and aggravate poverty (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).  By 
inhibiting economic dynamism, poorly functioning institutions can decrease the productivity and 
innovativeness of an economy, confine the benefits of growth to a narrow elite, and impede the 
alleviation of poverty  (Ahlstrom & Ding, 2014; Bruton et al., 2013; Holt, 1991). 
As defined earlier, political institutions are those institutional structures that establish 
and standardize access to economic opportunities, entrepreneurial rents and strong rule of law 
(Autio and Fu, 2015). Stability and the high quality of the political institutional environment offers 
a positive and conducive environment for entrepreneurs to thrive. High quality political institutions 
are characterized by comprehensive political representation without meddling by governments, 
military, economic and or other self-interest and powerful groups, ensuring individuals are not 
inhibited by monopolized control from powerful interest groups and granting inclusive access to 
economic opportunities (Puddington, 2013). However, research has found that insecurity coupled 
with lower economic growth rates arising from instability of institutions leads to weak formal 
enforcement of political rights and freedoms and can, therefore, deter potential entrepreneurs from 
actively pursuing entrepreneurial activity in a host country (Aidis et al., 2008).  
Democracy and autocracy are also facets of political freedom. Democracy is 
operationalised as a three interdependent elements concept. The first element is the presence of 
strong institutions and procedures whereby citizens are able to express their preferences about 
alternative policies and leaders. Secondly, the presence of institutionalized constraints on the 
exercise of power by the executive branch of a government, or in other words, the limitations 
imposed by law to provide checks and balances between decision makers in a government. Finally, 
the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in political participation 
(Marshall et al., 2010, Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). Having a democratic system also ensures a 
political system composed of a parliamentary system where executives (president, prime minister, 
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etc.) are elected directly or by an electoral college. Autocracy on the other hand is operationalised 
in terms of the presence of distinct political characteristics. The first characteristic of an autocracy 
is where competitive political participation is suppressed or restricted. Secondly, chief executives 
are chosen in a standardised process of selection within a political elite and once in office they 
exercise power with few institutional constraints. And finally, autocracies are characterized by a 
high degree of control over social and economic activity (Marshall et al., 2010, Marshall and 
Jaggers, 2002).  
The concept of political freedom is identified by a combination of factors that represent 
political rights and civil liberties as crucial pieces of this construct. Political rights and civil liberties 
operationalised by Freedom House (House, 2014b), are measured by political rights and civil 
liberties indices. Political rights and civil liberties enable people to participate freely in political 
process, ensuring the right to vote freely for alternatives in legitimate elections as well as the 
freedom of expression without the interference from the state (House, 2014b). Therefore, increased 
political rights and civil liberties are typically synonymous with democracy rather than an 
autocracy. More so, democratic institutions in contrast to autocratic ones allow for a representative 
political agenda where property rights are universally protected and abuse of power is repressed, 
creating a better environment for entrepreneurship (Autio and Fu, 2015).  In line with the above, 
political stability is maintained under democracies more so than under an autocracy. Likewise, a 
democratic system may help to reduce the likelihood of a “long-term radical political change” and 
induce political stability, which positively impacts economic activity by reducing uncertainty and 
increasing incentives to invest (Feng, 2001).  
Political legitimacy is defined as the people’s recognition and acceptance of the validity 
of the rules, laws, and regulations of their political system (Lipset, 1959). It is likely that in 
democratic and politically free institutional environments, political legitimacy increases as 
people’s trust in their political system/regime increases. Consequently, these political systems are 
more efficient and incur fewer transaction costs, thereby encouraging citizens’ participation in 
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economic activity. Additionally, effective constraints on arbitrary action by the executive branch 
of the government, decreases the risk of expropriation without due compensation, thus securing the 
property rights of economic agents (Acemoglu et al., 2005, Acemoglu and Johnson, 2003). Strong 
property rights ensures appropriate access to finance through encouragement of the development 
of strong financial institutions (De Soto, 2000, Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2011b), which decreases 
expropriation of liquid assets by the government. For strong property rights protection to take place, 
institutions need to be democratic and politically free to allow for a representative political agenda 
as well as appropriate checks and balances on executives. This is especially important if the 
inherited political institutional framework isolates the government from democratic and politically 
free processes, so that government misuse of power is inhibited.  In essence, a well-designed 
political system that integrates the elements discussed is more likely to protect property and 
political freedoms, and in doing so encouraging participation of individuals in economic and 
political life (Autio and Fu, 2015).  
Strong political institutions also encourage less economic and political corruption. 
Corruption is usually defined as the abuse of public power and authority for the private benefit of 
government agents (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009). It has the ability to be present in many layers of 
institutional arrangements from the legal and judicial down to the lower layers of administration, 
in any one country (McMullen et al., 2008). Freedom from corruption measures the level of 
corruption in different countries and is also correlated with levels of economic freedom, i.e. higher 
levels of freedom from corruption correlate to higher economic freedom and vis versa (Charron et 
al., 2010). This relationship implies that the higher the freedom from corruption in a country, the 
better the control of corruption score. Control of corruption looks at perceptions of corruption 
conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain but can have different 
aspects of corruption incorporated in the measure ranging from additional payments/bribery which 
affects the economic environment directly to also measuring “grand corruption” or political 
corruption (Charron et al., 2010).  
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Similar aspects are captured by political corruption. However, political corruption 
includes distinct types of corruption that cover both areas and levels of the polity realm, 
distinguishing between executive, legislative and judicial corruption. The measure also 
differentiates between corruption at the highest levels of the executive branch of the government 
(rules, cabinet, ministers etc.) and in the public sector at large (Charron et al., 2010). What makes 
this measure unique is that it captures different types of corruption: ‘petty’ and ‘grand’; bribery 
and theft; both corruption aimed at influencing law making but also corruption that affects 
implementation. Therefore, political corruption includes elements from control of corruption, 
freedom from corruption and the corruptions perceptions index and can thus identify the level of 
government effectiveness in terms of quality of the public service provision and the quality of the 
bureaucracy.    
A well-developed market environment corresponds to strong institutions which are likely 
to provide the appropriate incentives for potential entrepreneurs to start profitable business ventures 
(Djankov et al., 2002, Djankov et al., 2006a, North, 1990, North, 1994, Bowen and De Clercq, 
2008). Many developing countries and transition economies are characterized by weak formal 
institutions that create institutional gaps or voids where firms operating in these markets are faced 
with a number of unpredictable shocks (political instability, economic fluctuations, conflict etc.) 
and lack the appropriate intermediaries that can analyse market information, facilitate transactions 
as well as deter the support of a modern market economy (Puffer et al., 2010, Khanna and Palepu, 
2010). Drawing from the above literature, this thesis firstly aims to provide an understanding of 
the mechanisms through which formal institutions impact entrepreneurial start-ups (Hopp and 
Stephan, 2012, Zafirovski, 1999, Bowen and De Clercq, 2008).  
In this research, I also investigate more carefully the impact of three types of institutional 
changes: rapid conflictual change that occurs due to conflict, in this research being the Arab Spring 
that took place in 2010 where a wave of demonstrations led to the toppling of several regimes in 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and more gradual institutional change (e.g. 
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through political and economic reforms) including economic and political instability that is 
associated with change in entrepreneurial activity and finally social change through immigration. 
I explore the influence of these institutional changes taking into consideration political, economic 
and social change. An economy which facilitates entrepreneurial development by removing and/or 
lowering barriers to entry and exit will generate more opportunities for potential entrepreneurs 
(Smallbone and Welter, 2012). Consequently, reforms of institutional environments implemented 
by nations are increasing in importance. However, at the same time change comes with instability 
and therefore its overall impact may or may not be positive. 
Instability is not always symbolic of a weak economy (Olson, 2008). Institutional change 
may be different in magnitude and relates to the episodes of political, economic and social change 
(institutional change) that a country passes through because of wars, revolutions, conflict, and 
transition (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Fukuyama discusses the concept of instability (Fukuyama, 
2011). He argues that some societies go down the democratic path to stability while others remain 
trapped in an autocracy because a society needs three main pillars to reach democracy; centralized 
political power, rule of law and an accountable government. These pillars are coined into the term 
political order. The three factors are accountable for retaining a strong state where citizens are 
permitted to change their rulers when these rulers engage in activities detrimental to the well-being 
of the nation (Fukuyama, 2011).  
However, the three pillars of political order need to be equally strong to achieve maximum 
stability. Often, states champion one of the pillars over the other giving rise to instability and a 
weak political order. For example, ancient China experienced an early advantage compared to the 
western world on the path to strong political order by introducing a strong centralized state to 
alleviate the detrimental effects of constant civil war. This also resulted in arguably strong 
economic growth over the long term as the Chinese state implemented economic and political 
policies that advocated this growth. Nevertheless, this advantage has also led to the ‘autocraziation’ 
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of China in the long term as the strong centralized state was too strong, trumping warlords but also 
devastating any emergent civil society or forms of government accountability (Fukuyama, 2011).  
Another recent argument by Acemoglu and Robinson suggests that for any economic 
success, institutions must be sufficiently centralized to provide basic public services including 
justice, property rights enforcement and education (Acemoglu et al., 2012). They theorize that 
institutions are divided into extractive and inclusive, and argue that rich countries are rich due to 
inclusive economic and political institutions, while poor countries are poor due to extractive 
institutions. Inclusive institutions enable productive innovation leading to sustained economic 
growth and extractive institutions are these where a “small” group of individuals exploit the rest of 
the population to extract resources (Acemoglu et al., 2012). Historically, institutional change often 
takes place through conflict (revolutions, uprisings, and wars etc.). In some cases, extractive 
institutions are replaced by inclusive institutions in these affected countries. This process may lead 
to differential institutional drift, which is defined as the small institutional differences that occur 
over time producing significant changes in institutions in the long run (Acemoglu et al., 2012). 
These small institutional differences (institutional drifts) taking place over time can interact with 
“critical junctures” and historical contingency to produce a change in the path of the institutional 
framework in a state. By analysing this institutional evolution in its historical setting, Acemoglu et 
al. (2012) argue that we can better understand why some countries are rich and others poor and 
how this pattern may have changed over time from extractive and unproductive institutions to 
inclusive creative destruction institutions or vis versa. 
The incidents of discontinuity and rapid institutional change are called critical junctures or 
a crucial turning points in a country’s history; an example is the Glorious Revolution in England 
in 1688, which brought along much more inclusive institutions, creating the conditions that led to 
the industrial revolution (Acemoglu et al., 2012). This may suggest that revolutions may be 
endogenous in the long term but are not the only fashion in which institutional change occurs. Not 
all change requires a revolution to take place; the discontinuity coming from gradual change may 
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result from a specific set of political and social conditions that make reform based on collective 
action difficult (Fukuyama, 2011).  
Social change captured by immigration and entrepreneurship are also related. They are 
regarded as drivers of economic growth but have so far mainly been researched independently.  
Empirical evidence on the relationship between immigration and entrepreneurship is limited, 
mainly due to difficulties in observing immigrants’ contribution to entrepreneurial activities and 
how these contributions are impacted by the institutional environment of host nations. However, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that there is a strong contribution of immigrants to entrepreneurship 
(Wadhwa et al., 2011). Therefore, it has become important in light of the current global socio-
political-economic environment and the surges of immigrants and refugees to developed countries 
to analyse in depth the influence of host country institutional environments on immigrant 
entrepreneurial activity for both policy makers and researchers.   
1.4 Ameliorating factors 
Empirical studies in entrepreneurship have highlighted the importance of entrepreneurship 
as an employment alternative to other forms of work (Arenius and Minniti, 2005). Accordingly, 
studies have recognized socio-economic and demographic factors such as education, age and work 
status as important drivers of entrepreneurship (Arenius and Minniti, 2005). A second important 
set of factors that drive entrepreneurship is personal characteristics of individuals emphasized in 
the psychology and sociology literature (Kirzner, 1978, Baron, 2000, Gartner, 1985, Kihlstrom and 
Laffont, 1979, Weber and Milliman, 1997, Minniti, 2004, Aldrich, 1999). Personal characteristics 
and their impact on entrepreneurship development have received less attention than socioeconomic 
and demographic factors; this is mostly attributed to the challenges in obtaining appropriate data 
as well as methodological difficulties (Arenius and Minniti, 2005). Nevertheless, the importance 
of these characteristics has not been entirely neglected and several contributions have emphasized 
their significance. Some of these characteristics include, self-efficacy (Baron, 2000), fear of failure 
(Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979) social connections (i.e. knowing other entrepreneurs) (Baron, 2000, 
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Minniti, 2004, Aldrich, 1999), and a proxy for financial resources,  business angels (Arenius and 
Minniti, 2005)1. These personal characteristics will be explored in more details further in the thesis 
as they interact with the institutional factors to influence entrepreneurial activity. In the next section, 
I present the aims of the research accounting for the above definitions of entrepreneurship, 
institutional change, and ameliorating factors.  
1.5 Aims of research and empirical chapter summaries 
As stated in the section above, within this thesis I focus on how institutional change impacts 
on entrepreneurial activity. Despite the general assumption that national institutional frameworks 
can help explain cross country differences in new business creation, the role of macro level 
institutional change as combined with micro level personal characteristics has only received scant 
research attention (Autio and Acs, 2010). My contribution in this thesis thus focuses on three facets 
of institutional change; an overarching scheme of institutional change that occurs incrementally 
over time, change that occurs due to conflict (revolutions, wars etc.) and finally social change as 
captured by migration. Some key concepts introduced are now discussed.  
Short-term institutional change, (year on year) variations, are more frequent and gradual 
changes in institutional frameworks which can accumulate to significant increases. These changes 
can help in understanding how some nations (but not others) build entrepreneurship over time and 
thereby providing for insightful policy outputs in support of entrepreneurship activity. 
Constitutional level institutions are higher order formal institutions that deal with aspects such as 
political freedom, political stability, freedom from corruption, democracy and autocracy. Personal 
characteristics of individuals related to potential entrepreneurship capabilities, motivations and 
intentions are also a key concept assessed, including self-efficacy, fear of failure, social 
connections and being a business angel. These key concepts are discussed in further details in the 
                                                             
1  I consider these as personal characteristics and not “informal institutions” because they pertain to the 
individual rather than society in general and they are relatively easier to change over time. Informal institutions 
by definition are the informal rules which emanate from culture and tradition and are usually unwritten and 
developed outside of “officially-sanctioned channels” (North, 1990, North, 1997, Scott, 2008, Helmke and 
Levitsky, 2004). These informal institutions are mostly self-enforced through mechanisms such as social 
networks and relationships. They are difficult to change because they are embedded in the environment.  
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relevant empirical chapters 2, 3 and 4. Consequently, this thesis aims to answer the following 
questions. 
1. First, what is the relationship between gradual short-term change (year on year variations) 
over time at the high order institutional/constitutional levels and entrepreneurship between 
different countries? In what ways, does this short-term institutional change at the 
constitutional, political and regulatory levels influence entrepreneurial activity? 
Additionally, what is the role of social capital such as social connections, past business 
experience and related financial sources (e.g. business angels) in short-term institutional 
change processes? 
2. Second, how do changes in macro level political freedom, freedom from corruption and 
economic freedom combine and or relate to influence change in entrepreneurship behaviour 
between immigrants relative to natives in immigrant hosting countries?   
3. Third, what is the relationship between personal characteristics relevant to entrepreneurship: 
self-efficacy, lack of fear of failure, or social connections and being a business angel and 
entrepreneurial start-up decisions during periods of radical institutional change (eg. conflict, 
war, revolutions etc.)? Do some of these factors exert greater influence on entrepreneurial 
start-up decisions than others amidst different incidents of radical institutional 
change/discontinuity post the Arab Spring revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia (regimes were 
ousted) as compared to Algeria (regime remains in power)?  
1.5.1 Theoretical Model 
Figure 1.1 below illustrates my theoretical model. The model illustrates the levels of 
analysis in this thesis as well as consider the factors and institutions associated for each of the three 
empirical chapters. This model is not meant to be a conclusive framework that identifies all relevant 
factors of entrepreneurial development; however, it aims to illustrate the influences pertinent to 
this thesis, showing how they affect each other and how they are placed in the broader scope of the 
research. The model is a lens through which I can examine these institutions, the collective 
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decision-making process amidst changes in these institutions, how authority is revoked in times of 
radical change (revolutions, conflicts etc.), and finally how immigrants differ to natives in 
entrepreneurial development in response to change institutions. To explain entrepreneurial activity 
and the behaviours of individuals in the process of starting a business, the focus of the analysis 
requires that I investigate the behaviours of the individual parts of the process akin to behaviours 
of individuals in the organization and institutions structures. This investigation process is called 
internal analysis of system behaviour (Coleman and Coleman, 1994). This research explores the 
lower micro level of analysis, which is the behaviours of individuals attempting to start a business. 
While on the macro level, I study the impact of institutional change on the individuals and their 
entrepreneurial business start-up decisions. Individual actions are embedded in the macro-context, 
which may influence behaviours directly and shape the strength with which personal factors 
influence behaviours. Information is transmitted from the macro level institutional context down 
to the micro level personal characteristics. At the entrepreneurial activity level, I also aim to 
investigate how immigrants are affected differently than natives by institutional change. Three 
types of influence mechanisms can then explain this social behaviour: macro-to-micro analysis, 
individual actions, and micro-to-macro analysis. Figure 1.1 below illustrates these interconnected 
mechanisms in action for entrepreneurial business start-ups. 
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Figure 1.1 Main theoretical model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted based on (Coleman and Coleman, 1994) 
Chapter Summaries 
1.5.2 Empirical chapter 2 summary 
Chapter two of this thesis will aim to answer research question one above. Institutions are 
seen as being slow to change and hence help explain stable differences in entrepreneurship rates 
across countries. This chapter aims to develop a new perspective, clarifying the influence of short-
term institutional change on entrepreneurial activity. I develop hypotheses about the consequences 
of change in different types of institutions, utilising a panel data set derived from Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor and other sources. The chapter distinguishes between measures of high-
order political institutional change, political stability, economic regulation, practices of corruption, 
and relate them to annual changes in Total Early-Stage Entrepreneurial Activity. I find that changes 
in fundamental political institutions and in political stability explain changes in entrepreneurial 
activity. 
Accordingly, this study will strive to contribute to comparative international 
entrepreneurship literature e.g. (Aidis et al., 2008, Bruton et al., 2010, Bruton et al., 2009, Lim et 
al., 2010) by investigating the relationship between a country’s macro level institutional changes 
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over time on entrepreneurial activity. At the same time, as I consider how short term institutional 
change affects entrepreneurs, I enhance institutional theory, stressing the critical role of forward-
looking expectations. 
My contribution in this chapter is, therefore, the following. I argue that while 
entrepreneurship activity is influenced by more than one dimension of institutions, it is a change at 
a higher level of political institutions that matter most for entrepreneurship (Estrin et al., 2012, 
Williamson, 2000). I also argue that more democratic political environments which bring about 
better protection of property rights, and a fair legal framework generate stable political 
environments. Stable environments bring in more trust and less corruption. All these interrelated 
changes result in enhanced entrepreneurship.  Effectively the chapter will investigate change at the 
macro level of institutions.  Figure 1.2 below illustrates the theoretical model for this chapter. 
Figure 1.2 Theoretical model of Chapter 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Political Institutional Indicators and direction of their impact on entrepreneurial activity. 
1.5.3 Empirical chapter 3 summary 
Immigration is considered to be advantageous to recipient countries as it helps in closing 
the gap in the shortage of skilled- and entrepreneurial labor (Xavier et al., 2012). Research evidence 
from many economies suggests that immigrants differ from the home country nationals in their 
entrepreneurial intentions and motivations. Some studies investigated the positive externalities that 
immigrants create for economies, including effects on innovation and economic growth (e.g. Peroni, 
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C., Riillo, C.A. and Sarracino, F., 2016, Constant and Zimmermann 2008). This leads to the 
question of how do the host country institutional environments influence intentions and motivations 
of immigrants about self-employment and subsequent growth of their ventures.   
In this chapter, I utilize macro level institutional indicators of countries to investigate how 
immigrant entrepreneurial activity in hosting countries is influenced by these institutional 
environments. Conclusions are drawn using binary response logit models with random effects (Cox, 
1958) that estimate the impact of immigrant status on entrepreneurship activity accounting for the 
host macro (country) level political freedom, corruption, and economic freedom and controlling 
for the immigrant’s individual characteristics. The data for this chapter is obtained from a 
combination of several datasets: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), Quality of Government 
(QoG), Polity IV, World Bank and Freedom House. Several models are developed that estimate 
the interaction between macro level political institutions (i.e., political freedom), economic 
freedom (i.e., business and financial freedom), and corruption with immigrant status to test changes 
in Total Early-Stage Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) rates. Figure 1.3 below summarizes the 
theoretical model for chapter 3. 
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Figure 1.3 Theoretical model of Chapter 3
 
Note. Institutional Indicators and direction of their impact on immigrant entrepreneurial activity. 
1.5.4 Empirical chapter 4 summary 
In chapter four of this research, I answer question three above. Specifically, I focus on the 
impact of personal characteristics and resources such as self-efficacy, the lack of fear of failure, 
social connections and having been a business angel in the past (as a proxy for a financial resource) 
on decisions to start a business in Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia before and after political/economic 
change (Arab Spring). I build on existing research to emphasize the importance of aggregate 
personal characteristics and resources for entrepreneurial activity especially in uncertain 
environments (Stephan and Uhlaner, 2010, Nolan et al., 2008, Arenius and Minniti, 2005, De 
Clercq et al., 2013). In this chapter, I will present an analysis of the entrepreneurial decisions to 
start a business venture in the context of institutional change taking place, and explore whether the 
influence of personal characteristics on entrepreneurial behaviour is sensitive to the institutional 
environment. Asked differently, do personal characteristics and resources matter more or less for 
entrepreneurial behaviour in light of institutional change? Specifically, I will advance the 
understanding of which personal characteristics influence the decisions to start a business more 
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strongly conditional on the different profile of change in the three countries. Finally, I explore the 
influence of these personal characteristics before and after the Arab Spring revolutions. Figure 1.4 
below illustrates the theoretical framework for this chapter. Further details of this question are 
analysed in chapter 4. 
Figure 1.4 Theoretical model of Chapter 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.6 Contribution of Research 
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et al., 2011).  
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political, economic and social institutional change interacted with individual level social and 
psychological characteristics and how these cross-level interactions influence the decision to start 
a business venture. Second, the research investigates the magnitude of the impact of social 
institutional change on decisions to start a business in a large number of countries focusing on 
immigration. Finally, it adds to our understanding of the literature of economies in conflict and 
how wars and revolutions may impact entrepreneurial development in different countries.  
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: each chapter investigates different aspects of 
institutions and entrepreneurship including the context associated and how they influence each 
other. Several aspects of institutions are re-examined using key elements of empirical and 
theoretical literature for discussion. Additionally, I conduct unique empirical analysis using a 
combination of data that is specifically tailored to optimally capture the phenomena under 
investigation. Each chapter outlines its contributions to theory and practice in entrepreneurship. I 
conclude the thesis by reviewing the findings from all empirical chapters. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE ON 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP  
Abstract 
The chapter distinguishes between measures of high-order constitutional change, political 
stability, economic regulation and practices of corruption. Therefore, in this chapter I use an 
institutional perspective to investigate the ways in which change in high-order formal political 
institutions influences change in entrepreneurial activity. I develop a new short term institutional 
change perspective to investigate how these changes in high-order political institutions influence 
entrepreneurial activity. The findings suggest that short-term changes in political institutions are 
essential in explaining the development of entrepreneurship activity. Positive change over time in 
political stability, freedom from corruption and political legitimacy seems to play the most 
significant role in explaining an increase in a country’s entrepreneurial rates over time. Therefore, 
I argue that positive changes in fundamental political institutions of political freedom and stability 
positively influences entrepreneurship development and subsequently provide policy makers with 
a better understanding of economic growth attributed to entrepreneurship development, reinforcing 
important links between practitioners, academics and policy makers.  
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2.1 Introduction 
A great deal of entrepreneurship literature has focused on the impact of formal and informal 
institutions on entrepreneurship activity; however, less attention has been paid to the varying types 
of institutions and their dynamic impact on entrepreneurship. Much of the existing research on 
entrepreneurship examines broad national formal institutions (constitutional and regulatory levels) 
(Du and Mickiewicz, 2016). However, this research does not take into consideration the more 
dynamic nature of formal political institutions and the short-term change (year on year variations) 
over time when analysing their impact on entrepreneurship. It is well established that 
entrepreneurship rates vary across countries and that these variations are not just attributed to 
economic institutional changes (e.g. economic freedom) (Minniti et al., 2006). There is an 
abundance of literature that investigates the effects of the rapid transition from communism to 
market economies post the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and aids in disentangling the effects of 
abrupt and rapid institutional change on entrepreneurship (Smallbone and Welter, 2001; Estrin and 
Mickiewicz, 2011). However, this literature does not examine the effects of more frequent and 
gradual short-term institutional change on entrepreneurship. Short-term (year-on-year) variations 
in entrepreneurship do transpire; and understanding whether this variation is also affected by short-
term institutional change is of importance theoretically and practically. Small changes can 
accumulate to significant increases. Therefore, understanding gradual short-term institutional 
change may help us to understand how some nations (but not others) build entrepreneurship over 
time.  Understanding such changes can also provide valuable insights for policy makers interested 
in supporting entrepreneurship or in wanting to see the benefits of that support during their period 
of office. 
 This chapter, therefore, aims to investigate the impact of short-term change over time in 
the quality of political institutions on entrepreneurial activity. I seek to answer: how does short-
term change over time, influence entrepreneurial activity.  
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The approach of this chapter builds on the work of Douglass North (North, 1990; 1994; 
1997)  on institutions. Institutional theory explains how different groups and organizations enhance 
and secure their legitimacy by complying with the rules, regulations, norms, and values of the 
institutional environment (Bruton et al., 2010). To define political institutions, I first provide a 
definition of institutions as a concept and then apply the political angle to this definition. Douglass 
North defines institutions as the “rules of the game in a society or, more formally, as the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990). These rules are usually derived 
from institutions such as government agencies, regulation agencies, courts, rule of law, and societal 
or culturally embedded norms (Bruton et al., 2010). Political institutions could thus be defined as 
a system of politics and government, and the sets of rules, regulations, and norms that organize 
political activity. They explain aspects of political activity such as political legitimacy, political 
freedoms, stability and differences between government systems (democracies, autocracies). In 
doing so, these institutions also establish and regulate access to economic opportunities, 
entrepreneurial rents and rule of law (Autio and Fu, 2015).  
The following section looks at economic institutions. Economic institutions influence on 
entrepreneurship has been investigated in abundance in comparative entrepreneurship literature. 
Strong economic institutions such as those that enhance protection of property rights through rule 
of law are argued to assist entrepreneurs in accessing resources required to start business ventures 
such as finance and capital (De Soto, 2000, Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2011b, Estrin and Mickiewicz, 
2011a). However, the impact of political institutions (e.g. political freedom, democracy, political 
stability, and political legitimacy) on entrepreneurship development remains under-researched, 
even though much institutional research has revealed that political institutions can have powerful 
influences on economic activity, also via shaping economic institutions (North, 1990, North, 1994, 
Acemoglu et al., 2012, Weingast, 1995). Strong political institutions that support a fair judicial 
system where contracts are enforced and regulated can provide security of property rights. This 
minimizes the government’s ability to engage in corrupt activities, thus encouraging potential 
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entrepreneurs to start business ventures. According to (Wittman, 1995), political institutions act as 
the tools that alleviate “political market failures”, by reducing transaction costs in the political 
process and reducing political opportunism that fails to create an inclusive society and a broad base 
for entrepreneurship (see also: Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Therefore, examining the influence 
of political institutions on entrepreneurship merits detailed investigation.  
Evidence suggests that characteristics of political institutions such as political stability 
and type of regime (democracy or autocracy) are important in recognizing whether countries have 
well-defined and enforced property rights or weak protection of these rights (Aron, 2000). As 
defined earlier in chapter 1 of this thesis, political institutions are those institutional structures that 
establish and standardize access to economic opportunities, entrepreneurial rents and rule of law 
(Autio and Fu, 2015). The stability and quality of these political institutional environment provides 
for a positive and conducive environment for entrepreneurs to thrive (review chapter 1 for 
characteristics of the quality of political institutions and a discussion of the constructs used 
throughout this thesis).   
Long term historical changes in institutions provide this research with a historical lens that 
contributes to the analytical framework that allows us to understand economic changes. Although 
globalization and internationalization are important facets of economic change and growth, the 
influence of the ‘national education system, industrial relations, technical and scientific institutions, 
government policies, cultural traditions and many other national institutions is fundamental.’ 
(Freeman, 1995). These institutions typically encounter some change over time. Change over time 
in some political institutions has been examined in recent transition economies literature. For 
instance, the dominant institutional change that took place in transition (post-Soviet) economies, 
has focused on the transformation from centrally planned to more open, competitive markets 
economies (Aidis et al., 2008, Bruno et al., 2008, Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2011a, Smallbone and 
Welter, 2001). Additionally, there is a discussion in the literature about the process of institutional 
change (e.g. North, 1990, Williamson, 2000) where it is argued that change can be relatively slow, 
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whilst dramatic changes like the collapse of communism and transformation to open and free 
market institutions are rare.  
Therefore, scholarly work in the field has ignored short term change because it is has been 
thought that short term institutional change does not happen very often. Koellinger and Roy Thurik 
(2012) find that fluctuations in entrepreneurship are not always explained by GDP, suggesting that 
there other factors besides the global business climate that influence trends in entrepreneurship. 
The authors also argue that fluctuations in the global market prices, geopolitical changes (change 
in national policies and conditions) and technological advances which can happen incrementally 
can impact entrepreneurship development over time. A growing body of research argue that 
political institutional change need not only happen through episodes of “institutional upheaval” or 
moment of abrupt and large transformation, but that there is short term and gradual change that 
accumulates over time into significant institutional transformation (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009). 
They propose a unique theoretical lens about gradual and short term institutional change by linking 
institutional stability and change. The authors also argue that institutional stability is a function of 
active, ongoing political mobilization and that institutions are not only changing in times of crisis 
but on a more short term and continuous basis.  
Unlike in the traditional literature where many scholars attribute radical change in 
institutions to exogenous shocks, political institutions like constitutions and property rights laws 
do also evolve and shift in more subtle ways over time especially through endogenous 
developments. Consequently, I use this a starting point of analysis of this chapter and aim to 
understand the impact of these short term and gradual institutional changes on entrepreneurship. 
However, the literature on institutional change has yet to consider how often changes particularly 
in political institutions take place and how short-term change occurring over a long period impacts 
entrepreneurship.  
The lack of detailed data on countries’ political institutional characteristics over time has 
been a major obstacle in examining their influence on entrepreneurship (Beck et al., 2001). 
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Consequently, only a few research papers have explored the impact of political institutions on 
entrepreneurship in a cross-country setting including the paper by Autio & Fu (2015), which 
examines one form of entrepreneurship: informal entrepreneurship. However, in countries where 
good political institutions thrive and support economic freedom by providing secure property rights, 
fair judicial systems and constraints on the government’s ability to acquire wealth through political 
opportunism via arbitrary taxation and weak regulation, productive entrepreneurship is more likely 
to thrive (Sobel et al., 2007). It is, therefore, crucial to understand the impact of these political 
institutions on entrepreneurship development. Thus, I posit that positive change in political 
institutions over time has an important positive impact on entrepreneurial activity.  
The contribution in this chapter is therefore twofold. First, it produces empirical evidence 
that complements the existing literature on economic institutions impact on entrepreneurial activity 
(Hopp and Stephan, 2012, Stephan and Uhlaner, 2010, Hessels et al., 2008, Thornton et al., 2011, 
Aidis et al., 2008, Aidis et al., 2009, Estrin et al., 2012, Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2011a, Estrin et al., 
2013), with emphasis on political institutions. I conclude that change over time in formal political 
institutional plays an essential role in understanding how entrepreneurship decisions take place. 
Second, I argue that entrepreneurship activity is influenced by more than one dimension of the 
formal political institutional environment such as democratization, political freedom, 
regulation/stability of property rights through executive constraints, political rights, freedom from 
corruption, political stability and political legitimacy. Thus, I propose new generalizable proxies 
for political institutional strengths.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: the next section introduces the conceptual 
framework and development of the hypotheses. The following section is the methodology, data, 
and model specification section, followed by the key empirical findings. Finally, discussion and 
conclusions are provided in the last section. 
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2.2 Conceptual Framework/theoretical background and hypotheses 
2.2.1 Entrepreneurship and institutions 
In the following section, I briefly refer to the definition of entrepreneurship used in this 
chapter. Entrepreneurship can be defined and classified using two distinctive categories. The 
occupational category of entrepreneurship emphasizes the choice of starting a business venture as 
an occupation type. This defines entrepreneurs as individuals that work for their own accord 
(Gartner, 1985, Gartner, 1988, Gartner, 1990). In contrast, the behavioural category defines 
entrepreneurship as ‘the perceptions and creation of economic opportunities by an individual’ 
(Wennekers and Thurik, 1999). Several other authors define entrepreneurship as part of a taxonomy 
of functions and behaviours of the entrepreneur. Some economists define entrepreneurship as a 
medium of reaching market equilibrium through entrepreneurial activities (Wennekers and Thurik, 
1999, Marshall and Guillebaud, 1961, Schultz, 1980, Kirzner, 1978). Schumpeterian economists 
stress the entrepreneur as a source of creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1951, Wennekers and 
Thurik, 1999). Consistent with this, the Austrian school of thought emphasizes the abilities of the 
entrepreneur to perceive opportunities following an exogenous shock (Wennekers and Thurik, 
1999, Jacobson, 1992). Fundamentally, entrepreneurship is associated with the behavioural traits 
of an individual in which said individual uses entrepreneurial skills and abilities to take advantage 
of an opportunity and create a business venture as a result (Hébert and Link, 1988).   
Furthermore, economic growth literature has examined the importance of entrepreneurship 
to economic growth with evidence indicating that recently economic activity has shifted from large 
firms to smaller entrepreneurial firms (Wennekers and Thurik, 1999, Wennekers et al., 1997, 
Wennekers et al., 2002, Baumol, 1993). Therefore, entrepreneurship is considered an essential 
economic activity for economic growth and development through its ability to generate 
employment, promote innovation, and create wealth (Acs et al., 2008, Baumol, 2002a). 
A plethora of scholarship about entrepreneurship has found that entrepreneurship rates vary 
greatly across countries and much of this variation is not only credited to economic country 
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differences alone (Autio et al., 2013, Autio and Fu, 2015, Baumol, 1996, Baumol, 1993) but also 
to change and differences in formal institutions. Therefore, progressively, more research on 
entrepreneurship is conducted using institutional theories to better examine macro level cross-
country differences (Autio and Fu, 2015, Aidis et al., 2008, Estrin et al., 2012). In consequence, 
recent research efforts examine the impact of a country’s formal regulatory framework (formal 
institutions) on economic behaviours and activity (Djankov et al., 2002, Acemoglu et al., 2005, 
Acemoglu et al., 2012, Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2009, Autio and Fu, 2015).  
However, current research efforts using institutional theories have yet to investigate the 
effects of formal political institutional change at country level as characterized by several 
dimensions of political activity such as political freedom, regulation/stability of property rights 
through executive constraints, political rights, freedom from corruption, political stability, political 
legitimacy, and political regime i.e. democracy versus autocracy, on the economic behaviour of 
entrepreneurial entry.  
The works of Douglass North (North, 1990; 1994; 1997) and William Baumol (Baumol, 
1968; 1993; 1996; 2002b) on institutions and entrepreneurship provide the theoretical 
underpinnings of this chapter. They suggest that entrepreneurship behaviour (intention, motivation, 
and decisions to create a new business) is influenced by the institutional environment. Institutional 
theory describes how individuals and organizations assure their positions and legitimacy by 
following the rules and norms of the institutional environment (Turró et al., 2014). Scholars have 
argued that the institutional environment does not only determine individual decisions to become 
an entrepreneur but it also determines the characteristics of new business ventures and the ensuing 
impact they have on economic development and growth (Minniti and Lévesque, 2008, Fuentelsaz 
et al., 2015).  
According to (North, 1990; 1994; 1997), institutions constitute the structures which provide 
rules, constraints and incentives that operate as tools of governance for exchanges between 
individuals (economic, social or political). More specifically, North defines institutions as the 
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‘rules of the game in a society, or more formally, the constraints that shape human interaction’ 
(North, 1990).   
Formal institutions are the formal written rules and regulations such as property rights, rule 
of law and the legal and organizational framework in a society (Smallbone and Welter, 2012, North, 
1990, North, 1997). Informal institutions, on the other hand, are the culture, values or social norms 
of a society. North suggests that formal and informal institutions interact together whereby some 
of the formal written rules and regulations are more effective when reliant on the cultural values 
and norms of the society (informal institutions). Therefore, informal institutions limit the impact 
of formal institutions but can also be constrained by formal institutions (North, 2006, Aparicio et 
al., 2016).  
Next, I identify several institutional elements that are important to the study of 
entrepreneurship.  
Efficient government procedures may “guarantee that the mechanisms of the market work 
efficiently by eliminating market failures and possible administrative rigidities” (Fuentelsaz et al., 
2015, pg. 248), pointing to several dimensions such as property rights, rule of law, and finally 
freedom from corruption seen as an outcome of formal order. 
 Williamson (2000) pinpoints the importance of property rights and argues that the ‘rules of 
the game’ correspond to property rights. Property rights have been identified as key to effective 
economic transactions and it is a principal formal institution. The important point, however, is that 
it is anchored in political institutions, effective enforcement of rule of law, in particular, 
consequently counteracting “potential expropriations that entrepreneurs may suffer” (Fuentelsaz et 
al., 2015, Baumol, 1993). Property rights and freedom from corruption are further discussed later 
in this chapter.      
Employing institutional theory has been well established in researching entrepreneurship 
(Bruton et al., 2010, Aidis et al., 2008, Turró et al., 2014, Smallbone and Welter, 2012, Ács et al., 
2014, Ács et al., 2011) for some time now and applying institutional theory to entrepreneurship has 
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proven to be sufficiently helpful in explaining actual outcomes of entrepreneurship (Turró et al., 
2014, Johnson et al., 1997, Aidis et al., 2008, Aidis et al., 2009, Estrin et al., 2012) . Despite this, 
the impact of specific outcomes of institutional change such as political regime change and 
weakness of formal political institutions arising from the too frequent institutional change over a 
period of time, on entrepreneurial activity, have fared limited attention in the literature. And thus, 
far, not enough investigation into this impact has taken place.  
To explore political institutions, I briefly introduce the impact of economic institutions on 
entrepreneurship. Consistent with (Aidis et al., 2008, Davidsson and Henrekson, 2002, Acemoglu 
and Johnson, 2003, Acemoglu et al., 2005), entrepreneurship activity is influenced by economic 
institutions such as legal structures that govern business entry (Djankov et al., 2002), and security 
of property rights (Autio and Acs, 2010, Estrin et al., 2013). Entrepreneurship studies explored the 
influence of a country’s regulations on the prevalence of entrepreneurial activity (Levie and Autio, 
2011).  This is because it has been argued that entrepreneurial behaviour and choice are regulated 
by a country’s institutional framework (Autio and Fu, 2015, Estrin et al., 2012, Bowen and De 
Clercq, 2008).  
Compelling evidence suggests that economic institutional qualities of a country such as 
economic freedom, fair regulatory institutions, and prevalence of economic policies that encourage 
business entrance, play an important role in enabling economic growth (Glaeser et al., 2004, 
Acemoglu et al., 2000, Henisz, 2000).  
In turn, a country’s political institutional framework represents the laws and regulations 
that govern and regulate the sustainability of different economic activities such as entrepreneurship. 
Many scholars have argued that political institutions can have an influential impact on the operation 
of the economic structures and societal wealth creation in countries (Acemoglu et al., 2012, 
Weingast, 1995, Autio and Fu, 2015). Political institutions could thus be defined as a system of 
politics and government, and the sets of rules and norms that organize political activity. These 
institutions describe the degree to which these rules and norms shape political institutions such as 
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political legitimacy, political freedoms, stability and the basic differences between types of 
governments (democracies, autocracies).  
Acemoglu et al. (2012) argue that weak and non-inclusive political institutions (institutions 
that only consider the welfares of special interest groups such as the elites) can encourage inequality 
and increase poverty which in turn inhibits economic growth, impacting entrepreneurship 
negatively. Poorly functioning political institutions can decrease productivity and innovation in the 
economy thus hindering economic growth and entrepreneurial development (Bruton et al., 2010, 
Bruton et al., 2013).  
On the other hand, (Weingast, 1995) argues that political systems that protect political 
freedoms also encourage citizens’ participation in economic behaviour as they help to develop wide 
skills of self-organisation, initiative and voluntary cooperation; an idea that can be traced back to 
De Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, (De Tocqueville, 2003). In countries where political 
institutions develop fair judicial systems and constrain the government’s ability to acquire wealth 
through political opportunism via arbitrary taxation and weak regulation, productive 
entrepreneurship is more likely to thrive (Sobel et al., 2007).  
Therefore, in this chapter, I focus on the impact of the outcomes of short-term political 
institutional and regime change over time on entrepreneurship activity and ask: How do short-term 
political institutional change and regime change through democratization influence 
entrepreneurship activity in a mixed range of developing, developed and emerging countries? I aim 
to answer this question by utilizing (Gnyawali and Fogel, 1994) framework which identifies a 
number of environmental dimensions key to entrepreneurship development and recognise the 
impact of several formal political institutions pertinent to entrepreneurship: political freedom, 
regulation/stability of property rights through executive constraints, political rights, political 
stability, political legitimacy and freedom from corruption which is recognized as an outcome of 
good political institutions.  
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The theoretical model (figure 2.1 below) considers entrepreneurship to be influenced by 
the formal political institutional framework at the macro level and the prevailing personal 
characteristics for which I control for at the micro level. Recent research has investigated the impact 
of individual level psychological and social characteristics relevant to entrepreneurship (Arenius 
and Minniti, 2005, Hayton et al., 2013, Aidis et al., 2008, Hopp and Stephan, 2012). These can be 
divided into personal characteristics including lack of fear of failure (Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979), 
self-efficacy (Baron, 2000), financial resources (being a business angel in the past), and social 
capital which includes social connections (Aldrich, 1999, Baron, 2000, Arenius and Minniti, 2005, 
Minniti, 2004). Thus, I address the gap in the literature by examining the influence of change in 
formal political institutions over time, controlling for the influence of prevailing personal 
characteristics of fear of failure and self-efficacy on entrepreneurship activity. 
Figure 2.1 Main theoretical model: Political institutions, change, and entrepreneurial activity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Political Institutional Indicators and direction of their impact on entrepreneurial activity. 
2.2.2 Main effects of political change on entrepreneurship activity 
Although changes to political, economic and social institutions can positively impact 
entrepreneurship by improving the business environment and expanding business opportunities, 
there is also a counterweighting increasing element of uncertainty which may lead to negative 
effects on the economy (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, Collier, 2007). Unstable political institutional 
environments provoke hostile conditions for entrepreneurs to operate under. Potential 
entrepreneurs living in countries where either political institutions are unstable or suffer from weak 
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formal enforcement of rights, i.e. weak rule of law and lack of freedoms, are less likely to 
endeavour into starting a business venture (Aidis et al., 2008).  
Challenges to entrepreneurs can occur because of the lack of credible legal frameworks, 
lack of stable political structures and lack of political and expression freedoms deterring potential 
entrepreneurs from starting businesses. At the same time, when these dimensions change for better, 
the change itself may lead to instability and the outcomes of entrepreneurship in an unstable 
environment are highly uncertain (Tracey and Phillips, 2011).  
Freedom House (FH) indicators such as the freedom status index can be used to identify 
weakness in formal political institutions because it surveys important indicators of freedom that 
are associated with free and strong political institutions. Political rights and civil liberties are two 
sets of indices that FH investigates. Indicators of freedoms that may influence entrepreneurial entry 
such as political pluralism and participation, rule of law, personal autonomy and individual rights 
are aggregated over time. Thus, to examine the impact of short-term change in these political 
institutions over time on entrepreneurial activity I use Freedom House indicators of ‘political rights 
and civil liberties’ as proxies to test H1a below.   
Another important challenge that faces entrepreneurs in weak political institutional 
environments is the weak protection of property rights. Scholars like Acemoglu and Johnson in 
(Acemoglu et al., 2005) emphasise that security of property rights is in fact shaped by political 
institutions, i.e. effective constraints on arbitrary action by the executive branch of the government, 
which decreases the risk of expropriation without due compensation (Acemoglu et al., 2005, 
Acemoglu and Johnson, 2003). This may also hamper access to capital and finance through 
constraining the development of strong financial institutions (De Soto, 2000, Estrin and 
Mickiewicz, 2011b), as liquid assets are most easy to be expropriated. To test the quality of 
protection of property rights institutions, I follow Estrin et al. (2012) model and use the Polity IV 
indicator of efficient constraints on the arbitrary power of the executive branch of the government 
also called “constraints on executive” to test H1b below.  
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Political institutions affect how economic activities are regulated. In that regard, the degree 
of political democracy versus autocracy is expected to enhance entrepreneurial activity in a country 
(Laplume et al., 2014). Democratic political processes in contrast to autocratic political processes 
allow for a representative political agenda where property rights are universally protected and 
abuse of power is repressed creating a better environment for entrepreneurship (Autio and Fu, 
2015). Thus, democratic countries inspire potential entrepreneurs to start business ventures and 
participate in an economic activity (Autio and Fu, 2015). To test the impact of democratic 
institutions on entrepreneurship, I use Polity data from the Polity IV database project. Polity IV 
project defines polity as the degree of political democracy versus the degree of political autocracy 
at country level (Marshall and Cole, 2008, Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). Using democracy and 
autocracy scores I am able to test the impact of the change in political regime over time on 
entrepreneurship activity in H1c stated below. 
H1a: Countries characterized by increasingly politically free environments are likely to 
experience positive change in entrepreneurial activity rates.    
H1b: Countries characterised by increasing constraints on the executive are likely to 
experience positive change in entrepreneurial activity rates.  
H1c: Countries which develop more democratic institutions over time are likely to 
experience positive change in entrepreneurial activity rates.  
H1d: Countries with increased political stability over time are likely to experience positive 
change in entrepreneurial activity rates.  
2.2.3 Effects of freedom from corruption on entrepreneurship 
An important political institutional weakness outcome indicator is corruption; this outcome 
inflicts uncertainty and insecurity into economic activities and relations. Thus, an index of freedom 
from corruption may be utilised to evaluate the influence of corruption on economic activity, based 
on the measures of the perceived level of public sector corruption in a multitude of countries 
derived from expert and business surveys (Aidis et al., 2012). A corrupt environment is one 
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characterised by government/country officials who accrue private benefits at the cost of private 
businesses and entrepreneurs (Estrin et al., 2012). Corruption is a reflection of an “over regulated 
environment with officials endowed with discretionary power” (Aidis et al., 2008). More generally, 
corruption results from inefficient institutions (Aparicio et al., 2016, Klapper et al., 2006). 
Consequently, high prevalence of corruption may reduce entrepreneurial entry and activity in an 
economy and may have serious negative consequences on development of entrepreneurship  (Aidis 
et al., 2008, Akimova, 2002). (Aidis et al., 2008) investigated the impact of control of corruption 
on entrepreneurial development and found that higher control of corruption presented better 
opportunities for potential entrepreneurs. 
Another important but unexplored political institutional indicator that impacts 
entrepreneurship activity is political legitimacy. Political legitimacy can be defined as the people’s 
recognition and acceptance of the validity of the rules, laws, and regulations of their political 
system (Lipset, 1959). With strong political legitimacy, political systems will be more resilient in 
periods of crisis and instability. Additionally, political instability and the likelihood of violent 
threats to the government in power decreases with strong legitimacy thus promoting political 
stability. Citizens recognize equal political rights as well as democratic legitimacy where they have 
a say in electing authority. Given this, political legitimacy and stability encourage potential and 
current entrepreneurs to establish businesses ventures in a politically salient environment: where 
the political system is seen as legitimate and stable and where it is less likely that rights will be 
endangered by private action. As a result, the following is hypothesized: 
H2: Countries which exhibit a decrease in corruption over time are likely to experience 
positive change in entrepreneurial activity rates. 
H3: Countries with increased political legitimacy over time are likely to experience 
positive change in entrepreneurial activity rates. 
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2.3 DATA AND METHODS 
2.3.1 Datasets 
I combined Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), World Bank, Polity IV, Freedom 
House, Heritage Foundation and Quality of Government datasets to test the hypotheses. I drew the 
sample from all countries surveyed in GEM data resulting in a sample of 77 countries that have 
participated at least once in the GEM survey. Therefore, an unbalanced cross-country panel data 
for the period 2001 – 2014 with a maximum of 481 observations based on TEA (Total 
Entrepreneurial Activity) rates is utilized.  
GEM uses harmonized cluster sampling of at least 2000 individuals per country to identify 
new entrepreneurs. It measures different aspects of entrepreneurship including types of 
entrepreneurs, entrepreneurial intentions and other characteristics of entrepreneurial activity 
(Bosma et al., 2012). The data from GEM captures both formal and informal entrepreneurs, 
including self-employment, thus response bias is reduced. Accordingly, GEM database provides 
an internationally comparable data set that has been commonly accepted as a source of data to use 
for entrepreneurship research (Freytag and Thurik, 2010, Bowen and De Clercq, 2008); among 
others. The sampling procedure is reviewed by (Reynolds et al., 2005). 
As noted earlier, this chapter explores how institutional political change can impact 
entrepreneurial entry. Following the work of (Aparicio et al., 2016), I use natural logarithm in both 
dependent and independent variables to allow for a direct interpretation of their coefficients in 
terms of percentage change of the independent on the change in the dependent variables, for which 
a logarithmic difference is a good approximation (Wooldridge, 2010). Table 5 in the appendix 
presents a list of the variables used in this study, including a brief description and their sources. 
2.3.2 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable used is the change in the individual Total Entrepreneurial Activity 
rate (TEA), an important indicator from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) database. It 
defines entrepreneurs as the percentage of adult individuals in a sample between the age 18-64 
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involved in either starting their own business or in managing their new business that is less than 42 
months old. As I seek to investigate how short-term change over time impacts entrepreneurs, I 
calculate the TEA rate as the lagged difference (lagged by one year) or change between the years 
2001 to 2014 (14-year period). Thus the dependent variable is change in a country’s 
entrepreneurship rates over time. Additionally, the study employs an unbalanced panel data design 
as data is not available for consecutive years for the years and countries tested.  
2.3.3 Independent variables  
Formal political institutional factors can be examined using several measures. To ensure 
validity and reliability, I use several measures of political institutional change. It is important to 
note that I calculate the lagged difference/change between the years for all the independent 
variables (similar to the dependent variable above) as I am interested in identifying the impact of 
change over time in these variables. These variables are: political freedom from the Freedom House 
database (House, 2014a, House, 2014b); regime characteristics from Polity IV database (Marshall 
and Jaggers, 2002); levels of executive constraints (Marshall and Cole, 2008, Aidis et al., 2008, 
Estrin et al., 2012, Acemoglu and Johnson, 2003) from the same source; political legitimacy 
(Marshall and Cole, 2011) from Polity IV database; freedom from corruption (Miller, 2015) from 
Heritage Foundation, and political stability from the Quality of Government (QoG) project. I also 
use two variables from the QoG project as robustness measures: control of corruption and voice 
and accountability (Charron et al., 2010); these are explained further below in the Robustness 
Checks section.  
Political institutions can influence entrepreneurship in several ways; however, in this thesis, 
I look at approaches I believe to have an all-encompassing influence on political activity in a 
country and ensuing entrepreneurship.  
One way that a political system can be characterized is being defined as closer to a 
democracy and/or an autocracy (Marshall et al., 2010, Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). Democracy is 
operationalised as a three interdependent elements measure. The first element is the presence of 
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strong institutions and procedures whereby citizens are able to express their preferences about 
alternative policies and leaders. Secondly, the presence of institutionalized constraints on the 
exercise of power by the executive branch of a government, or in other words, the limitations 
imposed by law to provide checks and balances between decision makers in a government. Finally, 
the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in political participation 
(Marshall et al., 2010, Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). Having a democratic system ensures a political 
system composed of a parliamentary system where executives (president, prime minister, etc.) are 
elected directly or by an electoral college.  
Autocracy on the other hand is operationalised in terms of the presence of distinct 
political characteristics. The first characteristic of an autocracy is where competitive political 
participation is suppressed or restricted. Secondly, chief executives are chosen in a standardised 
process of selection within a political elite and once in office they exercise power with few 
institutional constraints. And finally, autocracies are characterized by a high degree of control over 
social and economic activity (Marshall et al., 2010, Marshall and Jaggers, 2002).  
Another important concept in political institutions is political freedom, which is 
identified by a combination of factors that represent political rights and civil liberties as crucial 
pieces of this construct (House, 2014b). Political rights and civil liberties enable people to 
participate freely in political process, ensuring the right to vote freely for alternatives in legitimate 
elections as well as the freedom of expression without the interference from the state (House, 
2014b). Therefore, increases in political rights and civil liberties is typically synonymous with 
democracy rather than an autocracy. More so, democratic institutions in contrast to autocratic ones 
allow for a representative political agenda where property rights are universally protected and 
abuse of power is repressed, creating a better environment for entrepreneurship (Autio and Fu, 
2015).  In line with the above, political stability is maintained under democracies more so than 
under an autocracy. Likewise, a democratic system may help to reduce the likelihood of a “long-
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term radical political change” and induce political stability, which positively impacts economic 
activity by reducing uncertainty and increasing incentives to invest (Feng, 2001).  
Along with political stability comes political legitimacy. Political legitimacy is defined 
as the people’s recognition and acceptance of the validity of the rules, laws, and regulations of their 
political system (Lipset, 1959). It is likely that in democratic and politically free institutional 
environments, political legitimacy increases as people’s trust in their political system/regime 
increases. Consequently, these political systems are more efficient and incur fewer transaction costs, 
thereby encouraging citizens’ participation in economic activity. Additionally, effective constraints 
on arbitrary action by the executive branch of the government, decreases the risk of expropriation 
without due compensation, thus securing the property rights of economic agents (Acemoglu et al., 
2005, Acemoglu and Johnson, 2003). Strong property rights ensures appropriate access to finance 
through encouragement of the development of strong financial institutions (De Soto, 2000, Estrin 
and Mickiewicz, 2011b), which decreases expropriation of liquid assets by the government. For 
strong property rights protection to take place, institutions need to be democratic and politically 
free to allow for a representative political agenda as well as appropriate checks and balances on 
executives. This is especially important if the inherited political institutional framework isolates 
the government from democratic and politically free processes, so that government misuse of 
power is inhibited.  In essence, a well-designed political system that integrates the elements 
discussed is more likely to protect property and political freedoms, and in doing so encouraging 
participation of individuals in economic and political life (Autio and Fu, 2015).  
Strong and well-designed political institutions also encourage less economic and 
political corruption. Corruption is usually defined as the abuse of public power and authority for 
the private benefit of government agents (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009). It has the ability to be 
present in many layers of institutional arrangements from the legal and judicial down to the lower 
layers of administration, in any one country (McMullen et al., 2008). The levels of corruption in 
different countries can also be correlated with levels of economic freedom, i.e. higher levels of 
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freedom from corruption correlate to higher economic freedom and vis versa (Charron et al., 2010). 
This relationship implies that the higher the freedom from corruption in a country, the better the 
control of corruption. Different perceptions of corruption are conventionally defined as the exercise 
of public power for private gain but can have different aspects of corruption incorporated in the 
construct ranging from additional payments/bribery which affects the economic environment 
directly to also measuring “grand corruption” or political corruption (Charron et al., 2010).  
For H1, I explain the construction of the relevant variables in this section. The Polity2 
indicators from Polity IV database measure a country’s regime characteristics over time by means 
of defining democratic versus autocratic regimes (for further details please see: Marshall and Cole, 
2008; Marshall and Cole 2011, Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). These are constructed as two indices, 
scoring from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). The democracy index is an 
additive 11-point scale from 0-10 with 10 being most democratic. The autocracy index follows the 
same 11-point scale with 10 being most autocratic.  
Levels of executive constraints are measured using a variable that refers to the “extent of 
institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers” of the executive branch of the 
government (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). Higher levels of constraints are thus accountable for by 
the power of a strong and independent judiciary system; therefore, stronger protection of property 
rights. 
Freedom House uses Political Rights and Civil Liberties indices to score countries based 
on the level of political and economic freedom. The political rights index scaled from 1-7 with 1 
being the best political rights (most free) and 7 being the worst political rights (least free). The civil 
liberties index is constructed in a similar fashion (House, 2014a).  
Political stability is measured using the World Governance Indicators index found in the 
QoG database (Charron et al., 2010). The index is scored between -2.5 and 2.5, with the higher 
scores corresponding to better outcomes, thus a 2.2 score means more political stability in relation 
to a -1.5 score.  
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H2 and H3 are estimated using freedom from corruption and political legitimacy 
respectively. Using an indicator from Heritage Foundation I measure freedom from corruption 
using a 0-100 scale in which a score of 100 indicates very little corruption and a score of 0 indicates 
a very corrupt government (Charron et al., 2010). Political legitimacy is scored from 0 to 3 with 0 
being most politically legitimate to 3 least politically legitimate (for further details on the 
construction of the variable see Marshall and Cole, 2011). 
2.3.4 Control variables 
Embarking on entrepreneurship requires the utilization and mobilization of multiple 
resources (De Clercq et al., 2013, Shane and Venkataraman, 2000, Gartner, 1985). These resources 
relate to the financial, human and social capital (Arenius and Minniti, 2005, Davidsson and Honig, 
2003). With entrepreneurs facing various challenges when embarking in entrepreneurship, 
particularly in weaker formal institutional frameworks, access to these resources becomes essential 
to their efforts. 
An important characteristic considered in this chapter is self-efficacy or confidence in one’s 
skills and abilities to start a business venture. It is relevant to business start-up decisions (Aparicio 
et al., 2016, Estrin et al., 2012, Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2012). Individuals who believe in their own 
abilities and skills are less prone to perceiving higher levels of uncertainty and instability and have 
more confidence to start a business venture (Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2012, Aparicio et al., 2016). 
Baron (2000) suggests that the decision to start a business is highly dependent on the intentionality 
and locus of control experienced, and by high perceptions of self-efficacy leading to more 
entrepreneurship.  
A second important characteristic is fear of failure (Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979, Arenius 
and Minniti, 2005). Fear of failure is viewed by Arenius and Minniti (2005) as the perceived risk 
of experiencing failure and its consequences when engaging in entrepreneurship. It can be argued 
then, that fear of failure is context specific and thus displays a reflection of the impact of 
institutional change (political, social and economic). It has also been discussed that fear of failure 
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plays an important in individual’s occupational and achievement aspirations including decisions to 
start a business venture (Welpe et al., 2012, Burnstein, 1963).  
Consequently, I control for change in these prevailing personal characteristics in the 
analysis to account for possible confounding effects of aggregate personal characteristics which 
could be seen to reflect the supply-side ‘entrepreneurial potential’ of a country (Stephan and 
Uhlaner, 2010).    
With regards to the self-efficacy indicator, it was found in GEM and it measures the 
percentage of individuals between age 18-64 who indicated that they have confidence in their skills 
and capabilities to start a business venture (Gartner, 1985, Arenius and Minniti, 2005, Baron, 2000). 
Fear of failure is viewed as the perceived risk of experiencing failure and its consequences when 
engaging in entrepreneurship (Arenius and Minniti, 2005). Like self-efficacy, it is measured as the 
percentage of individuals who indicated that fear of failure would deter them from starting a 
business venture or embarking on entrepreneurial activity.  
High growth aspiring entrepreneurship is another control variable I use in my analysis 
estimations. It is correlated with subsequent growth and expansion of firms and further economic 
development (unobserved directly from GEM data) (Efendic et al., 2014, Autio and Acs, 2010, 
Bowen and De Clercq, 2008). As a proxy for high growth, I use GEM data TEA High Growth 
indicator which measures the percentage of individuals who expected to hire more than 20 
employees in their businesses five years into the future. Similar to the dependent and independent 
variables above, the control variables are also measured using one year lagged difference/change 
overtime.  
2.3.5 Robustness checks 
To investigate and ensure robustness of the findings I utilize two proxy variables for the 
variables of freedom from corruption and political legitimacy. These are control of corruption and 
voice and accountability respectively. As a result, I report two models where freedom from 
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corruption and political legitimacy are replaced with control of corruption and voice and 
accountability.  
First, I replace freedom from corruption with an indicator named control of corruption 
obtained from the QoG data set (Charron et al., 2010). Control of corruption measures perceptions 
about corruption ranging from the effects of corruption on the business environment to measuring 
“grand corruption” in the political dynamic in a country. It is measured using a scoring mechanism 
where scores range between -2.5 (worst outcomes) to 2.5 (best outcomes, hence, least corruption) 
(Charron et al., 2010).  
Second, I replace political legitimacy with an indicator of voice and accountability. Voice 
and accountability combine several indicators measuring several aspects of political legitimacy and 
freedom including political rights and civil liberties. Similar to the control of corruption, voice and 
accountability is measured using a scoring system ranging between -2.5 (worst outcomes) to 2.5 
(best outcomes) (Charron et al., 2010). 
2.3.6 Estimation strategy 
I use panel data modeling techniques to address the research problem within a context of 
cross-country and time-series data. Panel data modeling accounts for country-level heterogeneity 
as it allows me to study the change in political institutions over time across countries and examine 
how this change impacts differences in TEA rates. I use fixed effects models, which are more 
robust than random effects. By using fixed effects models I can analyse the impact of the 
independent variables as they vary over time (Bartels, 2008) on the dependent variable. Table 5 (in 
the appendix), 2 and 3 present the variables used in the analysis, descriptive statistics and 
correlations respectively. I test the effects of the political institutional short-term change over time 
in H1a to H1d by exploring how entrepreneurial activity, proxied by TEA rates, vary across 
countries when political change expressed using (political freedom, executive constraints, political 
stability and regime status) takes place. Additionally, I control for the prevalence of personal 
characteristics of entrepreneurs using self-efficacy and fear of failure variables, and quality of 
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entrepreneurial activity using the high growth aspirations variable. All estimation results are 
illustrated in Table 3. 
First, I report the estimates of 4 models in which I regress change over time in TEA rates 
against several country level institutional variables controlling for individuals’ personal 
characteristics. Models 1-3 test the impact of change over time in regime status, in other words, the 
Polity2 indicator (of democracy and autocracy deconstructed), on the change in TEA rates. I 
perform an additional test to estimate the elements of decompositions of the polity2 indicator, 
democracy, and autocracy, on the change in TEA rates over time in the sample (review Table 6 in 
the appendix). In model 4 I test the impact of change over time in political rights (political freedom) 
on the change in TEA rates. While in model 5 I test the impact of effective protection of property 
rights using the indicator of the level of executive constraints in a country over time on the change 
in TEA rates. Finally, model 6 estimates the impact of the change in political stability in a country 
over time on the change in TEA rates.     
The second set of hypotheses postulates that entrepreneurship activity is likely to be 
positively impacted by a decrease in corruption and an increase in political legitimacy at country 
level over time, leading to an increase in TEA rates. Change in the freedom from corruption index 
and political legitimacy index over time respectively are used to test their separate impact on 
entrepreneurial activity (Table 4).  
In addition, I report two models were the two factors, political legitimacy and freedom from 
corruption, are replaced with alternative indicators as a robustness check (Table 7 in the appendix). 
Freedom from corruption is replaced by an indicator for control of corruption obtained from the 
QoG data set (Charron et al., 2010). Political legitimacy measure is replaced by an indicator for 
voice and accountability similarly obtained from the QoG data set (Charron et al., 2010). 
All models use logarithmic differences in the independent variables over time to test the 
hypotheses. For instance, in model one, I estimate the difference in 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2𝑖𝑡 overtime and the 
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impact it has on the difference in the dependent variable TEA 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 . The same estimation 
procedure applies for all models:  
Political Change 
Model 1: ∆TEA 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡  = ∆𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2𝑖𝑡  + Fear of 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + ∆Established 𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 
∆Self-𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 + ∆High 𝑎𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡 
Model 2: ∆TEA rate 𝑖𝑡  = ∆Democracy 𝑖𝑡  + ∆Fear of failure 𝑖𝑡  + ∆Established 
business 𝑖𝑡 + ∆Self-efficacy 𝑖𝑡 + ∆High aspirations 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇 𝑖𝑡 
Model 3: ∆TEA rate 𝑖𝑡  = ∆Autocracy 𝑖𝑡  + ∆Fear of failure 𝑖𝑡  + ∆Established 
business 𝑖𝑡 + ∆Self-efficacy 𝑖𝑡 + ∆High aspirations 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇 𝑖𝑡 
Model 4: ∆TEA rate 𝑖𝑡 = ∆Political rights 𝑖𝑡 + ∆Fear of failure 𝑖𝑡 +∆ Established 
business 𝑖𝑡 + ∆Self-efficacy 𝑖𝑡 + ∆High aspirations 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇 𝑖𝑡 
Model 5: ∆TEA rate 𝑖𝑡  = ∆Executive constraints 𝑖𝑡  +∆ Fear of failure 𝑖𝑡  + 
∆Established business 𝑖𝑡 + ∆Self-efficacy 𝑖𝑡 + ∆High aspirations 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇 𝑖𝑡 
Model 6: ∆TEA rate 𝑖𝑡 = ∆Political stability 𝑖𝑡 + ∆Fear of failure 𝑖𝑡 + ∆Established 
business 𝑖𝑡 + ∆Self-efficacy 𝑖𝑡 + ∆High aspirations 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇 𝑖𝑡 
Corruption and Political Legitimacy 
Model 7 ∆TEA rate 𝑖𝑡  = ∆Freedom from corruption 𝑖𝑡  + ∆Fear of failure 𝑖𝑡  + 
∆Established business 𝑖𝑡 + ∆Self-efficacy 𝑖𝑡 + ∆High aspirations 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇 𝑖𝑡 
Model 8: ∆TEA rate 𝑖𝑡 = ∆Political legitimacy 𝑖𝑡 + ∆Fear of failure 𝑖𝑡 + ∆Established 
business 𝑖𝑡 + ∆Self-efficacy 𝑖𝑡 + ∆High aspirations 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇 𝑖𝑡 
where 
𝜇 = country + time + residual 
𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
In these models TEA rate𝑖𝑡 represents the measure of entrepreneurship activity, 
Polity2 𝑖𝑡 , Political rights 𝑖𝑡 , Civil liberties 𝑖𝑡 , Executive constraints 𝑖𝑡 , Freedom from 
corruption𝑖𝑡, Political legitimacy𝑖𝑡, and Political stability𝑖𝑡 represent institutional factors, 
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Fear of failure𝑖𝑡 , Self-efficacy𝑖𝑡 , Established business𝑖𝑡 , High aspirations𝑖𝑡  represents 
controls including personal characteristics, phase of establishment and quality of 
entrepreneurship. 
2.4 RESULTS 
2.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics and correlations between variables are reported in Tables 1, and 
2 below respectively. Table 1 illustrates raw and change scores respectively. Descriptive statistics 
of the variables reveal a few important points. The average TEA rate level across the sample is 
around 10%. It is an indication of how much entrepreneurship activity takes place on average across 
the 77-country sample. However, the average level of change in TEA over time is 0.11%, meaning 
that the TEA rate has increased by 0.11% on average over the 14 year period examined. The 
political rights and civil liberties index level across the sample is 2.6 indicating that political 
freedom across the countries is relatively high since the countries are graded between 1 (most free) 
and 7 (least free) (House, 2014a). This result is further supported by the polity2 index which reveals 
that most countries are relatively more democratic than they are autocratic. However, the level of 
change in political freedom proxied by polity2 is only 0.2% over time meaning that change is 
relatively slow over the 14 year period.  
Compared to the Freedom House score, the average score across the countries is almost 
half at a score of 3.7 indicating that political freedom is generally split between mostly free and 
least free or in other words somewhat free. Surprisingly, freedom from corruption is almost 50% 
across the sample suggesting that only about half the sample revealed little to no corruption while 
the other half displayed relatively high corruption. On the other hand, the level change over time 
in freedom from corruption is 0.09% which similar to political freedom, indicates slow positive 
change into less corrupt environments across the sample over the 14 year period. Compared to the 
full freedom from corruption sample for the years 2001-2014 however, the average score was 37 
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out of 100, which is an indication that more than half of the sample indicated relatively high 
corruption.  
In terms of the control variables, positive perceptions of self-efficacy are reported by 49% 
of the sample countries while 33% of the sample report no fear of failure. High growth aspiring 
businesses represent a quarter of the sample of TEA at around 26% while established businesses 
represent a small 7% of the total sample. In the remainder of this section, I report the results of the 
hypotheses testing.  
2.4.2 Hypotheses testing 
Table 3 reports the fixed effects coefficient estimations for the 6 models corresponding to 
hypothesis 1. I report 6 models to indicate the robustness of the findings. Models 1 to 6 are named 
as in table 3 below: Polity2 (Democ/Autoc), Political rights, Executive constraints, and Political 
stability respectively. Most of the institutional variables show variation over the years, thus, a fixed 
effects model works. All estimations follow a similar procedure. Thus, I sequentially test every 
independent variable including controls separately in the 6 models.  
Model 1 tests political regime status using the polity2 difference score. Results indicate 
that other things being equal, change towards more democratic regimes over time is positively 
significant at the 95% confidence level, thus supporting hypothesis 1a that entrepreneurship 
activity increases in more democratic institutional environments over time. The coefficients reveal 
a positive change in polity2 is associated with a 46% positive improvement in TEA rates over time.     
In models 2 and 3 I estimate the decomposition of the polity2 construct and test change in 
democracy and autocracy respectively over time and their impact on entrepreneurial activity. 
Results for both are consistent with the polity2 indicator estimations in that they are both significant 
and show the hypothesized sign direction. The findings for the democracy model suggest that 
change to more democracy over time is associated with an improvement in TEA rates. The sign in 
the autocracy model is negative but significant indicating that change to more autocracy over time 
in the country samples is associated with a decrease in TEA rates. Therefore, hypothesis 1a is 
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confirmed. Table 6 in the appendix illustrates decomposition models of democracy and autocracy 
separate from the remainder of the models. 
In models 4, 5 and 6 I estimate change over time in the other political institutional factors 
of political freedom (political rights), executive constraints and political stability and find that they 
present the expected signs and are statistically significant. Consequently, hypothesis 1b, 1c, and 1d 
are supported.  
Table 4 illustrates the results corresponding to hypothesis 2, 3 using a different and distinct 
set of political institutional variables which are freedom from corruption (as an outcome of good 
institutions) and political legitimacy (being the social perceptions of individuals in a country about 
the legitimacy of their political environment). The findings are significant and present the expected 
sign for both models suggesting that in the country sample positive change in freedom from 
corruption over time and more positive change in perceptions about political legitimacy are 
associated with an increase in TEA rates. Once again, this pattern is consistent with findings about 
the impact of corruption on entrepreneurship, in particular outcomes such as inefficient and over 
regulated environments where officials are given unrestricted power (Djankov et al., 2006a, Aidis 
et al., 2008). Consequently, my findings support hypotheses 2 and 3. 
Accordingly, the findings allow several conclusions. Entrepreneurship activity increases in 
countries with more political freedom over time proxied by the political rights and civil liberties 
index. Stronger constraints on the executive branch of the government through change over time 
reflects more effective rule of law and is also positively associated with higher rates of 
entrepreneurship activity. This result is consistent with previous literature (Estrin et al., 2012, 
Estrin et al., 2013). Higher political legitimacy over time in the sample is positively associated with 
higher rates of entrepreneurship. More democracy over time is also positively associated with 
higher rates of entrepreneurship. Finally, these results suggest that out of all political institutional 
variables examined, change over time in political legitimacy, political freedom and freedom from 
corruption have the most prominent impact on entrepreneurial activity in the sample.  
60 
 
In terms of controls, the findings about change in self-efficacy and established business are 
significant at the 1% level and present the expected signs in all the models. However, fear of failure 
and high growth aspirations are not significant in any of the models and thus seem to have no 
impact on TEA rates on the basis of the current models or otherwise might not be as influential as 
other controls.  
2.4.3 Robustness checks 
To check for robustness of the results, I estimated alternative specifications that measure 
freedom from corruption and political legitimacy. In this set (see table 7) I estimated two models 
that test the impact of change over time in control of corruption (a proxy for freedom from 
corruption) and voice and accountability (a proxy for political legitimacy) on change in TEA rate. 
The results reveal that both controls of corruption and voice and accountability are significant and 
represent the expected signs suggesting that more control of corruption and more accountability 
over time account for the positive change in TEA rates.  
Finally, table 8 in the appendix estimates all the variables in one model to provide an overview of 
all institutional variables. The results highlight similar patterns to the results in the above 
mentioned models; political stability, freedom from corruption and political legitimacy are all 
significant a present the expected signs. Additionally, the proxies for freedom from corruption 
(control of corruption) and political legitimacy (voice and accountability) both present the expected 
signs and are also significant. However, the measures of political regime (polity2), democracy, 
political rights and executive constraints are all insignificant in this model. This result is not 
surprising as all of these measures are highly correlated and therefore, I did not expect results to be 
statistically significant. To confirm the high correlation, a VIF test as conducted results in a mean 
of 10.14 indicating high correlation between the polity2, democracy, political rights and executive 
constraints measures. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics: raw and change scores 
Variable Mean (raw) Mean (change) S.D. (raw) S.D. (change) Min (raw) Min (change) Max (raw) Max (change) No. Obs. 
Total TEA Rate 10.90012 0.1138877 7.708886 3.08706 1.48 -14.19 52.11 15.19 481 
Political rights index 2.612182 -.0033223 1.91121 .3078182 1 -4 7 4 481 
Civil liberties index  2.659985 -.0257475 1.612799 .2483559 1 -1 7 1 481 
Polity2 index 5.668693 .0245499 5.42586 .8601009 -10 -14 10 8 481 
Democracy index 5.52782 -.0437247 10.02313 5.635011 0 -5 10 5 481 
Autocracy index -.0721805 -.0680162 8.887097 5.625703 0 -5 10 5 481 
Exec constraints index 4.551168 -.0607639 9.665244 5.903344 0 -4 7 7 481 
Freedom from corruption 47.70962 .0961943 24.40834 3.73142 0 -24 100 34 481 
Political legitimacy index  .9022556 -.0040486 1.023903 .203255 0 -2 3 2 481 
Self-efficacy 48.72537 .0289813 15.71066 5.724917 8.65 -23.81 89.48 28.53 481 
Fear of failure 33.53532 .1321414 8.724349 6.22188 10.43 -20.04 65.4 25.77 481 
TEA High aspirations 26.09944 .1377339 12.0275 7.780878 0 -32.2 91.44 33.64 481 
Established business 7.480763 .1539085 5.086118 2.61866 0 -20.25 37.74 12.71 481 
Political stability .0720197 -.0010653 .9272882 .1749812 -2.5 -.7794521 2.5 .763721 481 
Control of corruption .3282983 .0000491 1.038029 .1221667 -1.5 -.5809187 2.5 .8057017 481 
Voice and Accountability .3211269 .0004845 .9161772 . .0942877 -1.8 -.5840169 1.8 .9825296 481 
Note. Descriptive statistics for all variables in estimations.  
Descriptive statistics are summarized using original form and differences 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix 
Correlation TEA 
 
 
Polity2 Freedom Democracy Autocracy Executive 
constraints 
Political 
stability 
Freedom Corruption Business  
Freedom 
 
Self-efficacy 
 
Establ. 
bus. 
Fear of 
failure 
GDP 
TEA 1.00             
Polity2 0.05 1.00            
Freedom 0.06 0.3812* 1.00           
Democracy 0.04 0.9310* 0.3638* 1.00          
Autocracy -0.07 -0.8547* -0.2059* -0.6061* 1.00         
Exec Constraints 0.02 -0.02 -0.2588* 0.8758* -0.4902* 1.00        
Political stability 0.0943* -0.02 0.0813* 0.02 0.03 0.02 1.00       
Freedom from 
corruption -0.08 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 1.00      
Business Freedom -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 1.00     
Self- 
efficacy 0.1958* 0.05 0.10 0.05 -0.06 0.07 0.03 -0.1105* 
0.03 
 1.00    
Established bus. 0.3240* -0.09 -0.07 -0.0960* 0.07 -0.1100* -0.02 -0.1331* 0.07 0.2370* 1.00   
Fear of failure -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 0.08 -0.1198* -0.07 1.00  
GDP per capita 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.05 1.00 
Note. Correlations matrix is based on a sample of 481 observations.  
Correlations are calculated using differences. 
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Table 3. Regression of change in political indicators on change in TEA rate 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Polity2 = D 0.46*** 
     
 
(0.05) 
     
Democracy = D 
 
0.67*** 
    
  
(0.10) 
    
Autocracy = D 
  
-1.25*** 
   
   
(0.35) 
   
Political Rights = D 
   
1.51+ 
  
    
(0.84) 
  
Executive Constraints = D 
    
1.54*** 
 
     
(0.15) 
 
Political Stability = D 
     
2.03* 
      
-0.83 
Fear of Failure Rate = D, 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Established Business Ownership Rate = D, 0.31** 0.31** 0.31** 0.31** 0.31** 0.30* 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) 
Perceived Capabilities = D, 0.08+ 0.08+ 0.08+ 0.08+ 0.08+ 0.09+ 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Growth Expectation = D, 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04+ 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
GDP Per Capita = D 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 0.05* 0.05+ 0.06* 0.03 0.05* 0.13*** 
 
-0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Observations 475 475 475 478 481 451 
R-squared 0.126 0.125 0.127 0.132 0.128 0.121 
Number of country 78 78 78 77 79 77 
Note. Dependent variable: TEA Rate.  
Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 * significant at *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Table 4. Regression of change in political legitimacy  
and freedom from corruption on change in TEA rate 
Independent Variables (1) (2) 
Political Legitimacy = D, -2.45** 
 
 
(0.87) 
 
Freedom from corruption = D, 
 
-0.09* 
  
(0.03) 
Fear of Failure Rate = D, 0.01 0.01 
 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Established Business Ownership Rate = D, 0.30** 0.29* 
 
(0.09) (0.11) 
Perceived Capabilities = D, 0.09* 0.09* 
 
(0.04) (0.04) 
Growth Expectation  = D, 0.02 0.03 
 
(0.02) (0.02) 
GDP Per Capita = D, 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 0.03 0.12*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) 
Observations 481 454 
R-squared 0.130 0.122 
Number of countries 79 79 
Note. Dependent variable: TEA Rate. 
 Robust Standard errors are in parentheses.  
* significant at *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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2.5 LIMITATIONS, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Drawing on a 14 year panel data (2001-2014) of entrepreneurship development (GEM data 
(Reynolds et al., 2005)) in combination with independent data on institutional indicators (Polity IV, 
Freedom House, Heritage Foundation and Quality of Government datasets), I tested how political 
institutional change over time, in particular, regime status change, political freedom, freedom from 
corruption, political legitimacy and political stability, impact the development of entrepreneurship 
over time in a sample of 77 countries. This study provides deeper insights into the effect of short-
term change in institutional quality on entrepreneurship development. The study uses panel data 
analysis techniques and thus extends existing research that is mainly based on cross-sectional data 
(Aidis et al., 2008, Aidis et al., 2009, Estrin et al., 2012, Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2011b). The overall 
results indicate that countries which develop into more democratic and stable states, characterized 
by politically freer environments over time, experience improvement in entrepreneurship 
prevalence rates. More democratic political environments bring about better protection of property 
rights, and a fair legal framework generates stable political environments resulting in enhanced 
entrepreneurship (Bruno et al., 2008). 
The results have shown that improvement in formal political institutions and political 
stability over time positively impact entrepreneurship development. The results thus far 
complement the existing literature which examines the effects of levels of institutions on the 
prevalence of entrepreneurship (Bowen and De Clercq, 2008, Levie and Autio, 2011, Aidis et al., 
2008, Estrin et al., 2012, Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2011a, Davidsson and Henrekson, 2002) in that I 
find similar effects when examining change in institutions. My findings also extend the existing 
literature by using alternative measures of high order and constitutional level political institutions: 
political freedom, stability, freedom from corruption and regime status.  
I find support for all the hypotheses. Additionally, I also find support for the impact of 
change in aggregate personal characteristics of positive self-efficacy perceptions as a control 
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variable, combined with political institutional change over time and positive rates of 
entrepreneurship.  
More generally, this chapter study makes two contributions to comparative 
entrepreneurship research and to the wider institutional theory literature. It introduces a novel 
dynamic perspective emphasizing the dynamic change in both institutions and entrepreneurship. It 
also helps to understand which changes and in which institutions are most significant for 
entrepreneurship. The focus on institutional change enriches and advances both institutional theory 
and comparative entrepreneurship research.   
I hypothesized that more free environments over time characterized by better political 
rights and civil liberties have a positive impact on entrepreneurial activity rates in the samples. For 
increasingly politically stable environments over time, I also find support for the hypothesis 
suggesting that these positively impact entrepreneurial development. This result is consistent with 
research by (Estrin et al., 2012) and confirms that when uncertainty in the business environment is 
lessened this encourages entrepreneurial start-ups (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2003, Williamson, 
2000). The findings also suggest that property rights enforcement as a higher order institution 
enhances stability over time when effectively enforced as it provides for “transactional trust” which 
makes it easier for entrepreneurs to access to finance and other resources. In contrast, entrepreneurs 
face risks of opportunistic behaviour where the rule of law is weak; consistent with (Estrin et al., 
2012). Strong rule of law over time brings along political stability, unlocking avenues for 
entrepreneurs to appropriately plan, coordinate and acquire resources in an expropriation-free 
environment (Tonoyan et al., 2010, Baumol, 1996). Rule of law also sustains stability as it reflects 
a strong legal framework, where business agreements and disputes are efficiently and impartially 
resolved and business procedures such as applying for finance are simplified and transparent, 
promoting more entrepreneurship development (Tonoyan et al., 2010).    
As far as inducing a positive impact on entrepreneurship, democratization over time is an 
important factor and thus I also find support for this hypothesis. Similar results were found 
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regarding freedom from corruption. The results showed that freedom from corruption is statistically 
significant but less impactful to entrepreneurship than political institutional change; less corruption 
over time has a positive impact on entrepreneurship. One possible explanation is that formal 
institutional factors of political stability, political freedom and democratization may have a more 
relevant and direct impact on entrepreneurship development than corruption. Aidis et al., 2012 and 
Du and Mickiewicz, 2016 argue that corruption may be less harmful to an economic environment 
than an arbitrary and predatory government because corruption in its essence is an informally 
embedded behaviour that requires more than just improvement in the formal environment but 
additionally a societal change that needs to be targeted over a period of time to reap results. Alvarez 
and Urbano (2011) argue that control of corruption has a positive but lower impact on 
entrepreneurship because some countries, especially in the developing world, are characterized by 
high rates of unofficial economies where entrepreneurs assume the payment of bribes and other 
forms of transactions costs to be a business cost (Aparicio et al., 2016). Similar studies suggest that 
the regulatory environment is not necessarily related to the prevalence of entrepreneurship activity 
(Stenholm et al., 2013). This is also the case when entrepreneurs are faced with persistent and 
extensive formal institutional weaknesses and are thus pushed into finding other solutions to start 
and operate business ventures (Acs and Virgill, 2010).  
The influence of change in institutions that spans over a 14-year period on the development 
of entrepreneurship in a large 77 country sample is the most significant contribution. While past 
research has investigated long-term historical changes as well as change related to the fall of 
communism, the present study is to my knowledge the first that examines change over the short-
term in several formal institutions and how this change affects the development of entrepreneurship 
or in other words, the change in TEA. By relating short-term change in institutions to short-term 
change in entrepreneurship, this research also introduces a novel perspective to comparative 
entrepreneurship research by emphasizing the change in institutions (as explained above) and also 
the change in entrepreneurship (as the dependent variable). The findings also point to the important 
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role of political institutions, which are often overlooked in economics and business research 
(Easterly, 2013). This chapter also extends research in comparative entrepreneurship that hitherto 
has largely overlooked political institutions even though they can be a key source of stability and 
thus entrepreneurial behaviour. The important role of political institutions has been generally 
overlooked in the economics and business research (Easterly, 2013). 
Additionally, the study improves upon existing research on entrepreneurship by employing 
several indicators of political institutional change over time rather than using single institutional 
indicators in cross-sectional format. Past research examines the impact of formal and informal 
institutions on entrepreneurship development; however, the use of several institutional change 
indicators, as well as panel data analysis, have not been as prevalent due to the lack of appropriate 
data. Recent research explored the influence of some institutions such as control of corruption and 
confidence in one’s skills over time but as of yet, formal institutional change spanning a period of 
more than 10 years and a large country sample offering dynamism in the relationship between 
institutional change and entrepreneurship activity has yet to surface (Aparicio et al., 2016).  
Because of the long period studied and employment of several political institutional change 
indicators over time, the results reflect the strong impact on entrepreneurship development and thus 
benefit existing entrepreneurship research. The robustness of the results on the importance of 
democratization, political freedom and political stability generate even more positive impact on 
entrepreneurship development and subsequently provides us with a better understanding of 
economic growth attributed to entrepreneurship development over a period of time. 
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2.6 Appendices 
Table 5. Description of variables 
Dependent variable Description Source 
Change in 
Entrepreneurial activity 
(TEA rate) 
Percentage of individuals involved in TEA (Total Entrepreneurial 
Activity) between the age 18-64 involved in either starting their 
own business or in managing their new business that is less than 
42 months old. 
GEM for the period 
20001 to 2014 
Independent variable Description  Source 
Formal institutions: 
change in scores over 
time 
Political Rights Index 
(political freedom) 
Civil Liberties Index 
(civil freedom) 
 
Polity2 Index 
(Democracy versus 
Autocracy) 
 
Democracy Index 
 
Autocracy Index 
 
 
Executive constraints 
index 
 
Freedom from corruption 
index 
 
Political legitimacy index 
 
 
 
Scores countries on a 7 to 1 ranking scale, with 1 representing the 
greatest of political freedom and 7 the smallest degree of political 
freedom (House, 2014a).  
Scores countries on a 7 to 1 ranking scale, with 1 representing the 
greatest of civil liberties and 7 the smallest degree of civil liberties 
(House, 2014a).  
Combines scores of Autocracy and subtracting scores of 
Democracy with a resulting unified polity scale ranging from +10 
(strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic) (Marshall and 
Cole, 2008) 
Additive eleven point scale (0-10), ranging from 10 (most 
democratic) to 0 (least democratic) (Marshall and Cole, 2008) 
Additive eleven point scale (0-10), ranging from 10 (most 
autocratic) to 0 (least autocratic) (Marshall and Cole, 2008) 
Scores from 1 = “unlimited authority” to 7 = “executive parity”; 
the higher the value, the less arbitrariness (Marshall and Cole, 
2008) 
Freedom from corruption uses a 100 point scale; higher freedom 
from corruption score means less corruption; thus 1 = very corrupt 
government, 100 = very little corruption (Miller, 2015) 
Political legitimacy: uses a scale from 0-3, with 0 = highest 
political legitimacy and 3 = least political legitimacy (Marshall 
and Cole, 2011) 
Political stability: uses a scoring scales from -2.5 to 2.5, with 
higher scores corresponding to better outcomes; thus -2.5 is least 
politically stable and 2.5 most politically stable (Charron et al., 
2010) 
 
 
Freedom House for the 
period 2001 to 2014 
 
Freedom House for the 
period 2001 to 2014 
 
Polity IV project for the 
period 2001 to 2014 
Polity IV project for the 
period 2001 to 2014 
Polity IV project for the 
period 2001 to 2014 
Polity IV project for the 
period 2001 to 2014 
Index of Economic 
Freedom, Heritage 
Foundation 2001 to 2014 
State Fragility Index, 
2001 to 2014 
 
Quality of Government 
2001 to 2014 
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Political Stability Index  
 
 
Aggregate personal 
characteristics change 
over time 
Self-efficacy 
 
Fear of failure 
 
High growth aspirations 
Control variables 
Owner/Manager 
established business 
 
 
 
 
 
Percentage of individuals who answer whether they believed to 
have the knowledge, skill, and experience required to start a new 
business.  
Percentage of individuals who answer whether fear of failure 
would stop them from starting a business or not. 
Percentage of individuals who answer whether they have high 
aspirations and expect to generate 10 or more jobs in first 5 years. 
 
Percentage of owners/managers of established business 
 
 
 
 
 
GEM for the period 2001 
to 2014 
GEM for the period 2001 
to 2014 
 
GEM for the period 2001 
to 2014 
GEM for the period 2001 
to 2014 
Note. Descriptions and sources of all variables. 
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Table 6. Regression of change in Polity2 measures deconstructed  
to include democracy and autocracy on change in TEA rate 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Polity2 = D 0.46*** 
  
 
(0.05) 
  
Democracy = D 
 
0.67*** 
 
  
(0.10) 
 
Autocracy = D 
  
-1.25*** 
   
(0.35) 
Fear of Failure Rate = D, 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Established Business Ownership Rate = D, 0.31** 0.31** 0.31** 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Perceived Capabilities = D, 0.08+ 0.08+ 0.08+ 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Growth Expectation  = D, 0.02 0.02 0.03 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
GDP Per Capita = D 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 0.05* 0.05+ 0.06* 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Observations 475 475 475 
R-squared 0.126 0.125 0.127 
Number of countries 78 78 78 
Note. Dependent variable: TEA Rate.  
Robust Standard errors are in parentheses.  
* significant at *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Table 7. Regression of change in control of corruption  
and voice and accountability on change in TEA rate (robustness) 
Independent Variables (1) (2) 
Control of corruption = D, 2.45* 
 
 
(1.21) 
 
Voice and accountability = D, 
 
4.98** 
  
(1.68) 
Fear of Failure Rate = D, 0.02 0.00 
 
(0.03) (0.02) 
Established Business Ownership Rate = D, 0.32** 0.30** 
 
(0.12) (0.11) 
Perceived Capabilities = D, 0.09* 0.09+ 
 
(0.04) (0.04) 
Growth Expectation early-stage Entrepreneurial Activity: Relative Prevalence = D, 0.04+ 0.05+ 
 
(0.02) (0.02) 
GDP Per Capita = D, 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 0.11** 0.14*** 
 
(0.04) (0.03) 
Observations 424 451 
R-squared 0.131 0.127 
Number of countries 77 77 
Note. Dependent variable: TEA Rate.  
Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Table 8. All variables model 
Independent Variables (1) 
Polity2 = D, 
 
Democracy = D, 
 
Political Rights = D, 
 
Executive Constraints = D, 
 
Political Stability = D, 
 
Freedom from corruption = D, 
 
Political Legitimacy = D, 
 
Control of corruption = D, 
 
Voice and accountability = D, 
 
Fear of Failure Rate = D, 
 
Established Business Ownership Rate = D, 
 
Perceived Capabilities = D, 
 
Growth Expectation = D, 
 
GDP Per Capita = D, 
 
Constant 
 
Observations 
Number of country 
R-squared 
0.82 
(1.50) 
-1.70 
(1.93) 
-0.52 
(0.80) 
1.68 
(3.14) 
1.73+ 
(1.04) 
-0.09* 
(0.04) 
-2.83* 
(1.11) 
1.98+ 
(1.09) 
3.71+ 
(2.05) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.28*** 
(0.07) 
0.08** 
(0.03) 
0.03+ 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.14 
(0.14) 
408 
74 
0.178 
Note. Dependent variable: TEA Rate. 
Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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CHAPTER 3: IMMIGRATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, A CROSS-COUNTRY 
ANALYSIS  
Abstract 
Immigration is considered to be strategic to recipient countries as it helps in closing the gap 
in the shortage of skilled and entrepreneurial labour (Xavier et al., 2012). Research evidence from 
many economies suggests that immigrants differ from home country nationals in their 
entrepreneurial intentions and motivations. Some studies investigated the positive externalities of 
immigrants, and effects on innovation and economic growth in several countries. This leads to the 
question of how do the host country institutional environments influence intentions and motivations 
of immigrants about self-employment and subsequent growth of their ventures.  In this chapter, I 
utilize macro level institutional indicators of countries to investigate how immigrant 
entrepreneurship activity in host countries is influenced by institutional environments. I find strong 
support confirming the positive relationship between strong political institutions, freedom from 
corruption and prevalence of immigrant entrepreneurial activity compared to non-immigrants in 
host countries.  The findings are central to policy makers in their attempts not only to integrate and 
assimilate immigrants into host country social environments but also to contribute to long term 
economic growth of a host country through targeted policies that aim to attract immigrant 
entrepreneurial efforts. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Immigration to developed countries is a topic of extensive discussion in the current global 
political and socio-economic environment. Part of this debate is focused on the current crisis 
causing political upheaval in several countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, 
such as in Syria and Yemen. The implications of global events such as Brexit are also topics of 
concern; as immigration policies face scrutiny and change, they can bring about uncertain 
consequences and challenges, and impact the business creation by immigrants.  
The levels of immigrant entrepreneurial activity vary across countries (Xavier et al., 2012). 
Past entrepreneurship research has documented macro-level institutions as important in explaining 
cross-country differences in entrepreneurship more generally; however, the purpose of this chapter 
is to explore how institutions may impact immigrant entrepreneurship in particular. Therefore, I 
seek to answer: how do political institutions, economic freedom, and corruption influence 
immigrant entrepreneurial activity compared to nonimmigrants in the same environment. I aim to 
examine how these factors can shape immigrant entrepreneurship globally.  
Recent empirical studies that use regional data illustrated the impact of immigrants on 
entrepreneurship in several countries. OECD reports, for instance, have shown that immigrants are 
more likely than non-immigrants to engage in entrepreneurship activity (Desiderio and Mestres-
Domènech, 2011, Mestres, 2010). Research conducted in Germany has also found that immigrants 
earn considerably more from self-employment than their non-immigrant counterparts (Constant 
and Zimmermann, 2006). In Italy, Piergiovanni et al. (2012) find that immigrant entrepreneurship 
plays an important role in economic performance. They argue that immigrants contribute to 
economic growth through creativity acquired from a diversity of experiences, knowledge and the 
“know-how” coming from different countries. Complementing research efforts provide data and 
statistics on the impact of immigrant entrepreneurs in many developed countries such as the UK, 
US, Canada, and Australia. Business ownership rates are higher among the foreign-born than the 
native-born in many of these countries (Fairlie and Lofstrom, 2015, Clark and Drinkwater, 2006, 
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Clark and Drinkwater, 2000). One important aspect of this debate about immigration is about the 
influence of host country institutional environments on immigrant entrepreneurial activity 
compared to non-immigrants. The focus of this chapter is to examine how host country institutional 
environments that include political institutions, economic freedom and corruption influence 
immigrant entrepreneurial activity compared to non-immigrants. Within the institutional factors 
prevalent to entrepreneurship and immigration, this chapter focuses on the three mentioned 
previously.  
The focal reason for this choice of factors is that migrants often choose the countries that 
they migrate to. Thus, those with more resources or who are more able to spot opportunities are 
likely to choose countries with good and strong political and economic institutions and less 
prevalence of corruption which are also usually developed economies. By seeking an opportunity, 
immigrants are also taking advantage of strong political and economic freedoms conducive to 
positive growth in economic activities such as entrepreneurship. On the other hand, refugees - those 
migrants who have been pushed rather than leaving their countries for economic opportunities, are 
more likely to live in less developed countries – the World Economic Forum states that 84% of 
refugees live in developing countries and therefore they may not reap any potential benefits from 
a positive institutional environment.  
Another crucial reason for examining the above institutions is that immigrants are usually 
unfamiliar with their hosting country environment. This possess additional challenges for 
immigrants when navigating their new environment compared to non-immigrants. Arbitrariness of 
officials stems from lack of clarity of rules and regulations which can lead to implicit and explicit 
prejudice against immigrants. Therefore, host countries which are politically freer are likely to 
attract those immigrants who are seeking opportunities and who have resources as they navigate 
their new environment in comparison to non-immigrants. In freer more democratic countries it is 
easier to find out about the business environment because these environment are more transparent 
and have key attributes of clarity of rules and regulations. As (Przeworski, 2000) illustrated, the 
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more democratic the regime, the more political freedom associated. Another important association 
in democratic regimes is that there is   a difference between the interactions and allocation of 
decision-making rights between a presidential system that strictly separates the powers between 
the executive and the legislature, or a parliamentary system, where a legislative majority elects the 
executive and there is less power separation (Przeworski, 2000). A well designed political system 
where a legislative majority can elect the executive such as a in a parliamentary system is able to 
protect property rights and political freedoms, thereby encouraging citizens’ participation in the 
economic life but also encourage immigrants to capitalize on the freedoms when it comes to 
economic activity. Attention to these relations is therefore important to understand the effect of 
political institutions on different forms of entrepreneurship. My contribution from this chapter is 
thus to present one of the first empirical examinations of the impact of institutions on immigrant 
entrepreneurship status.  
A different aspect of the debate is that immigration is a driver of economic growth in host 
countries through the promotion of immigrant entrepreneurship (Wennekers and Thurik, 1999, 
Wennekers et al., 1997, Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2008, Peroni et al., 2016). Immigrant 
entrepreneurs are arguably of particular importance to economic growth due to the unique human 
capital resources they are endowed with in comparison with home country entrepreneurs (Neville 
et al., 2014). Immigration and entrepreneurship are both regarded as drivers of economic growth; 
however, much of the existing research examines these concepts independently (Peroni et al., 2016, 
Borooah and Hart, 1999, Levie et al., 2007, Levie and Hart, 2013, Peri, 2012). Recent research 
efforts have attempted to investigate the contribution of immigrants to economic growth (Kerr et 
al., 2013, Wennekers and Thurik, 1999). However, less research has investigated the association 
between immigrants and entrepreneurship due to challenges in assessing the contribution of 
immigrants to entrepreneurship activity (Peroni et al., 2016).  
In addition to contributing to economic development, economist William Easterly presents 
a second argument on the importance of immigrant entrepreneurship. Easterly reveals some of the 
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important hindrances for immigrants when he argues that many in developed countries, natives 
express hostility towards individuals emigrating from developing countries whilst expressing and 
feeling no hostility when they “in-migrate within the country” (Easterly, 2013). With the rise of 
right wing nationalist parties in Europe and elsewhere, this ideology is gaining ground. Easterly 
contends that alleviating poverty can only work when immigrants are treated fairly as individuals 
in their perusal of a better quality of life including finding work or becoming self-employed in a 
stable and free environment.  
“The development mindset is apparently that eliminating poverty only counts if you stay at 
home and not if you as an individual migrate to another country. Immigrants contribute to 
global economic development (GDP), however, development and aid are only particular 
about national development and not the individual influence of people in diaspora” 
(Easterly, 2013).    
 Tabellini (2010) argued that collectivist values of today are associated with autocratic 
regimes from the past. In his research, Tabellini found that regions with a history of autocracy have 
very low values of trust and respect for others outside the group. Alongside these discoveries, the 
study also noted that these autocratic countries and regions are still poorer than other more 
democratic and individualistic societies (Tabellini, 2010). As a result, business creation and 
economic growth of individuals in these countries are hindered (Easterly, 2013). Yet one important 
missing link in this mechanism is that these countries are more hostile to immigrants, hindering 
their economic contribution.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I develop the conceptual 
framework and hypotheses. The methodology, data and estimation strategy are explained in section 
three of this chapter. Results and findings are described in section four. Section five discusses these 
findings. Finally, in section six I conclude. 
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3.2 Conceptual Framework / Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
3.2.1 Entrepreneurship & Immigration 
Entrepreneurship activity is influenced by multiple factors, which can be grouped as 
personal characteristics (e.g. age, education and gender etc.) and institutional environments (e.g. 
economic freedom and prevalence of corruption) (Aidis et al., 2008, Arenius and Minniti, 2005, 
Davis and McClelland, 1962). However, it has always been more challenging to examine the latter 
cluster of factors. Likewise, studies that examine the association between entrepreneurship and 
immigration can be grouped into two types (Peroni et al., 2016).  
One group of research examines the unique features (individual factors such as 
demographics) of immigrants compared to nonimmigrants to explain differences in 
entrepreneurship activity. The second group explores the influence of institutional environments 
on immigrants and their entrepreneurship. Much of the research on immigration and 
entrepreneurship has focused on one group or the other in isolation, potentially giving rise to 
incomplete findings and omitted variable bias. Therefore, a combined view on the interrelationships 
between individual factors and institutional environments could provide richer insights. The next 
few paragraphs shed some light on the two streams of research relating to individual factors and 
institutions. I aim to bridge the gap between these two groups of studies and examine both 
socioeconomic individual and institutional factors in this chapter.  
The first group of studies is based on such mezzo level social factors as the occupational 
characteristics, demographic background (ethnicity, age, gender, education etc.), and access to 
resources. Migrant entrepreneurs acquire access to much-needed resources such as capital, 
information, and labour through social networks embedded within the host country and the country 
of origin (Peroni et al., 2016, Altinay, 2008). Scholars suggest that immigrants choose self-
employment through entrepreneurship to escape low paying jobs and discrimination in the job 
market, based on race, language, religion etc., see: (Hatton and Leigh, 2011, Light, 1979, Peroni et 
al., 2016), therefore accounting for the higher entrepreneurial rates among migrants. In countries 
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like the US, UK, Canada and Australia, there are practically no formal barriers to the immigrant’s 
geographical or economic mobility, therefore enabling potential business start-ups (Aldrich and 
Waldinger, 1990).  
The first model in the first group of studies, the middleman minority theory, developed by 
(Bonacich, 1973), suggests that immigrant businesses are more common amongst immigrant-
concentrated areas in a host country. Within these immigrant groups, the economic role played by 
business owning immigrants is that they act as an intermediary between producers and consumers, 
owner and renter, and the masses and the elite. This usually means that they tend to be in self-
employment, particularly in trade and commerce. Research has discussed that this is a natural 
reaction to the hostility immigrants face due to racial, ethnic and or religious differences from host 
nations. Therefore to escape this hostility and its resultant economic discrimination, immigrants 
are pushed from full-time employment to self-employment (Bonacich, 1973). Similar to (Easterly, 
2013), middleman minority theory purports that minority immigrant entrepreneurs have high “intra-
group solidarity” and therefore do not integrate with the rest of the society, supporting a 
collectivists attitude that shuns outsiders. These close knit communities usually use this 
collectivist’s mechanism to bypass formal and informal institutions of their host nations. 
Nestorowicz (2012) argues the following: “Owing to solidarity, organisation, thrift, and access to 
low-cost co-ethnic labour force middleman minorities are able to compete with native businesses 
successfully enough to generate heavy concentrations of ethnic enterprises in certain middleman-
specific industries or occupations, what may further lead to ethnic domination of these markets.” 
However, this may bring about hostility towards the immigrant population that may results in less 
assimilation (Easterly, 2013, Nestorowicz, 2012). 
The second model called ethnic enclaves was developed to emphasize the importance of 
addressing the internal economic structures used within the immigrant societies (Nestorowicz, 
2012). Ethnic enclaves are defined as areas where there exists a concentration of a certain ethnic 
group within a host country that share the same values, norms and attitudes as well as similar 
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demographic characteristics (Altinay, 2008, Peroni et al., 2016). These commonly shared values 
and cultural norms present in an ethnic enclave provide several essential benefits to immigrant 
entrepreneurs, including facilitating business start-up decisions and acquisition of resources such 
as capital, or information  (Auster and Aldrich, 1984, Peroni et al., 2016). However, similar to 
middleman minorities, ethnic enclaves arguably create a disconnection between the resident 
population in a host country and the immigrant community in the enclave, thus encouraging 
feelings of discrimination and antagonism between the immigrant and non-immigrant populations 
(Peroni et al., 2016). The difference between the middleman minorities and ethnic enclaves theories 
is that the middleman minorities theory assumes that immigrants are inherently more inclined to be 
entrepreneurial within communities in which they feel attached while the ethnic enclaves theory 
assumes that immigrants benefit from the support of other immigrants in their ethnic enclave, thus 
resulting in the facilitation of entrepreneurial activity.   
The second group of theories explores the relationship between features of the institutional 
environment of the host country and individual characteristics of immigrant entrepreneurs. Some 
scholars have credited immigrants’ choice of self-employment to cultural attributes in the home 
country that encourage an entrepreneurial attitude (Basu and Altinay, 2002, Levie and Hart, 2013). 
Another name given to these theories is the interactive model, and it postulates that immigrant 
entrepreneurial activity takes place because of opportunities perceived by immigrants originating 
from their exposure to host country market structures and institutional environment (Aldrich and 
Waldinger, 1990, Peroni et al., 2016). In extending this interactive model, (Kloosterman and Rath, 
2001, Kloosterman et al., 1999) incorporated the country’s institutional framework (formal and 
informal institutions). Calling it “mixed embeddedness”, the authors argued that immigrants belong 
to specific ethnic networks but they are also entrenched and predisposed to the unique political and 
socioeconomic institutional environments of their hosting country (Peroni et al., 2016). Building 
on this, the research aims to investigate the impact of formal political institutions and informal 
institutions (corruption) as well as economic freedom in the host country when examining 
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immigrant entrepreneurship activity. Thus, this research seeks to answer the question: how do 
institutions influence immigrants’ entrepreneurial activity. 
3.2.2 Formal political institutions’ effects on immigrant entrepreneurship: political freedom 
Stability of the political institutional environment provides a positive and conducive 
environment for entrepreneurs to thrive. However, research has found that insecurity coupled with 
lower economic growth rates arising from instability of institutions leads to weak formal 
enforcement of political rights and freedoms and can, therefore, deter potential entrepreneurs from 
actively pursuing entrepreneurial activity in a host country (Aidis et al., 2008). Immigrants are 
more likely than non-immigrants to be unfamiliar with the host country institutional environment 
(Neville et al., 2014) and therefore, unstable institutions provide an additional challenge for these 
immigrants, constraining their entrepreneurship activity.  
Evidence suggests that political institutions are important in recognizing whether countries 
have well-defined and enforced property rights or weak protection of these rights (Aron, 2000). As 
defined earlier in this thesis, political institutions are those institutional structures that establish and 
standardize access to economic opportunities, entrepreneurial rents and rule of law (Autio and Fu, 
2015). However, the impact of political institutions (e.g. political freedom, democracy, political 
globalization, and regime durability) on entrepreneurship development in particular remains under-
researched, even though much institutional research has revealed that political institutions can have 
powerful influences on economic activity, also via shaping economic institutions (North, 1990, 
North, 1994, Acemoglu et al., 2012, Weingast, 1995, Autio and Fu, 2015, Easterly, 2013). Strong 
political institutions also encourage less economic and political corruption (Anokhin and Schulze, 
2009), therefore, stability and the high quality of the political institutional environment provides a 
positive and conducive environment for entrepreneurs to thrive and merits further investigation. 
Thus, this research predicts that the degree of political stability as measured by the 
variability of political freedom is expected to have a stronger impact on immigrant entrepreneurial 
activity in a host country compared to non-immigrants (Laplume et al., 2014). The concept of 
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political freedom is identified by a combination of factors that represent political rights and civil 
liberties as crucial pieces of this construct. Political rights enable people to participate freely in the 
political process: the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete 
for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a 
decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. Whilst civil liberties 
represent freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and 
personal autonomy without interference from the state. These elements having an ensuing impact 
of stability over time where usually only “natural” changes in the environment take place (eg. newly 
elected president, new party wins the election in the parliament). (Przeworski, 2000) illustrate that 
these “natural” changes in institutions are not radical and therefore have low to no impact on 
economic and social activity over time.  
Democratic and politically freer institutions in contrast to autocratic and less free 
institutions allow for a representative political agenda where property rights are universally 
protected and abuse of power is repressed, creating a better environment for entrepreneurship 
(Autio and Fu, 2015). Thus, more politically free countries motivate potential immigrant 
entrepreneurs to start business ventures and participate in economic activity (Autio and Fu, 2015) 
as more opportunities are identified by these immigrants. Although I did not test for this relation, 
however, host country citizens on the other hand may not perceive this conducive environment as 
an opportunity because it may be perceived that the labour market (especially in developed 
countries) is advantageous for paid employment; additionally, embarking on a business start-up is 
a complicated task with numerous considerations (e.g. access to resources, being risk averse, etc.) 
(Parker, 2009). Political freedom illustrates the strength and formal enforcement of strong property 
rights, and more generally, the rule of law. The degree to which a country is more democratic than 
autocratic is expected to encourage the entrepreneurial entry (Laplume et al., 2014). Consequently, 
I argue that more politically free countries positively influence immigrant entrepreneurship activity 
and entry in comparison to non-immigrants.  
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 Acemoglu et al. (2005) discuss two related aspects of property rights. The vertical aspect 
which is about “the risk of expropriation by arbitrary government”, and the horizontal aspect which 
is associated with the quality of contracting institutions (Estrin et al., 2012). Strong political 
freedom ensures the protection and stability of property rights; in particular, Weingast (1995) views 
the limits imposed on the ability of the government to confiscate wealth as the constitutional 
foundation conducive to entrepreneurship (Estrin et al., 2012). Immigrant entrepreneurs are 
especially vulnerable to this, because of the increased uncertainty associated with their new 
environment as well as with having to deal with issues of institutional discrimination. A move 
toward democracy is conducive to a reduction in institutional discrimination. In turn, the political 
instability measures used in economic growth literature summarize a part of the uncertainties faced 
by entrepreneurs, and by immigrant entrepreneurs (Ali, 2001). Immigrants are more likely to take 
into account the “probability that the rules of the game will still be in force tomorrow” (Ali, 2001).  
Likewise, a democratic system may help to reduce the likelihood of the “long-term radical 
political change”, which positively impacts economic activity by reducing uncertainty and 
increasing incentives to invest (Feng, 2001). This is another reason why political freedom is likely 
to have a greater positive effect on immigrants’ entrepreneurship activity.  
Another important facet of political freedom and entrepreneurship is the level of political 
globalization. As a nation-state transforms itself into a competitive state, the extent of political 
globalization becomes a crucial factor in this transformation. When a country’s institutional 
framework develops at the national level, so does its political, economic and social relationships 
and connectedness at a multinational/global level ‘so that (countries) increasingly must be seen as 
components in a larger and more complex international political configuration.’ (Ougaard, 2004, 
Cerny, 1997). Within an increasingly interconnected international and political system, the 
integration of the global economy intensifies. Immigrants are usually endowed with unique skills, 
capabilities, cultural norms and values from their countries of origin which they can utilize in their 
hosting countries. With more interconnectedness, it is likely more important for immigrants to have 
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a breadth of avenues and cultures through which they can utilize these unique skills and share their 
traditions as well as seize entrepreneurial opportunities based on their distinctiveness. Being a 
proxy for general openness of a country, strong political globalization can benefit immigrants as 
they reap the benefits of a more welcoming and interconnected business environment in 
comparison to less politically globalized countries. Consequently, the greater the intensity of this 
global connectedness is likely to have a greater positive influence on immigrants’ entrepreneurial 
activity in light of economic opportunities in comparison to non-immigrants. 
More so, having a parliamentary political system is typically associated with free and 
transparent elections that reflect on political freedoms. Parliamentary systems are argued to be more 
conducive to the stability of democracy than in presidential systems. The presidential system 
usually takes an ‘undesirable element of winner-take-all politics into societies..’ (Horowitz, 1990). 
While in a presidential system, a president is elected as a sole entity; in a parliamentary system, 
there are many possible outcomes and numerous political parties can have a presence which lessens 
the possibility of conflicts as well as give a larger number of people in society a voice in their 
chosen leadership. This reflects upon a more politically free environment which in hand is 
conducive to favour a positive outlook on immigration policies and associated economic growth 
through immigrant entrepreneurial activity.  
Finally, political regime durability represents the number of years since the most recent 
regime change and/or the end of transition period identified by the lack of political stability over 
time (Marshall et al., 2010). Research has found that semi-democratic regimes are less durable over 
time than autocratic or democratic regimes (Knutsen and Nygård, 2015, Gurr, 1974). Therefore, a 
more democratic polity associated with (i.e. higher regime durability) is favourable for 
entrepreneurship and in hand reflects on immigrant’s positive entrepreneurial activity development 
in such environments.  
To test the effect of political freedom institutions on immigrant entrepreneurship activity, 
I use several measures and I posit therefore:  
86 
 
H1a: Strong political freedom in recipient economies positively influences immigrant 
entrepreneurial activity compared to home country entrepreneurs.  
H1b: Democratic institutions in recipient economies positively influence immigrant 
entrepreneurial activity compared to home country entrepreneurs.  
H1c: Greater political globalization in recipient economies positively influences 
immigrant entrepreneurial activity compared to home country entrepreneurs.  
H1d: Parliamentary political systems in recipient economies positively influence 
immigrant entrepreneurial activity compared to home country entrepreneurs. 
H1e: High regime durability in recipient economies positively influences immigrant 
entrepreneurial activity compared to home country entrepreneurs.  
3.2.3 Corruption, Government Effectiveness, and Immigrant Entrepreneurship 
Corruption is typically defined as the abuse of public power and authority for the private 
benefit of government agents (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009). It can be present in several layers of 
institutions from the legal and judicial down to the lower layers of administration, in any one 
country (McMullen et al., 2008) leading to government ineffectiveness. If left untouched, 
corruption leads to insecurity and uncertainty in the economic environment and can challenge the 
foundations of institutional trust needed for entrepreneurial development (Anokhin and Schulze, 
2009). It also leads to market inefficiencies, again resulting in a decrease in entrepreneurial activity 
(Aidis et al., 2008). With the prevalence of corruption, the quality of the bureaucracy and 
independence of the civil service from political pressures becomes negatively affected leading to 
loss of credibility and government ineffectiveness.  
Decisions to migrate are typically complex and multi-faceted and many times depends on 
the interplay of several factors including corruption in immigrant countries of origin. Skilled 
workers for example tend to leave corrupt countries of origin to move to less corrupt environments 
where employment is less hampered by nepotism (Ariu and Squicciarini, 2013). Therefore, 
immigrant entrepreneurs may face an increasing burden when pursuing entrepreneurial activity in 
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an environment hampered by favoritism and opportunism because, in the absence of effective 
enforcement of contracts and laws, depending on legal contractual agreements becomes an unsafe 
and risky option (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009). 
The inability to enforce contracts due to corruption tends to typically be locally embedded 
in the institutional environment, particularly in developing countries where immigrants usually 
come from resulting in less confidence in the appropriate systems to appeal to formal institutions. 
Because these rights are not universally protected due to the prevalence of corruption, immigrants 
will have less confidence in formal institutions. The alternative to institutional trust, in this case, 
would be to rely on the foundations of ethnic belonging, social capital, and connections. However, 
these alternatives are not long term economic solutions because they have their own limitations 
(such as exposure to adverse selection and loss of potential economic linkages through this type of 
selection; see, (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009). Consequently, I agree with the literature arguing that 
efficient and appropriately regulated environments that are not fraught with corruption will have a 
positive impact on immigrant entrepreneurial activity compared to non-immigrants (Djankov et al., 
2006a, Aidis et al., 2008, Estrin et al., 2013).  Government effectiveness has been shown to be a 
strong macro-level predictor of democratic support (Magalhães, 2014). In more democratic regimes, 
government effectiveness, which implies the quality of the policy making formulation and 
implementation, quality of the bureaucracy and satisfaction of citizens to the credibility of the 
government, positively influence democratic support and therefore more political freedom. 
Therefore, I also argue that higher government effectiveness positively influences immigrant 
entrepreneurial behaviour. 
The hypotheses for this section are below: 
H2a: More freedom from corruption in recipient countries positively influences immigrant 
entrepreneurial activity compared to home country entrepreneurs.  
H2b: Stronger government effectiveness in recipient countries positively influences 
immigrant entrepreneurial activity compared to home country entrepreneurs.  
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3.2.4 Economic Freedom and Immigrant Entrepreneurship 
This set of hypotheses is concerned with how the institutions of economic freedom can 
influence immigrants’ business start-up rates. Several authors argue that entrepreneurs and private 
investors are concerned more about the stability of the country’s economic environment than the 
stability of the political environment (Ali, 2001). Private investors and entrepreneurs alike take 
their business decisions, by considering a number of important economic factors such as wages, 
interest and exchange rates, taxation and regulatory policies. When these business factors are 
deemed to be unstable, confidence and ‘animal spirits’ (Keynes, 2016) decrease, raising the 
question as to whether immigrant entrepreneurs should invest or postpone (Ali, 2001). Business 
freedom is measured as an index of regulation and business friendliness as well as competitiveness. 
In particular, start-up regulation is defined as how easy or difficult it is to open and operate a 
business (McMullen et al., 2008, Heckelman, 2000). More regulations imposed by a government 
usually translates into further difficulties for entrepreneurs that want to start business ventures. 
More so, immigrant entrepreneurs face the burden of uncertainty and lack of knowledge and 
experience with local host country business regulations and start up procedures, and are therefore 
more disadvantaged. The efforts and time required to register a new business and other regulations 
can vary significantly between countries. For example, Singapore is ranked number one in the 
World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business report in 2016 for continuing to be the economy with the 
most business-friendly environment, the United Kingdom comes in at 6th, whilst for Germany, the 
ranking is 15th globally.  
Immigrants are often faced with additional restrictions on business freedom in their host 
countries. Some of these restrictions are in the form of labour movement regulation for example, 
which can impede the process of hiring foreign-born as well as restrict their access to investment 
opportunities (Clark et al., 2015). Some other business freedom restrictions include access to 
finance for immigrants and the difficulty to provide settled immigrants the same access to business 
start-up tools (e.g. entrepreneurial support programs). Furthermore, differences in how a country 
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implements its business regulations can also influence immigrant entrepreneurship. One country 
may apply the regulations and laws stated in a transparent and clear manner whilst another country 
may have issues in the application. Consequently, variations and irregularities may occur opening 
the path for less transparent and corruption-prone business environments.   
Next, financial freedom measures the relative openness of a country’s banking and financial 
environment in providing lending and other financial services to promote businesses and economic 
growth. Much research has cited that access to finance is a major constraint to entrepreneurship 
(Korosteleva and Mickiewicz, 2011, Ho and Wong, 2007). Therefore, a developed financial sector 
plays a major role in assisting with the financing hardships faced by entrepreneurs. Immigrant 
entrepreneurs, in particular, are more likely to benefit from higher financial freedom as they are 
more likely than non-immigrants to face hardships in environments hampered by restrictive 
financial regulatory systems that impose restrictions and heavy regulation and prevent 
implementation of many essential financial services due to discrimination, settlement, trust and 
more importantly shorter credit histories – crucial criteria for lending in many countries. When 
procedures of opening bank accounts, lending and operating other financial services is deemed 
unfriendly (heavy bureaucratic requirements, timely and costly), then that leaves a burden on 
potential investors and entrepreneurs, some of which may choose not to seek formal financial 
assistance. Consequently, I posit that immigrants are more likely to enter entrepreneurship in 
countries with higher financial and business freedom.  
H3a: Strong economic freedom in recipient economies positively influences immigrant 
entrepreneurial activity compared to home country entrepreneurs.  
3.3 Data and methods 
3.3.1 Data sources 
I empirically analyse the impact of macro institutions of political freedom, informal 
corruption practices, government effectiveness, as well as economic freedom on individual Total 
Early Stage (TEA) entrepreneurial activity status in a cross country sample for the year 2012. I 
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merged data for this chapter from several sources including: The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
(GEM), Quality of Government (QoG) database, Heritage Foundation, Freedom House, Polity IV 
project and the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI). The sample is obtained from 
all countries surveyed in GEM data for the year 2012 resulting in a cross-country sample of a 
maximum of 60 countries and 178,688 observations. This maximum number is based on the 
measure of TEA status (dependent variable, explained below). Year 2012 was chosen because the 
GEM survey for that year contains specific questions on migration. The next few paragraphs 
discuss the data sources and setup.   
GEM is a global project developed by the collaboration of a number of established 
academic and non-academic institutions around the world. The key goal of the project is providing 
robust data that can be used to investigate differences in attitudes, perceptions, motivations, and 
rates of entrepreneurship across many countries. In addition, GEM provides data that measures 
diverse characteristics of entrepreneurship including types of entrepreneurs, entrepreneurial 
intentions and others (Bosma et al., 2012). GEM data are collected via surveys taken from 
population-representative stratified samples of at least 2000 individuals per country. Both formal 
and informal entrepreneurs are included in the dataset, thus mitigating any potential response bias, 
and providing a comprehensive outlook on entrepreneurial activity. Therefore, GEM database 
offers the research and policy making communities an internationally comparable data set that is 
commonly accepted as a source of data to use in entrepreneurship research (Freytag and Thurik, 
2010, Bowen and De Clercq, 2008, Aidis et al., 2008, Estrin et al., 2012, Estrin et al., 2013), among 
others. The design and sampling procedure of GEM is reviewed by (Reynolds et al., 2005).  
The remaining datasets provide several of the measures used in this analysis. QoG is a 
unique dataset that compiles several datasets drawing on a number of sources about political 
institutions and good governance. From QoG and the Polity IV project I obtain the formal 
institution's data on political freedom proxied by Polity2 measure, Freedom House score 
(democracy vs autocracy), political globalization, and the type of political system (parliamentary 
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vs presidential). QoG also provides data on freedom from corruption and economic freedom (I use 
business and financial freedom indicators). WDI provides data on government effectiveness, 
measures of corruption and GDP per capita. Finally, I also acquire several control and robustness 
measures from QoG, Polity IV, and GEM datasets. Table 10 in the appendix illustrates the list of 
variables used in this study including a brief description for each variable and the sources. 
3.3.2 Dependent Variable 
I use Total Early Stage Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) status as the dependent variable. 
TEA takes the value of one for the working age adults in a population who are either involved in 
the process of starting a business venture or are active owners-managers of businesses which are 
less than 42 months old (Wong et al., 2005, Reynolds et al., 2005). The variable is constructed from 
the GEM dataset.  
3.3.3 Independent variables 
As noted earlier, this investigation examines how formal political institutions (political 
freedom), informal institutions of corruption, and finally business and financial freedom influence 
immigrant participation in entrepreneurial entry, when also controlling for individual level 
characteristics (immigrant vs non-immigrant, age, gender, education, self-efficacy, and opportunity 
perception). Several measures and robustness indicators of political institutional factors are used in 
this investigation to ensure validity and reliability; some of which have been previously used in the 
literature. I look at TEA status of immigrant entrepreneurs to identify immigrants vs non-
immigrants. I use the GEM indicator of migration in which a question is asked whether they were 
born in the country they are in the recipient country or elsewhere. This is coded 1 for immigrant 
and 0 for home country entrepreneurs.   
Macro level predictors (H1): Political Institutions 
I proxy for political freedom in a host country by using the Polity2 indicator from Polity 
IV database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). The Polity2 indicator measures a country’s political 
freedom over time by defining regime characteristics through the lens of democracy versus 
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autocracy (Marshall and Cole, 2008, Marshall and Cole, 2011, Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). The 
polity score ranges from -10 which indicates a strongly autocratic regime to +10 for strongly 
democratic regimes. Therefore, countries which score higher are more politically free.  
The Polity2 score comes from QoG (Charron et al., 2010, House, 2014a). To ensure 
robustness, I use both the Polity2 and Freedom House index, which follows a similar pattern of 
measurement, where 0 indicates least democratic and 10 as most democratic (Marshall and Jaggers, 
2002, Charron et al., 2010). The imputed version from QoG used has values for countries where 
Polity data is missing and it is constructed by regressing Polity on the average Freedom House 
measure (Charron et al., 2010). It is constructed by averaging the Freedom House measures of 
political rights and civil liberties and transforming them to a scale from 0-10 and transforming 
Polity into a similar scale. These variables are then averaged to the imputed measure. Hadenius and 
Teorell (2005) find that this imputed average score has more validity and reliability than its separate 
elements.  
Another measure of political freedom is the political openness and democracy indicator 
from the QoG database (Charron et al., 2010). The degree of political openness and democracy is 
measured using a unique political globalization index (Dreher, 2006). It is “measured using the 
number of embassies and high commissions in a country, the number of international organizations 
of which the country is a member, the number of UN peace missions the country has participated 
in, and the number of international treaties that the country has signed since 1945” (Charron et al., 
2010, Dreher, 2006).  
Next, a measure of types of political system is obtained also from the QoG database 
(Charron et al., 2010). This political system measure categorizes constitutional institutions into 
three types: presidential, assembly-elected president and parliamentary with the latter indicating 
more political freedom (Charron et al., 2010).  
I examine a final measure of regime durability. Regime durability is measured by the 
number of years since the most recent regime change defined by a three point change in the polity 
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score over a period of three years or less, or the end of a transition period defined by lack of stability 
in political institutions (Charron et al., 2010). 
Macro level predictors (H2): Corruption and Government effectiveness  
Like political measures, corruption indicators are collected from several sources. These 
sources are the QoG database, Heritage Foundation, Transparency International and the World 
Bank Governance Indicators (review table 33 in chapter 5 appendix for details of all measurements). 
I use an indicator from Heritage Foundation/QoG to measure freedom from corruption. Freedom 
from corruption relies on the corruption perceptions index (review table 33 in appendix chapter 5) 
and measures the level of corruption in different countries and is also correlated with levels of 
economic freedom, i.e. higher levels of freedom from corruption correlate to higher economic 
freedom and vis versa (Charron et al., 2010). This relationship also implies that the higher the 
freedom from corruption in a country, the better the control of corruption score. Control of 
corruption looks at perceptions of corruption conventionally defined as the exercise of public power 
for private gain but can have different aspects of corruption incorporated ranging from additional 
payments/bribery which affects the economic environment directly to also measuring “grand 
corruption” or political corruption (Charron et al., 2010).  
Similar aspects are captured by political corruption. However, political corruption 
measures distinct types of corruption that cover both areas and levels of the polity realm, 
distinguishing between executive, legislative and judicial corruption. The concept also 
differentiates between corruption at the highest levels of the executive branch of the government 
(rules, cabinet, ministers etc.) and in the public sector at large (Charron et al., 2010). What makes 
this concept unique is that it captures different types of corruption: ‘petty’ and ‘grand’; bribery and 
theft; both corruption aimed at influencing law making but also corruption that affects 
implementation. Therefore, political corruption includes elements from control of corruption, 
freedom from corruption and the corruptions perceptions index and can thus identify the level of 
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government effectiveness in terms of quality of the public service provision and the quality of the 
bureaucracy.   
Government effectiveness is measured using a variable from the QoG/World Bank 
Governance Indicators, which combines responses on the quality of public service provision, 
quality of bureaucracy, independence of the civil service from political pressures and credibility of 
the government’s commitment to its policies (Charron et al., 2010). 
Macro level predictors (H3): Economic Freedom  
Lastly, I proxy for economic freedom using business and financial freedom constructs 
which are captured from the QoG database. Business freedom is scored using 10 components all 
weighed equally, based on data from the World Bank’s Doing Business Report (for a review of 
components, check Charron et al., 2010). Financial freedom measures the openness of a country’s 
banking and financial sector by determining the extent of government regulation and intervention 
in the financial services system. The financial environment is therefore measured using a score 
between 0 and 100, where 100 is the maximum degree of freedom (Charron et al., 2010).   
Control variables 
Several streams of literature have argued that there are factors which explain why 
immigrants seek entrepreneurship rather than employment. Many of these studies cite that 
immigrants are pushed into self-employment affected by individual characteristics such as age, 
gender, education etc., and as a result of facing discrimination in the host country which makes 
finding employment challenging (Fairlie and Lofstrom, 2015, Fairlie and Robb, 2008, Collins, 
2003, Aldrich and Waldinger, 1990, Waldinger et al., 1990). The role of individual level 
characteristics which influence entrepreneurship has been studied widely in literature (Arenius and 
Minniti, 2005, Levesque and Minniti, 2006, Minniti and Nardone, 2007, Aidis et al., 2008, Estrin 
and Mickiewicz, 2011b). Age, for instance, has been shown to have an inverted U-shaped 
relationship with entrepreneurship activity rates. Empirical evidence found that individuals 
between 25 and 35 years old are most likely to be nascent entrepreneurs (Acs et al., 2004, Arenius 
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and Minniti, 2005); however, there is a higher likelihood for older individuals to be established 
business entrepreneurs. Older individuals may be better equipped to run established businesses as 
they are more likely to have acquired the experience and social capital to succeed in business. 
Therefore, I control for age in my analysis. I use logarithmic age in my analysis to try and achieve 
a normal distribution but also for ease of interpretation as is routinely used in regression analysis 
(Wooldridge, 2010) 
In line with past research on the relationship between gender and entrepreneurship, I also 
control for gender as it has been argued that gender differences have an impact on business creation. 
Several studies examined the similarities and differences between genders especially with respect 
to individual psychological, personal, and attitudinal characteristics (Brush, 1992, Ahl, 2006); 
however, many of these studies have yet to examine these effects on immigrant females in 
particular. The gender debate in entrepreneurship has been a precarious one. Due to the societal 
expectations toward women in the social context of a family, such as raising children and domestic 
caring, they are more likely to have a lower engagement in entrepreneurship activity than men 
(Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2011b).  
The relationship between education and entrepreneurship, on the other hand, has been less 
clear in research. Arenius and Minniti (2005) argue that entrepreneurs usually have a ‘broad range 
of talents’ but no specific higher education qualifications. Other scholars find that entrepreneurial 
entry decisions are influenced by education (Delmar and Davidsson, 2000); whilst (Uhlaner and 
Thurik, 2004) find that entrepreneurship rates are negatively correlated with higher education. 
More so, I only find limited research on the role of education on immigrants and how it impacts 
their entrepreneurship activity (Peroni et al., 2016). 
I proxy for financial resources using a dummy variable that represents previous provision 
of funds for business start-ups in the form of business angels. Being a business angel in the past is 
associated with not only capital provision but also experience and contact networks which can aid 
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potential entrepreneurs in their ventures (Storey, 2003). Therefore I control for this being a business 
angel in my estimations.  
As established in the psychology literature, confidence is ones skills and abilities is an 
important aspect of the intentionality and the locus or feeling of control in entrepreneurial start-up 
decisions (Arenius and Minniti, 2005). Starting a firm requires and intentionality and it is also an 
activity that requires repeated attempts to induce control over the process in order to achieve 
success and that requires confidence in an individual’s skills and abilities – self-efficacy. Therefore, 
I also control for self-efficacy. 
Opportunity perception presents itself as another important factor linked to higher 
likelihood of entrepreneurial activity. Alertness to untapped opportunities (Kirzner, 1978) is a 
necessary prerequisite to many entrepreneurial endeavours and therefore an individual’s perception 
of opportunity is also controlled for.  
At low income levels, starting a new business venture may substitute for weak labour 
markets but can also provide high expected returns that deter from employment and promote 
opportunity. High income levels on the other hand may decrease a house hold’s financial strains, 
therefore increasing the likelihood of starting a business (Arenius and Minniti, 2005). Thus, I also 
control for income level.  
Employment status has also been considered an important factor in determining 
entrepreneurship as an employment choice in empirical studies in economics. Generally, research 
has argued that employed individuals are more likely to start new businesses however less 
agreement exists about the relationship between aggregate unemployment and decisions to become 
entrepreneurs (Arenius and Minniti, 2005, Blanchflower, 2004).  
Age, gender, education, income level, being a business angel, employment status, self-
efficacy and opportunity perception controls are taken from the GEM Adult Population Survey of 
2012. Age is a continuous variable measuring the individuals in the sample between ages 18-64 
years old. I generate a dummy variable for gender. GDP control is measured using WDI GDP per 
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capita for the year 2012. I use the self-efficacy indicator found in GEM to measure the percentage 
of individuals between age 18-64 who indicated that they have confidence in their skills and 
capabilities to start a business venture (Gartner, 1985, Arenius and Minniti, 2005, Baron, 2000). I 
also examine immigrant opportunity perception using an opportunity variable available from GEM. 
Opportunity is constructed by asking respondents a question whether they see that there are 
business opportunities within the next 6 months in their environment.   
3.3.4 Empirical model 
This cross-sectional study utilizes multi-level random effects logistic regression models to 
compare the individual likelihood of an immigrant participating in TEA or no entrepreneurial 
activity. The levels in this analysis are individual and country levels. The baseline category is 
participation in TEA (coded as 1) and no entrepreneurial activity (coded as 0). I use the ‘Xtlogit’ 
command in Stata to run these models to estimate the impact of political freedom, corruption, and 
business freedom, controlling for individual level characteristics, on entrepreneurship. The Xtlogit 
regression command corresponds to a binary response logit estimation technique that is used to 
estimate the probability of a binary response occurring based on one or more independent variable(s) 
(Cox, 1958), with random effects. The model aims to isolate the impact of immigrant status on 
entrepreneurship, accounting for country level political freedom, corruption and business freedom 
whilst controlling for individual characteristics. Therefore, the random effects multi-level logit 
model is an appropriate estimation technique to use in this analysis as the dependent variable is 
divided into two categories and I am seeking to estimate the likelihood that the independent 
variables discussed above influence TEA entrepreneurial activity.   
To examine the impact of institutional factors and how they influence migrant 
entrepreneurship activity I use random (country level) effects models. For instance, in model one, 
I estimate the interaction in Polity2 with migrant status and the impact it has on the dependent 
variable TEA. The same estimation procedure applies for all models. β0 is the constant term; β1-n 
are coefficients of variables to be estimated that correspond with the 3 sets of hypotheses. Table 9 
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in the appendix summarizes the hypotheses and their expected signs, followed by the empirical 
models. Table 10, also in the appendix, summarizes the variables and their sources. 
3.3.5 Econometric Models 
In this section I present the main models tested in this analysis. Each section below 
corresponds to the respective set of hypotheses as discussed earlier in this chapter. I estimate 
variations of the basic political freedom model below by adding (1) an interaction between Polity2 
and migrant, (2) an interaction between Imputed Polity2 and migrant, (3) interaction between 
political globalization and migrant, (4) interaction between political system and migrant, (5) 
interaction between regime durability and migrant. The remaining 2 sets of hypotheses (corruption, 
government effectiveness and economic freedom) are tested in a similar manner. More econometric 
model elements can be found in the appendix titled Econometrics models details.  
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics: Sample, Demographics, Self-efficacy, and Opportunity 
Tables 11 and 12 of the descriptive statistics below summarize the details of this study’s 
sample and reveal a few important points. The sample consists of a minimum of 170,166 and a 
maximum of 178,688 individual observations from 60 countries in 2012. Among the full sample 
(immigrants and non-immigrants), almost 12% indicated that they are involved in Total Early Stage 
Entrepreneurship (TEA) which is approximately 21,450 individuals. However, upon further 
exploration, nearly 10% of those engaged in TEA are immigrants, compared with the percentage 
of non-migrants. An interesting statistic concerns female participation in TEA. Based on the sample, 
more female immigrants are involved in TEA than male immigrants.  
Across the 60 countries, about 7% of immigrants in the sample stated they were born in 
Russia, while others coming next on the ranks were born in Germany (around 4%), Iran 3% and 
Malaysia 2%. The tables titled Country of Origin and Correlations respectively illustrates countries 
of origin of migrants and a correlations analysis and can both be found in the appendix. Finally, 
among the immigrant sample, only 30% indicated that they see an opportunity to start a business 
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venture within the next 6 months. More than 50% of the sample reported that they have positive 
perceptions about self-efficacy suggesting that they see themselves as having the skills required for 
starting a business venture.  
3.4.2 Formal institutions: Political Freedom 
The average value of the political freedom index proxied by Polity2 (Marshall and Jaggers, 
2002, Charron et al., 2010) is around 7.5 suggesting that most respondents in the sample live in 
relatively democratic and politically free institutional environments. I find additional support for 
this statistic from the Imputed Polity2 and Freedom House (House, 2014a, Charron et al., 2010) 
results which reveal the same democratic pattern across the sample. Further exploration of the 
descriptive statistics indicates that almost 70% of immigrants reside in countries with high ratings 
of political freedom.  
The statistics also suggest that most respondents in the sample live in countries which are 
more open to political globalization based on the high number of operational embassies and high 
commissions suggesting strong relationships with other nations. Other results suggest that 51% of 
individuals in the sample live within a parliamentary political system suggesting that many live in 
relatively developed countries.  
3.4.3 Business and Financial freedom, Government effectiveness and Corruption 
Results for freedom from corruption reveal that surprisingly only about 50% of the 
respondents in the sampled countries revealed little to no corruption while the remaining 50% are 
on average on the highly corrupt end of the spectrum. This may be an indication of the pervasive 
nature of corruption even in relatively politically free countries. The corruption perceptions index 
corroborates the results and reveals a similar pattern. After further investigation using several other 
measures of corruption such as the corruption perceptions index (CPI), political corruption and 
control of corruption, the results follow the same pattern.  
In terms of business and financial freedom, the Heritage Foundation indices reveal that 
there is relatively high economic freedom in the sampled countries. As for government 
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effectiveness, the results reveal that a more effective government is associated with higher business 
creation by immigrant entrepreneurs. 
3.4.4 Hypotheses Testing 
Tables 13 to 15 below report the multi-level Xtlogit regressions results for the 3 groups of 
hypotheses. In Table 13 I report the estimation results for effect of macro level political institutions 
interacted with migrant’s status. Table 14 reports estimations for the second set of hypotheses 
related to corruption and government effectiveness and immigrant entrepreneurship. Finally, Table 
15 illustrates estimations for the third set of hypotheses related to economic freedom. The 
dependent variable used is the TEA status. The main effects models investigate how the 
independent variables interacted with migrant status impact their entrepreneurial entry; for example, 
when being a migrant is interacted with political freedom, implies exploring how political freedom 
impacts entrepreneurial entry of migrants compared to home country entrepreneurs. Table 16 in 
the appendix estimates all the variables in one model to provide an overview of all institutional 
variables. The results illustrate some expected insignificance and correlation between polity2 
(political freedom), imputed polity2 and political globalization. This result is not surprising as all 
of these measures are highly correlated and therefore, I did not expect results to be statistically 
significant. However, the measure political system and government effectiveness became negative 
yet still significant. Additionally, the measures for business freedom displays a similar pattern to 
former, however financial freedom remains similar to the initial results.  
All the estimations follow a similar procedure. Thus, I sequentially test every independent 
variable including the controls separately in the models. In each of the tables, I report an all 
variables model that excludes the interaction terms (model 1 in each of the tables). For H1, macro 
level political institutions models are reported in the remaining columns in Table 13. Model 1 in 
Table 13 shows that all independent variables but political freedom, regime durability, and imputed 
polity are significant at least at the 5% level. In model one in table 13, the probability of 
participating in TEA is 0.19 higher for migrants than for non-migrants under higher levels of 
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political freedom in the host country.  Therefore, this finding reveals that migrants are more likely 
to engage in TEA in politically freer environments than home country entrepreneurs. Moreover, 
when interacting migrants with the imputed political freedom indicator (Freedom House and Polity 
IV), the results are confirmed. H1a and H1b are consequently supported.  
The remaining interacted models related to political freedom and migrant interactions 
(political globalization, political system, and regime durability) are all significant and positively 
associated with new business creation compared to nonimmigrants in the same environment which 
confirms H1c, H1d and H1e.  
The controls in these models indicate that being one year younger is associated with a 0.55 
increase in the probability of participating in business creation. I also find that attaining a post-
secondary education is associated with an 8% increase in the likelihood of participating in TEA. 
This may be a direct result of the movement towards more innovative businesses that require higher 
education skills in countries where such environment is encouraged (many developed countries 
like US, Canada, UK etc.). In addition, the models show that having been a business angel in the 
past and possessing positive perceptions about self-efficacy are also positively associated with 
positive TEA.  
The second set of hypotheses examines the influence of informal institutions (corruption) 
and government effectiveness on immigrant’s business creation activities. Yet, when looking at 
model 1 in Table 14, I encounter some unexpected results. All but the corruption indices are 
insignificant in this model, prompting further exploration of the effect of corrupt political and 
economic institutions on immigrants’ business creation activities. Therefore, in the remaining 
interaction models, I tested the influence of freedom from corruption on migrant’s participation in 
entrepreneurship. The results revealed what is expected. Freedom from corruption is significant at 
the 1% level and displays the anticipated positive sign suggesting that migrants’ engagement in 
entrepreneurship activity increases in less institutionally corrupt environments. Therefore, the 
results contribute to past literature which suggests that entrepreneurship is nurtured in environments 
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where corruption practices are less prevalent (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009, Aidis et al., 2008) but 
the findings in this chapter also enhances the current literature by illustrating this effect on 
immigrants compared to nonimmigrants in the same host country environment. H2a is therefore 
supported. Additionally, immigrants are more likely to become engaged in entrepreneurial activity 
than non-immigrants under stronger government effectiveness, showing support for H2b. 
The final set of hypotheses are about economic freedom and are shown in Table 15. Model 
1 illustrates an all variables model. Utilising business and financial freedom indicators, results from 
models 2 and 3 are both significant and display the expected sign. This suggests that migrants’ 
entrepreneurial activity rates increase in environments with better business and financial freedom 
compared with non-migrants’ entrepreneurial activity. The implications of higher business and 
financial freedom can be seen as supporting the significance of financial institutional openness and 
lower transactional costs of business creation such as time, licensing and paperwork required, 
among others. Therefore, H3a is also supported.  
Again, age, gender, education, income level, being a business angel, employment status, 
self-efficacy and opportunity perception controls are significant and present the expected signs in 
all these models. 
Table 11. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Level Observations Mean SD Min Max 
TEA Individual 187063 .11 .32  0  1 
Migrant Individual 184841  0.04 .20 0 1 
Log_age1 Individual 185189 3.62   .37 2.77 4.59 
Male Individual 187060 . .48 .499 0 1 
Post Sec Individual 187063 .31 .46 0 1 
Work FT/PT Individual 187063 .6310973 .4825088 0 1 
Mid Income Level Individual 187063   .2706104 .4442763 0 1 
Business angel Individual 187061 .0572534 .2323268 0  1 
GDP Country 181943 21447.4 19233.67 268.0539 99557.73 
Self-efficacy Individual 187058 .4880902 .4998595 0 1 
Opportunity Individual 187057 .3541718 .4782628 0 1 
Polity2 Country 180564 .4589393 .4983125 0 1 
Fh_Polity2 Country 180564 .3924316   .4882933 0 1 
Democracy Country 187063   .443035 .4967457 0 1 
Political Globalization Country 187063 84.98067 12.60821 40.78684 97.51914 
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Political System Country 187063   1.096278 .9665166 0 2 
Freedom from Corruption Country 187063 50.89745 20.63252 19 93 
Corruption Perception index Country 187063 53.2022 18.31441 22 90 
Political corruption Country 185081 .3418273 .2634262   .0097602 .877192 
Control of Corruption Country 187063 .4309916 .9741979 -1.295879 2.391255 
Government effectiveness Country 187063 .5606612   .8449145 -1.02327 2.21447 
Business Freedom Country 187063 73.64065 13.5827 42 99.1 
Financial Freedom Country 187063 60.07771 17.25876    10 90 
Regime Durability Country 184906 39.49327 40.22876    0 203 
 
Table 12. Descriptive statistics (immigrant vs. non-immigrant) 
Status in 
% 
TEA 
(No) 
TEA 
(Yes) 
Female Male Non-
secondary 
Post-
secondary 
Not 
working 
Work 
FT/PT 
Mid 
income 
(No) 
Mid 
income 
(Yes) 
Non-
immigrant 
88.31 11.69 51.17 48.83 68.49 31.51 37.20 62.80 73.04 26.96 
Immigrant 90.06 9.94 54.31 45.69 54.95 45.05 35.36 64.64 72.80 27.20 
Total 88.39 11.61 51.31 48.69 67.89 32.11 37.12 62.88 73.03 26.97 
 
Status Self-efficacy 
(No) 
Self-efficacy 
(Yes) 
B.angel 
(No) 
B.angel 
(Yes) 
Opport 
(No) 
Opport 
(Yes) 
Non-
immigrant 
51.44 48.56 94.41 5.59 64.74 35.26 
Immigrant 55.76 44.24 94.53 5.47 71.17 28.83 
Total 51.63   48.37 94.42 5.58 65.03   34.97 
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Table 13. Estimation results of interaction  
between political institutions and migrant status 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Status: Migrant 0.19*** 0.07 0.08 0.06 -0.63** 0.01 0.11+ 
 
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.24) (0.08) (0.06) 
Log Age -0.55*** -0.53*** -0.53*** -0.53*** -0.53*** -0.53*** -0.54*** 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Gender = Male 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Post-Secondary Education 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Work: F-T, P-T 1.42*** 1.41*** 1.41*** 1.42*** 1.42*** 1.42*** 1.44*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Middle Income 33%tile -0.06** -0.05** -0.05** -0.05** -0.05** -0.05** -0.06*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Business Angel 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
GDP per capita (current US$) -0.00* -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Polity2 -0.14 -0.25+ 
     
 
(0.18) (0.13) 
     
Imputed Polity/Freedom -0.09 
 
-0.18 
    
 
(0.18) 
 
(0.14) 
    
Political Globalization -0.01+ 
   
-0.01* 
  
 
(0.00) 
   
(0.00) 
  
Political System -0.14* 
    
-0.15* 
 
 
(0.06) 
    
(0.06) 
 
Regime Durability 0.00 
     
0.00 
 
(0.00) 
     
(0.00) 
Perceived Capabilities 1.41*** 1.40*** 1.40*** 1.40*** 1.40*** 1.40*** 1.41*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Opportunity Perception 0.53*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.53*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Polity2 X Migrant  
 
0.19* 
     
  
(0.09) 
     
Imputed Polity/Freedom X Migrant 
 
0.18* 
    
   
(0.09) 
    
Democracy  
   
-0.21 
   
    
(0.14) 
   
Democracy X Migrant 
   
0.19* 
   
    
(0.09) 
   
Political Globalization X Migrant 
   
0.01*** 
  
     
(0.00) 
  
Political System X Migrant 
     
0.12* 
 
      
(0.05) 
 
105 
 
Regime Durability X Migrant 
      
0.00+ 
       
(0.00) 
Constant -0.33 -2.14*** -2.16*** -2.23*** -1.44*** -2.16*** -2.30*** 
 
(0.40) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.36) (0.12) (0.12) 
lnsig2u -2.19*** -1.89*** -1.86*** -1.74*** -1.79*** -1.79*** -1.83*** 
 
(0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Observations 170,165 172,239 172,239 178,687 178,687 178,687 176,613 
Number of Countries 57 58 58 61 61 61 60 
Note. Dependent variable: TEA Rate.  
Robust Standard errors are in parentheses.  
* significant at *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Table 14. Estimation results of interaction between  
corruption and government effectiveness and migrant status  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Status: Migrant 0.18*** -0.13 -0.22 0.29*** 0.07 0.04 
 
(0.04) (0.14) (0.16) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Log Age -0.53*** -0.53*** -0.53*** -0.53*** -0.53*** -0.53*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Gender = Male 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Post-Secondary Education 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Work: F-T, P-T 1.42*** 1.42*** 1.42*** 1.42*** 1.42*** 1.42*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Middle Income 33%tile -0.05** -0.05** -0.05** -0.05** -0.05** -0.05** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Business Angel 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
GDP per capita (current US$) -0.00 -0.00* -0.00* -0.00** -0.00* -0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Perceived Capabilities 1.40*** 1.40*** 1.40*** 1.40*** 1.40*** 1.40*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Opportunity Perception 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Freedom from Corruption 0.00 -0.00 
    
 
(0.02) (0.00) 
    
Corruption Perceptions Index 0.03 
 
-0.00 
   
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.01) 
   
Political corruption -0.31 
  
0.19 
  
 
(0.46) 
  
(0.29) 
  
Control of Corruption -0.53 
   
-0.06 
 
 
(0.57) 
   
(0.10) 
 
Government Effectiveness -0.39* 
    
-0.17 
 
(0.20) 
    
(0.11) 
Freedom from Corruption X Migrant 0.00* 
    
  
(0.00) 
    
Corruption Perceptions Index X Migrant 
 
0.01* 
   
   
(0.00) 
   
Political Corruption X Migrant 
   
-0.53* 
  
    
(0.21) 
  
Control of Corruption X Migrant 
   
0.11* 
 
     
(0.05) 
 
Government Effectiveness X Migrant 
    
0.13* 
      
(0.05) 
Constant -3.60** -2.17*** -2.18*** -2.33*** -2.28*** -2.28*** 
 
(1.31) (0.19) (0.23) (0.20) (0.13) (0.12) 
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lnsig2u -1.85*** -1.72*** -1.72*** -1.76*** -1.72*** -1.75*** 
 
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Observations 176,731 178,687 178,687 176,731 178,687 178,687 
Number of Countries 60 61 61 60 61 61 
Note. Dependent variable: TEA Rate.  
Robust Standard errors are in parentheses.  
* significant at *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Table 15. Estimation results for interaction of  
business and financial freedom with migrant status 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Status: Migrant 0.17*** -0.42+ -0.20 
 
(0.04) (0.25) (0.21) 
Log Age -053*** -0.53*** -0.53*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Gender = Male 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Post-Secondary Education 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Work: F-T, P-T 1.42*** 1.42*** 1.42*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Middle Income 33%tile -0.05** -0.05** -0.05** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Business Angel 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
GDP per capita (current US$) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Perceived Capabilities 1.40*** 1.40*** 1.40*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Opportunity Perception 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Business Freedom -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
Financial Freedom 0.00   
 (0.00)   
Business Freedom X Migrant  0.01* 
 
 
 (0.00) 
 
Financial Freedom X Migrant  
 
0.01+ 
 
 
 
(0.00) 
Constant  -1.10*** -2.37*** 
 
 (0.33) (0.24) 
lnsig2u  -1.92*** -1.71*** 
 
 (0.19) (0.19) 
Observations  178,687 178,687 
Number of countries  61 61 
Note. Dependent variable: TEA Rate.  
Robust Standard errors are in parentheses.  
* significant at *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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3.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
Drawing on a combination of institutional indicators and databases  (Reynolds et al., 2005), 
including GEM, Polity IV, Freedom House, Heritage Foundation and Quality of Government 
datasets, this chapter tested how micro level individual characteristics (education, age, and gender) 
and institutions, in particular: political freedom, freedom from corruption, and business freedom, 
impact immigrant business entry in a large sample of 60 countries from the year 2012. This study 
offers a deeper investigation and insights into the influence of both micro and macro level 
individual characteristics and institutions respectively on immigrant entrepreneurial activity.  
The main findings in this chapter suggest that immigrant entrepreneurs thrive in 
environments characterized by democratic and politically free institutions which in turn provide 
for a supporting mechanism in an unfamiliar cultural, economic and political setting that 
immigrants usually experience. The degree of political freedom can be measured in a number of 
ways. In this chapter, I measure political freedom using three indicators: political globalization, 
political system (parliamentary, presidential) and degree of democracy versus autocracy.  
Thus, the investigation findings have shown that immigrants are more likely to participate 
in entrepreneurial activity when political freedom is strong and host countries benefit from outlets 
of political liberty, autonomy, and democratic choice. Neville et al. (2014) argued that immigrants 
are most likely to be unfamiliar with the host country institutional environment which can lead to 
increased uncertainty, constraining immigrant’s entrepreneurship activity.  
Furthermore, this analysis also finds that more politically free institutions have a more 
pronounced positive impact on migrant entrepreneurial activity than on non-migrant 
entrepreneurial activity. This is consistent with previous research (Peroni et al., 2016) which 
suggests that migrants moving into a host country benefit more at the margin from supportive 
institutions than non-migrants because they not only have to adhere to new systems wherein there 
lies great uncertainty, but they also face an additional challenge of having to adjust their 
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expectations on the stability of institutions (typically from one that is very unstable to one that is 
stable).  
Therefore, the higher degree of political stability as measured by the variability of political 
freedom positively impacts entrepreneurial activity by immigrants in a country (Laplume et al., 
2014) and more so than home/non-immigrant country entrepreneurs. Democratic political 
institutions in contrast to autocratic ones allow for a representative political agenda where property 
rights are universally protected and abuse of power is repressed creating a better environment for 
entrepreneurship (Autio and Fu, 2015). To add to the robustness of the results several indicators of 
high order and constitutional level political institutions were tested: political globalization, political 
system (parliamentary, presidential) and degree of democracy versus autocracy.  
Additionally, another important argument is that migrants often choose the countries that 
they migrate to and therefore, migrants with more resources or who are more likely to spot 
opportunities are likely to choose countries with good and strong political and economic institutions 
with less prevalence of corruption, usually those being developed economies. Immigrants are also 
taking advantage these opportunities through strong political and economic freedoms conducive to 
positive growth in economic activities such as entrepreneurship. On the other hand, migrants who 
have been pushed out of their countries due to war or conflict for example, are more likely to live 
in less developed countries – as mentioned earlier, the World Economic Forum states that 84% of 
refugees live in developing countries and therefore may not reap any potential benefits from a 
positive institutional environment.  
The analysis from this chapter also finds that younger, male, and secondary-educated 
individuals are more likely than their older, female, and non-secondary school educated 
counterparts to start businesses. Findings pertaining to individual level characteristics, therefore, 
suggest that entrepreneurs are more likely to be more educated and also younger. This has important 
policy implications in both immigrant producing countries and host countries. It suggests that there 
is a linkage between entrepreneur’s skills and business start-ups. Host country policies can aim to 
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attract highly skilled and educated immigrants promoting at the same time innovation as a catalyst 
for economic growth. Immigrant producing countries may develop policies that aim to support 
immigrants in their endeavours as well as support labour export such as in the case of the 
Philippines (Asis, 2006). 
Migration has significant impact on economic activity of countries, especially in Europe 
given the aging population of some European countries and the several refugee crises (Syria, 
Yemen, among others) (Levie, 2007). Literature has also discussed evidence about the positive 
influence of net contributions of immigrant entrepreneurs to economic growth. However, much 
less research has contributed to the importance of the impact of the institutional environment 
(political and economic) on potential immigrant entrepreneurial activity and even less so, across 
countries.  
Additionally, issues of national, regional, urban and rural development are topics of great 
significance for policy makers. Policy decisions need to take into account how to balance national 
economic development through immigrant integration and social harmony and therefore research 
like the current one provides data on migrants and locals to aid policy makers with appropriate 
decision-making (Levie, 2007). If countries aspire to increase new rates of business activity, then 
the potential contribution from immigrants should form part of the public policy debate in these 
countries. As evidence suggests (e.g. Keeble and Tyler (1995)), the environment and its 
attractiveness play a vital role in enticing potential immigrants and subsequently entrepreneurship 
activity and therefore, institutions need to be supportive and promote policies tailored to engage 
immigrants (Li et al., 2017). The research thus contributes to the relatively scare literature on the 
interplay between institutions, immigration and entrepreneurship development and adds a 
comparative perspective to host country nationals bringing in deeper insights. 
This chapter also contributes to the literature on corruption and entrepreneurship (Djankov 
et al., 2006a, Aidis et al., 2008). In particular, the findings suggest that efficient and appropriately 
regulated environments where government and public officials face checks and balances on their 
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power resulting in freedom from corruption positively influence immigrant entrepreneurial activity. 
The findings also suggest that there is an important linkage between the institutional 
framework/environment in a host country and immigrant’s potential entrepreneurial activity. This 
is central to policy makers in their attempts not only to integrate and assimilate immigrants into 
host country social environments but also to contribute to long-term economic growth of a host 
country through targeted policies that aim to attract immigrant entrepreneurial efforts.  
Future research could expand on the above findings to look at the impact of strong, free 
political and economic institutions on ethnic minorities, new refugees and generational 
immigration. Additionally, research in the future could investigate differences between pull and 
push factors for immigration and how some immigrants are pushed becoming refugees in countries 
neighbouring these coming out of conflict (wars, economic deterioration, prevalence of corruption, 
natural disasters etc.). The particular contribution of immigrants to entrepreneurial activity is 
another avenue for future research especially examination of job creation, innovation and 
productivity in light of supportive political institutions.   
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3.6 Appendices 
Table 9. Hypotheses Summary 
Hypothesis Variables  Sign Support 
H1a: Strong political freedom in recipient economies positively 
influences immigrant entrepreneurial activity compared to home 
country entrepreneurs. 
Political Freedom interacted 
with migrant 
+ Yes 
H1b: Democratic institutions in recipient economies positively 
influence immigrant entrepreneurial activity compared to home 
country entrepreneurs. 
Democracy interacted with 
migrant 
+ Yes 
H1c: Greater political globalization in recipient economies 
positively influences immigrant entrepreneurial activity compared 
to home country entrepreneurs. 
Political Globalization 
interacted with migrant 
+ Yes 
H1d: Parliamentary political systems in recipient economies 
positively influence immigrant entrepreneurial activity compared to 
home country entrepreneurs. 
Political System interacted 
with migrant 
+ Yes 
H1e: High regime durability in recipient economies positively 
influences immigrant entrepreneurial activity compared to home 
country entrepreneurs. 
Regime durability interacted 
with migrant 
+ Marginal 
support 
H2a: More freedom from corruption in recipient countries positively 
influences immigrant entrepreneurial activity compared to home 
country entrepreneurs. 
Freedom from Corruption 
interacted with migrant 
+ Yes 
H2b: Stronger government effectiveness in recipient countries 
positively influences immigrant entrepreneurial activity compared 
to home country entrepreneurs. 
Government Effectiveness 
interacted with migrant 
+ Yes 
H3a: Strong economic freedom in recipient economies positively 
influences immigrant entrepreneurial activity compared to home 
country entrepreneurs. 
Business and Financial 
Freedom interacted with 
migrant 
+ Yes 
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Table 10. Data sources and description of variables 
Dependent 
Variable 
Description Source 
Total Early-stage 
Entrepreneurial 
Activity (TEA) 
The prevalence rate of individuals in the working age population who are 
actively involved in business start-ups, either in the phase of starting a 
new firm (nascent entrepreneurs) or in the phase spanning 42 months after 
the birth of the firm (owner- manager of new firms). 
GEM APS for 2012 
Independent 
Variables 
Description Source 
Immigration status Individuals are asked whether they were born in the country they are 
living in currently or born elsewhere. 
GEM APS for 2012 
Log Age Age of respondents to GEM survey between (18-64 years old) in 
logarithm form. 
GEM APS for 2012 
Gender Gender of respondents male = 1, Female = 0. GEM APS for 2012 
Post-Secondary 
Education 
Educational Attainment: post-secondary. GEM APS for 2012 
Business angel Being a business angel in the past 3 years. GEM APS for 2012 
Work Status Working status: in full-time/part-time work dummy GEM APS for 2012 
Income level Income level: Middle-income level dummy  GEM APS for 2012 
GDP GDP per capita in current $US. World Bank 
Development 
Indicators 2012 
Opportunity Individuals that see an opportunity to start a business in the next 6 months.  GEM APS for 2012 
Self-efficacy Individuals are asked whether they have the knowledge, skills, and 
experience required to start a new business. Dichotomous Yes or No using 
a dummy 
GEM APS for 2012 
Polity2 (level of 
democracy) 
Combines scores of Autocracy and subtracting scores of Democracy with 
a resulting unified polity scale ranging from +10 (strongly democratic) to 
-10 (strongly autocratic) (Marshall and Cole, 2008) Additive eleven point 
scale (0-10), ranging from 10 (most democratic) to 0 (least democratic) 
(Marshall and Cole, 2008). 
Polity IV project for 
the year 2012 
Fh_Polity2 (level 
of democracy) 
The scale ranges from 0-10 where 0 is least democratic and 10 most 
democratic. Average of Freedom House (fh_pr and fh_cl) is transformed 
to a scale 0-10 and Polity (p_polity2) is transformed to a scale 0-10. These 
variables are averaged into fh_polity2. The imputed version has imputed 
values for countries where data on Polity is missing by regressing Polity 
on the average Freedom House measure. (Charron et al., 2010). 
Quality of 
Government Dataset 
2016 
Democracy Democracy Score: additive eleven point scale (0-10), ranging from 10 
(most democratic) to 0 (least democratic) (Marshall and Cole, 2008).  
Polity IV project for 
the year 2012 
Political 
Globalization 
Measured by the number of embassies and high commissions in a 
country, the number of international organizations of which the country 
is a member, the number of UN peace missions the country has 
participated in, and the number of international treaties that the country 
has signed since 1945. 
Axel Dreher Index of 
Globalization, Quality 
of Government 2016 
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Political System 0. Presidential 
1. Assembly-elected President 
2. Parliamentary 
World Bank Database 
of Political Institutions 
2012, Quality of 
Government 2016 
Freedom from 
Corruption 
Is based on a 100-point scale in which a score of 100 indicates very little 
corruption and a score of 0 indicates a very corrupt government. 
Heritage Foundation 
2012, Quality of 
Government 2016 
Corruption 
Perception index 
The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen 
by business people, risk analysts, and the general public and ranges 
between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). 
Transparency 
International, Quality 
of Government 2016 
Political corruption The directionality of the Political Corruption index runs from less 
corrupt to more corrupt. The corruption index includes measures of six 
distinct types of corruption that cover both different areas and levels of 
the polity realm, distinguishing between executive, legislative and 
judicial corruption. 
Varieties of 
Democracy, Quality of 
Government 2016 
Control of 
Corruption 
All scores lie between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to 
better outcomes. 
World Bank 
Governance 
Indicators, Quality of 
Government 2016 
Government 
effectiveness 
All scores lie between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to 
better outcomes. 
World Bank 
Governance 
Indicators, Quality of 
Government 2016 
Business Freedom The business freedom score encompasses 10 components, all weighted 
equally and based on objective data from the World Bank’s Doing 
Business study. It is graded from 0 to 100, where 100 represents the 
maximum degree of business freedom 
Heritage Foundation 
2012, Quality of 
Government 2016 
Financial Freedom The financial freedom factor measures the relative openness of each 
country’s banking and financial system by determining: the extent of 
government regulation of financial services; the extent of state 
intervention in banks and other financial services; the difficulty of 
opening and operating financial services firms (for both domestic and 
foreign individuals); and government influence on the allocation of credit. 
It is graded from 0 to 100, where 100 represents the maximum degree of 
financial freedom.  
Heritage Foundation 
2012, Quality of 
Government 2016 
Regime Durability The number of years since the most recent regime change (defined by a 
three point change in the p_polity score over a period of three years or 
less) or the end of transition period defined by the lack of stable political 
institutions (denoted by a standardized authority score). 
Polity IV project for 
the year 2012 
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Table. Country of origin 
Country of birth Freq. Percent Cum. 
United States 113 1.47 1.47 
Russia 564 7.35 8.82 
Egypt 10 0.13 8.95 
South Africa 43 0.56 9.51 
Greece 18 0.23 9.74 
Netherlands 40 0.52 10.26 
Belgium 50 0.65 10.92 
France 208 2.71 13.63 
Spain 76 0.99 14.62 
Hungary 32 0.42 15.03 
Italy 126 1.64 16.67 
Romania 149 1.94 18.61 
Switzerland 91 1.19 19.8 
Austria 42 0.55 20.35 
United Kingdom 295 3.84 24.19 
Denmark 32 0.42 24.61 
Sweden 73 0.95 25.56 
Norway 26 0.34 25.9 
Poland 168 2.19 28.08 
Germany 376 4.9 32.98 
Peru 82 1.07 34.05 
Mexico 70 0.91 34.96 
Cuba 46 0.6 35.56 
Argentina 131 1.71 37.27 
Brazil 95 1.24 38.5 
Chile 33 0.43 38.93 
Colombia 138 1.8 40.73 
Venezuela 97 1.26 42 
Malaysia 162 2.11 44.11 
Australia 20 0.26 44.37 
Indonesia 86 1.12 45.49 
Philippines 38 0.49 45.98 
New Zealand 5 0.07 46.05 
Singapore 5 0.07 46.11 
Thailand 14 0.18 46.29 
Christmas Island 1 0.01 46.31 
Japan 18 0.23 46.54 
South Korea 19 0.25 46.79 
Vietnam 33 0.43 47.22 
China 81 1.06 48.27 
Turkey 146 1.9 50.18 
India 245 3.19 53.37 
Pakistan 47 0.61 53.98 
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Afghanistan 24 0.31 54.29 
Sri Lanka 14 0.18 54.47 
Burma (Myanmar) 20 0.26 54.73 
Iran 198 2.58 57.31 
Canada 55 0.72 58.03 
Morocco 133 1.73 59.76 
Algeria 93 1.21 60.97 
Tunisia 29 0.38 61.35 
Libya 7 0.09 61.44 
Senegal 8 0.1 61.55 
Mauritania 1 0.01 61.56 
Mali 5 0.07 61.63 
Guinea 7 0.09 61.72 
Ivory Coast 6 0.08 61.79 
Burkina Faso 1 0.01 61.81 
Niger 1 0.01 61.82 
Togo 1 0.01 61.83 
Benin 7 0.09 61.93 
Mauritius 4 0.05 61.98 
Liberia 1 0.01 61.99 
Sierra Leone 4 0.05 62.04 
Ghana 13 0.17 62.21 
Nigeria 22 0.29 62.5 
Central African Republic 4 0.05 62.55 
Cameroon 8 0.1 62.65 
Cape Verde 18 0.23 62.89 
Sao Tome and Principe 3 0.04 62.93 
Equatorial Guinea 1 0.01 62.94 
Gabon 4 0.05 62.99 
Republic of the Congo 11 0.14 63.14 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 36 0.47 63.61 
Angola 69 0.9 64.5 
Guinea-Bissau 5 0.07 64.57 
Barbados 2 0.03 64.6 
Sudan 11 0.14 64.74 
Rwanda 15 0.2 64.93 
Ethiopia 13 0.17 65.1 
Somalia 31 0.4 65.51 
Djibouti 2 0.03 65.53 
Kenya 17 0.22 65.75 
Tanzania 9 0.12 65.87 
Uganda 2 0.03 65.9 
Mozambique 31 0.4 66.3 
Bahamas 1 0.01 66.31 
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Zambia 44 0.57 66.89 
Madagascar 5 0.07 66.95 
Zimbabwe 127 1.65 68.61 
Malawi 16 0.21 68.82 
Lesotho 6 0.08 68.89 
Botswana 3 0.04 68.93 
Comoros 3 0.04 68.97 
Namibia 4 0.05 69.02 
Swaziland 2 0.03 69.05 
Saint Helena 1 0.01 69.06 
Eritrea 6 0.08 69.14 
Aruba 18 0.23 69.38 
Faroe Islands 5 0.07 69.44 
Greenland 6 0.08 69.52 
Gibraltar 1 0.01 69.53 
Portugal 75 0.98 70.51 
Luxembourg 9 0.12 70.63 
Ireland 18 0.23 70.86 
Iceland 5 0.07 70.93 
Albania 27 0.35 71.28 
Malta 1 0.01 71.29 
Cyprus 7 0.09 71.38 
Finland 65 0.85 72.23 
Bulgaria 51 0.66 72.89 
Lithuania 45 0.59 73.48 
Latvia 21 0.27 73.75 
Estonia 9 0.12 73.87 
Moldova 22 0.29 74.16 
Armenia 12 0.16 74.31 
Belarus 83 1.08 75.39 
Andorra 5 0.07 75.46 
Monaco 3 0.04 75.5 
Ukraine 182 2.37 77.87 
Serbia 164 2.14 80.01 
Montenegro 21 0.27 80.28 
Kosovo 22 0.29 80.57 
Croatia 112 1.46 82.02 
Slovenia 24 0.31 82.34 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 244 3.18 85.52 
Macedonia 28 0.36 85.88 
Czech Republic 79 1.03 86.91 
Slovakia 20 0.26 87.17 
Liechtenstein 1 0.01 87.18 
Bermuda 1 0.01 87.2 
119 
 
Grenada 9 0.12 87.31 
Falkland Islands 1 0.01 87.33 
Belize 1 0.01 87.34 
Guatemala 7 0.09 87.43 
El Salvador 8 0.1 87.53 
Honduras 20 0.26 87.79 
Nicaragua 154 2.01 89.8 
Costa Rica 4 0.05 89.85 
Panama 7 0.09 89.94 
Haiti 11 0.14 90.09 
Bolivia 56 0.73 90.82 
Guyana 15 0.2 91.01 
Ecuador 85 1.11 92.12 
Paraguay 37 0.48 92.6 
Suriname 31 0.4 93.01 
Uruguay 56 0.73 93.73 
Netherlands Antilles 2 0.03 93.76 
Saint Martin 2 0.03 93.79 
Guam 1 0.01 93.8 
Brunei 1 0.01 93.81 
Papua New Guinea 2 0.03 93.84 
Fiji 1 0.01 93.85 
Palau 1 0.01 93.86 
Micronesia 1 0.01 93.88 
Kazakhstan 99 1.29 95.17 
Saint Lucia 2 0.03 95.19 
Dominica 30 0.39 95.58 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 7 0.09 95.68 
Puerto Rico 3 0.04 95.71 
Dominican Republic 15 0.2 95.91 
Hong Kong 9 0.12 96.03 
Macau 1 0.01 96.04 
Cambodia 5 0.07 96.11 
Laos 2 0.03 96.13 
Trinidad and Tobago 9 0.12 96.25 
Jamaica 20 0.26 96.51 
Bangladesh 17 0.22 96.73 
Taiwan 12 0.16 96.89 
Lebanon 33 0.43 97.32 
Jordan 4 0.05 97.37 
Syria 13 0.17 97.54 
Iraq 56 0.73 98.27 
Kuwait 2 0.03 98.29 
Saudi Arabia 4 0.05 98.35 
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Yemen 4 0.05 98.4 
Gaza Strip & West Bank 2 0.03 98.42 
United Arab Emirates 3 0.04 98.46 
Israel 5 0.07 98.53 
Bahrain 1 0.01 98.54 
Qatar 1 0.01 98.55 
Bhutan 1 0.01 98.57 
Mongolia 1 0.01 98.58 
Nepal 5 0.07 98.65 
Tajikistan 6 0.08 98.72 
Turkmenistan 2 0.03 98.75 
Azerbaijan 24 0.31 99.06 
Georgia 29 0.38 99.44 
Kyrgyzstan 16 0.21 99.65 
Uzbekistan 27 0.35 100 
Total 7,677 100 
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Table. Correlations 
Variables TEA migrant log age male postsec_high work_ft_pt midincome bus_angel gdppercapita self_efficacy opportunity polity2 
TEAyydum2 1                       
migrant -0.0094 1                     
log age -0.0812 0.0311 1                   
male 0.065 -0.0121 -0.0346 1                 
postsec_high 0.0096 0.0426 0.0319 -0.0061 1               
work_ft_pt 0.1849 0.0032 -0.0111 0.1796 0.1547 1             
midincome -0.0019 -0.004 -0.0028 -0.0045 -0.0544 0.0337 1           
bus_angel 0.1051 0.0003 -0.0062 0.0559 0.0335 0.0698 -0.0162 1         
gdppercapita -0.1281 0.1277 0.1921 0.0016 0.1659 0.0393 -0.0035 -0.0645 1       
self_effic~y 0.2502 -0.0083 -0.0377 0.1309 0.045 0.1593 -0.0073 0.1177 -0.1413 1     
opportunity 0.1829 -0.0213 -0.0987 0.0534 -0.0091 0.0829 0.0218 0.098 -0.1287 0.224 1   
polity2 -0.1183 0.0939 0.1513 0.0015 0.1141 0.0166 -0.051 -0.0477 0.6577 -0.0719 -0.1875 1 
imputed polity -0.1048 0.1036 0.1415 0.0012 0.108 0.0224 -0.0492 -0.0373 0.64 -0.0509 -0.1502 0.8876 
political globalization -0.1213 0.0301 0.1482 -0.0023 0.0723 -0.0094 0.0214 -0.0907 0.4748 -0.1192 -0.1557 0.3835 
dpi_system -0.1334 0.092 0.1188 0.0075 0.0483 0.0011 -0.0331 -0.0723 0.477 -0.1223 -0.2036 0.4635 
p_durable -0.0458 0.0915 0.1552 -0.0082 0.1196 0.0189 -0.0092 -0.0291 0.6522 -0.0451 -0.03 0.4507 
hf_corrupt -0.1264 0.1312 0.1976 -0.0049 0.1431 0.0265 -0.0343 -0.0598 0.8543 -0.1298 -0.1341 0.7254 
ti_cpi -0.1311 0.1283 0.2002 -0.0031 0.1427 0.0202 -0.0377 -0.0644 0.8414 -0.1304 -0.1463 0.7209 
vdem_corr 0.137 -0.1222 -0.1911 0.0012 -0.1204 -0.0079 0.0472 0.0776 -0.7361 0.1181 0.1829 -0.7504 
wbgi_cce -0.1338 0.1294 0.1987 -0.0037 0.1391 0.0186 -0.0384 -0.0666 0.8491 -0.1296 -0.1423 0.7228 
wbgi_gee -0.1518 0.1311 0.207 -0.0024 0.16 0.0259 -0.0332 -0.0751 0.8469 -0.1541 -0.1868 0.7277 
hf_business -0.1486 0.1003 0.163 -0.0009 0.2047 -0.0045 -0.0104 -0.0696 0.623 -0.1427 -0.1441 0.4893 
hf_financ -0.0866 0.0863 0.1411 -0.0061 0.0949 -0.0038 -0.0293 -0.0401 0.529 -0.0784 -0.1492 0.5423 
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Variables continued imputed polity political globalization political system P_durable hf_corrupt ti_cpi vdem_corr wbgi_cce wbgi_gee hf_business hf_financ 
TEAyydum2                       
migrant                       
log age                       
male                       
postsec_high                       
work_ft_pt                       
midincome                       
bus_angel                       
gdppercapita                       
self_effic~y                       
opportunity                       
polity2                       
imputed polity 1                     
political globalization 0.3964 1                   
dpi_system 0.3625 0.2796 1                 
p_durable 0.4411 0.2232 0.0572 1               
hf_corrupt 0.7623 0.4183 0.5273 0.5435 1             
ti_cpi 0.7616 0.4337 0.5318 0.5286 0.9869 1           
vdem_corr -0.7323 -0.4181 -0.4924 -0.4754 -0.8758 -0.8998 1         
wbgi_cce 0.7575 0.4325 0.5372 0.5236 0.9881 0.9953 -0.8989 1       
wbgi_gee 0.7348 0.4337 0.5901 0.5339 0.9475 0.9443 -0.9007 0.9477 1     
hf_business 0.487 0.3387 0.4447 0.4079 0.6719 0.6664 -0.6126 0.6745 0.7408 1   
hf_financ 0.5464 0.2944 0.4229 0.3288 0.6333 0.6386 -0.662 0.6381 0.7091 0.5646 1 
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Econometric models details 
Political Freedom models 
The political freedom models are as follows: 
(1) TEA status = β0 + β1(Migrant) + β2(Log_Age) + β3(Male) + β4(Post_sec High) + β5(Work FT/PT) + β6(Mid 
Income) + β7(Business angel) + β8(GDP/capita) + β9(Self-efficacy) + β10(Opportunity Perception) + 
β11(Polity2) + β12(Fh_Polity2) + β13(Political Globalization) + β14(Political System) + β15(Regime Durability) 
+ ε 
(2) TEA status = β0 + β1(Migrant) + β2(Log_Age) + β3(Male) + β4(Post_sec High) + β5(Work FT/PT) + β6(Mid 
Income) + β7(Business angel) + β8(GDP/capita) + β9(Self-efficacy) + β10(Opportunity Perception) + 
β11(Polity2) + β12(Polity2*Migrant)+ ε 
(3)  TEA status = β0 + β1(Migrant) + β2(Log_Age) + β3(Male) + β4(Post_sec High) + β5(Work FT/PT) + β6(Mid 
Income) + β7(Business angel) + β8(GDP/capita) + β9(Self-efficacy) + β10(Opportunity Perception) + 
β11(Fh_Polity2) + β12(Fh_Polity2*Migrant)+ε 
(4)  TEA status = β0 + β1(Migrant) + β2(Log_Age) + β3(Male) + β4(Post_sec High) + β5(Work FT/PT) + β6(Mid 
Income) + β7(Business angel) + β8(GDP/capita) + β9(Self-efficacy) + β10(Opportunity Perception) + 
β11(P.Globalization) + β112(P.Globalization*Migrant)+ ε 
(5)  TEA status = β0 + β1(Migrant) + β2(Log_Age) + β3(Male) + β4(Post_sec High) + β5(Work FT/PT) + β6(Mid 
Income) + β7(Business angel) + β8(GDP/capita) + β9(Self-efficacy) + β10(Opportunity Perception) + 
β11(P.System) + β12(P.System*Migrant)+ ε 
(6)  TEA status = β0 + β1(Migrant) + β2(Log_Age) + β3(Male) + β4(Post_sec High) + β5(Work FT/PT) + β6(Mid 
Income) + β7(Business angel) + β8(GDP/capita) + β9(Self-efficacy) + β10(Opportunity Perception) + 
β11(Regime Durability) + β12(Regime Durability*Migrant)+ ε 
Corruption and Government Effectiveness models 
For the next set of hypotheses, I utilise: 
(7)  TEA status = β0 + β1(Migrant) + β2(Log_Age) + β3(Male) + β4(Post_sec High) + β5(Work FT/PT) + β6(Mid 
Income) + β7(Business angel) + β8(GDP/capita) + β9(Self-efficacy) + β10(Opportunity Perception) + 
β10(Freedom corruption) + β11(CPI)+ β12(Political Corruption) + β13(Control of Corruption) + 
β14(Government Effectiveness) + + ε 
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(8)  TEA status = β0 + β1(Migrant) + β2(Log_Age) + β3(Male) + β4(Post_sec High) + β5(Work FT/PT) + β6(Mid 
Income) + β7(Business angel) + β8(GDP/capita) + β9(Self-efficacy) + β10(Opportunity Perception) + 
β10(Freedom corruption) + β11(Freedom Corruption*Migrant) + ε 
(9)  TEA status = β0 + β1(Migrant) + β2(Log_Age) + β3(Male) + β4(Post_sec High) + β5(Work FT/PT) + β6(Mid 
Income) + β7(Business angel) + β8(GDP/capita) + β9(Self-efficacy) + β10(Opportunity Perception) + β11(CPI) 
+ β12(CPI*Migrant) + ε 
(10) TEA status = β0 + β1(Migrant) + β2(Log_Age) + β3(Male) + β4(Post_sec High) + β5(Work FT/PT) + β6(Mid 
Income) + β7(Business angel) + β8(GDP/capita) + β9(Self-efficacy) + β10(Opportunity Perception) + 
β11(Political Corruption) + β12(Political Corruption*Migrant) + ε 
(11)  TEA status = β0 + β1(Migrant) + β2(Log_Age) + β3(Male) + β4(Post_sec High) + β5(Work FT/PT) + β6(Mid 
Income) + β7(Business angel) + β8(GDP/capita) + β9(Self-efficacy) + β10(Opportunity Perception) + 
β11(Control of Corruption) + β12(Control of Corruption*Migrant) + ε 
 TEA status = β0 + β1(Migrant) + β2(Log_Age) + β3(Male) + β4(Post_sec High) + β5(Work FT/PT) + β6(Mid 
Income) + β7(Business angel) + β8(GDP/capita) + β9(Self-efficacy) + β10(Opportunity Perception) + 
β11(Government Effectiveness) + β12(Government Effectiveness*Migrant) + ε 
Business and Financial Freedom models 
And finally, I have: 
(12) TEA status = β0 + β1(Migrant) + β2(Log_Age) + β3(Male) + β4(Post_sec High) + β5(Work FT/PT) + β6(Mid 
Income) + β7(Business angel) + β8(GDP/capita) + β9(Self-efficacy) + β10(Opportunity Perception) + 
β11(Business Freedom) + β12(Business Freedom*Migrant) + ε 
(13) TEA status = β0 + β1(Migrant) + β2(Log_Age) + β3(Male) + β4(Post_sec High) + β5(Work FT/PT) + β6(Mid 
Income) + β7(Business angel) + β8(GDP/capita) + β9(Self-efficacy) + β10(Opportunity Perception) + 
β11(Business Freedom) + β12(Business Freedom*Migrant) + ε 
(14)  TEA status = β0 + β1(Migrant) + β2(Log_Age) + β3(Male) + β4(Post_sec High) + β5(Work FT/PT) + β6(Mid 
Income) + β7(Business angel) + β8(GDP/capita) + β9(Self-efficacy) + β10(Opportunity Perception) + 
β11(Financial Freedom) + β12(Financial Freedom*Migrant) + ε 
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Table 16. All variables model 
VARIABLES (1) 
  
Status: Migrant 0.18*** 
 (0.05) 
Log Age -0.55*** 
 (0.03) 
Gender = Male 0.07*** 
 (0.02) 
Post-Secondary Education 0.08*** 
 (0.02) 
Work: F-T, P-T 1.42*** 
 (0.02) 
Middle Income 33%tile -0.06** 
 (0.02) 
Business Angel 0.39*** 
 (0.03) 
GDP per capita (current US$) -0.00+ 
 (0.00) 
Perceived Capabilities 1.41*** 
 (0.02) 
Opportunity Perception 0.53*** 
 (0.02) 
Polity2 -0.15 
 (0.16) 
Imputed Polity/Freedom -0.12 
 (0.18) 
Political Globalization -0.00 
 (0.00) 
Political System -0.09+ 
 (0.05) 
Regime Durability 0.00 
 (0.00) 
Freedom from Corruption 0.02 
 (0.01) 
Corruption Perceptions Index 0.01 
 (0.02) 
Political corruption -0.26 
 (0.37) 
Control of Corruption -0.33 
 (0.42) 
Government Effectiveness -0.31+ 
 (0.19) 
Business Freedom -0.02*** 
 (0.00) 
Financial Freedom 0.01* 
 (0.00) 
Constant -2.22* 
 (1.01) 
Observations 167,749 
Number of Countries 56 
Note. Dependent variable: TEA Rate. 
Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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CHAPTER 4: EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONAL DISCONTINUITY ON BUSINESS 
CREATION IN THREE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA (MENA) COUNTRIES: 
ALGERIA, EGYPT & TUNISIA 
Abstract  
What happens to entrepreneurship and attitudes towards entrepreneurship when institutions 
change due to conflict (e.g. revolutions, uprisings, wars, etc.)? I explore this question by 
investigating how recent institutional changes related to the Arab Spring revolutions influence 
decisions to start a business in Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt. The Arab Spring Revolutions are 
considered to have created a change in the political and economic fabric in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region. Thus, the choice of these countries is primarily based on the recent 
political and economic changes that have taken place since the revolutions started in 2010. I draw 
on the paradoxical nature of institutional change through radical change due to revolutions and 
crises. Therefore, this chapter contributes to the existing literature by exploring how radical 
institutional change after conflict (revolutions, war, and uprisings) both directly and in conjunction 
with the personal characteristics of individuals influence entrepreneurial activity. The findings 
suggest that there should be a greater focus in countries coming out of conflict on how to leverage 
the benefits of social and business networks to stimulate growth through entrepreneurial activity. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The approach of this chapter builds upon the works of Mancur Olson and Daron Acemoglu 
(Acemoglu et al., 2012, Olson, 2008, Olson, 1993). Olson’s theory of economic growth proposes 
that when a country experiences prolonged periods of stability, economic growth suffers. Thus, 
over time a stable democracy will tend to amass more and more distributional coalitions (rent-
seeking special interest groups or elite oligarchs) whose political power will gradually grow, 
causing the impediment of economic growth.  
In contrast, in countries that experienced a deep rooted change in political regime, surges 
in economic growth rates have taken place. It is thus particularly suitable to use Olson’s work to 
analyse how political change may influence entrepreneurial business start-ups as entrepreneurial 
rates and development is expected to increase after political change (e.g. in the case of Arab Spring 
revolutions). An example of this argument in action is the following: in Great Britain, institutional 
structures that drive entrepreneurship, as well as cultural attitudes about these institutions, have 
remained intact for long periods of time despite several phases of political, economic and social 
change in its modern history that nevertheless did not cause any major disruption  (Olson, 2008).  
On the other hand, other countries in Europe such as Germany have historically endured 
long periods of instability, totalitarianism, civil conflict. The institutional structures that affect 
entrepreneurship such as the extent of the (formal) rule of law supportive of business start-ups as 
well as (informal) cultural values and norms were disrupted due to political change. Olson argues 
that with the disruption in these institutions and the overthrowing of the ruling regimes at the time, 
rent-seeking special interest groups composed of the oligarchy of people in power also disappear. 
This disruption of power may lead to a holistic market society where more individuals can 
participate in the overall economic growth.  
The previous argument, therefore, applies here. After political and economic change in 
emerging economies such as in Latin America, MENA region, and Africa, entrepreneurs can rise 
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and expand their common interests thanks to decreased ability to collude of larger organizations as 
a result of radical changes in institutional structures. 
In a more recent argument, Acemoglu et al. (2012) argue that for any economic success, 
institutions must be sufficiently centralized to provide basic public services including justice, 
property rights enforcement and education (Acemoglu et al., 2012). They theorize that institutions 
are divided into extractive and inclusive and they argue that rich countries are rich due to inclusive 
economic and political institutions, while poor countries are poor due to extractive institutions 
(Figure 4.1 below). Inclusive institutions enable productive innovation leading to sustained 
economic growth and extractive institutions are these where a “small” oligarchic group of 
individuals exploit the rest of the population to extract resources (Acemoglu et al., 2012).   
Historically radical institutional change has often taken place through conflict (revolutions, 
uprisings, and wars). In some (but not all) cases, extractive institutions are replaced by inclusive 
institutions in the affected countries. This process may lead not to incremental differential 
institutional drift but significant transformations in institutions. These notable transformations are 
called ‘critical junctures’ (and/or a crucial turning point in a country’s history); for example, the 
Glorious Revolution in England in 1688 which brought along much more inclusive institutions 
creating the conditions that led to the industrial revolution (Acemoglu et al., 2012). Yet 
revolutions may be endogenous in the institutional change model in the long term because they 
start from the dismay of the citizens of a nation from the current state of affairs. However, 
revolutions are not the only manner in which institutional change occurs. Not all significant 
change requires a revolution to take place; the discontinuity coming from accumulated gradual 
change may result from a specific set of political and social conditions that make reform based on 
collective action feasible (Fukuyama, 2011). Figure 4.1 below illustrates the institutional 
divergence process. 
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Figure 4.1 Critical Junctures 
Critical juncture       Institutional disruption  Institutions revert to 
extractive  
 
 
 
Conflict                     Extractive to Inclusive 
 
Based on the above introduction, I bring in micro aspects to the analysis and set to examine 
the relationships between the personal characteristics and entrepreneurial business start-up activity 
in Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia countries amidst radical political change in the region. I then explore 
how these personal characteristics may inspire the decisions to start business ventures in the three 
countries after the Arab Spring as compared to before. Personal resources and individual social 
networks may substitute for the systems to enforce formal regulatory institutions not being in place 
(Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2012). Thus potential entrepreneurs may develop a strong social network 
and are encouraged to utilize their skills in starting a business venture through these connections 
rather than the official formal channels (Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2012).  
In particular, in this chapter, I aim to examine the relationship between personal 
characteristics relevant to entrepreneurship such as self-efficacy, lack of fear of failure (De Clercq 
and Arenius, 2006, Minniti and Nardone, 2007, Stephan and Uhlaner, 2010), entrepreneurship-
relevant social resources (social connections) (Minniti and Nardone, 2007), financial resources 
(business angels) and their impact on and entrepreneurial activity in Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia 
before and after the Arab Spring. Mainly, I set out to explore how these personal characteristics 
influence entrepreneurial start-ups and how they are influenced by the prevalence of changing 
political, social and economic formal institutions due to conflict.  
As shown by Arenius and Minniti (2005), personal characteristics have an impact on the 
decision to start a business. That is, personal perceptions and attitudes about one’s skills (self-
efficacy), knowledge of other entrepreneurs and fear of failure are all critical factors in deciding to 
start a business (Arenius and Minniti, 2005, Arenius and De Clercq, 2005, Aidis et al., 2008, Estrin 
et al., 2012).  
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Following this, I explore and expand on the understanding of the effects of the above 
mentioned personal characteristics in an environment characterized by turmoil, instability and 
political change such as in the MENA region post Arab Spring. In particular, I investigate how and 
to what extent knowing other entrepreneurs through social connections impact decisions to start a 
business; and similarly if the belief in one’s skills and abilities (self-efficacy), and fear of failure 
affects decisions to start a new business venture (Hopp and Stephan, 2012) in post conflict Algeria, 
Egypt and Tunisia impact decisions to start a businesses. (Hopp and Stephan, 2012). 
Even though entrepreneurship is an occupational choice, it may be a choice out of necessity 
or one selected to capitalize on a business opportunity. When there are limited employment 
opportunities, then entrepreneurship may be the occupational route of choice in which case, 
imitation of business ideas and models may be borrowed (Hart and Mickiewicz, 2016). This in 
hand creates competition in the market but can also have a crowding out effect and push existing 
ventures out of the market. However, when the political, economic and social environments are 
changing in light of radical change induced by revolutions (e.g. Arab Spring revolutions), potential 
entrepreneurs may realize that business opportunities may ensue. Therefore, the environment 
becomes more attractive for entry because of the rising optimism following said radical change. 
Thus, this chapters aim to categorize potential entrepreneurship into those that see an opportunity 
for a business start-up in the near future. Additionally, entrepreneurship as an occupation choice 
can also mean that potential entrepreneurs may choose to start a business as a self-employment 
motivation. However, some may be looking into expanding and growing these businesses as well 
as creating jobs and aspiring at high growth rather than solely self-employment. Therefore, in this 
chapter I also categorize potential entrepreneurs into those that choose entrepreneurship motivated 
by self-employment and those that aspire for growth.      
The contribution of this chapter lies in its exploration of the impact of individual 
characteristics in an environment characterized by evident and exogenously determined radical 
institutional change. Institutional change in this scenario acts as a determinant of differing levels 
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of entrepreneurship in countries affected by the change (i.e. the Arab Spring). The decision to start 
a business venture is a complex one and is dependent on high risk-taking and individual personal 
traits and/or characteristics within the economic context. Therefore, I hope this chapter will serve 
as a starting point for further empirical studies of entrepreneurship in the MENA region economies 
and other emerging markets. To aid my analysis, I summarize the contextual background of the 
three countries over the period prior and post the Arab Spring revolutions of 2010 in which I will 
be able to assess the institutional environment based on historical indices and explore whether the 
current frameworks have changed either hindering and/or supporting entrepreneurial activity. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: the next section examines the conflict 
context of the Arab Spring revolutions and ensuing change. Next, the theoretical framework and 
proposed hypotheses are discussed. The methodology, sampling, and estimation are discussed next. 
Finally, the results and discussion of findings sections follow respectively. 
4.2 Context: The Arab Spring 
“Despite the prevailing pessimism, it should be recognised that the situation of pluralism 
has improved. There are now many more political parties, social movements, young people, 
women, organizations etc. who have a voice in the process. They have adopted the rule that 
freedom implies their participation and their right to make demands; a formula they seem 
unwillingly to surrender. There is, therefore, an enormous sense of citizen appropriation, 
an empowerment of the masses..” (Mediterranean, 2013). 
The Arab Spring has had deep political, social and economic implications in the Arab world 
when previously this region was considered one characterised by persistent authoritarianism for 
decades (Beck and Hüser, 2012). After countries in the Eastern Bloc completed their transition 
from Soviet-type economies to a freer market economy, many believed that this transition would 
be disastrous; however, entrepreneurs were able to assist in these transitional economies of Eastern 
and Central Europe by contributing substantially to new job creation, tackling a major problem 
facing Eastern Bloc economies during transition (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2009, Ayyagari and Beck, 
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2003, Aidis et al., 2008). As mentioned earlier in this chapter, formal institutional frameworks in a 
country play a critical role in developing an abundant and successful environment for 
entrepreneurship development. In this regard, I argue that the institutional frameworks in Egypt, 
Algeria and Tunisia considered as pre-and post-Arab Spring, and affected by political, economic 
and social change, have an important influence on decisions to start a business but also a unique 
impact from country to country. The following paragraphs shed light on the impact of the Arab 
spring revolutions on the institutional fabric in the countries affected and the region by spill over 
effects.  
The Arab Spring was a wave of revolutionary demonstrations, protest, riots and civil wars 
that took place in the Arab world and more specifically the MENA region. These protests erupted 
on December 18 of 2010 and have yet to stop in some countries (e.g. Syria, Egypt, and Yemen) at 
time of writing. They were fuelled by the discontent and frustration of the people in the region with 
the ruling regimes and governments following enormous income inequalities, human rights 
violations and the long-standing state of emergency applied in many of the region’s countries. In 
addition, these revolutions were prompted by poverty, unemployment and the lack of economic 
opportunities for the region’s countries increasing youth population (Malik and Awadallah, 2013). 
Furthermore, many of the youth in the Arab World have gradually become more educated leading 
to higher aspirations for their careers and futures. These aspirations have been severely dampened 
by the local government’s unwillingness to reform economically and politically (Malik and 
Awadallah, 2013).  
In many MENA region countries, the Arab Spring confronted the political power of the 
ruling regimes but it also dictated the political debate in other countries in the region not directly 
affected by the wave of revolutions. According to Beck and Hüser (2012), the Arab Spring was 
inevitable because of the considerable change in the demographic fabric of the Arab World. The 
population of the region grew from 128 million to 359 million inhabitants in the years between 
1970 and 2010. Of this number, an estimated 40 percent live below the poverty line while almost 
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30 percent of the population is aged between 20 and 35 years (Beck and Hüser, 2012). Even though 
this generation of Arab youth is more educated and qualified than the generations before them, the 
unemployment rates for the individuals between the age of 15 and 24 was the highest in the world 
at  25.6 percent in 2003 (Beck and Hüser, 2012). Additionally, the labour markets in these countries 
offer limited opportunities for university graduates leading to the severe discontent and desperation 
amongst the educated.  
It is imperative to note that in addition to the political/institutional changes that arise as a 
result of the Arab Spring, there are also divergent levels of macro economic indicators such as GDP 
per capita for Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia in the periods before and after the Arab Spring. Graph 1 
in the appendix from the World Bank’s: World Development Indicators illustrates the changes in 
GDP per capita in Algeria and Egypt for several years in the period before and after the Arab Spring 
(from 2008 to 2012). As can be seen, in both Algeria and Egypt, GDP per capita increased after the 
Arab Spring revolutions noting a slight surge from 2011 and 2012 in Algeria while keeping a steady 
pace in Egypt. Due to continuous economic reforms applied by the Algerian government prior to 
unrest and upheaval, the economic environment developed allowing for opportunities and growth.  
4.2.1. Political implications of the Arab Spring 
The Arab Spring started on December 18, 2010 in Tunisia following Mohammed 
Bouazizi's self-immolation in protest of the autocratic treatment by the government of the people 
as well as corruption. As protests and demonstrations exploded in Tunisia, a chain reaction 
followed leading to governments being overthrown in four countries in the MENA region. These 
are: 
 Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Bin Ali stepped down and fled to Saudi Arabia on 
January 14, 2011. 
 President of Egypt Husni Mubarak stepped down from power on February 11, 2011, after 
18 consecutive days of protests ending a 30-year reign as head of government. Elected 
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president Mohamed Mursi of Egypt was ousted by the military on July 3, 2012, just one 
year after being elected leading to ongoing violence and demonstrations as a result. 
 Following a civil war, Libyan president Muammar Al Kadafi was overthrown on August 
23, 2011, and killed on October 20, 2011, after 42 years in power. 
 Ali Abdallah Salih, president of Yemen agreed to step down and initiate early elections on 
February 27, 2012.  
On the one hand, the collapse of these autocratic regimes in Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria 
among others has not led to the establishment of democratic regimes which would bring about 
political and economic stability. Conversely, many countries involved in the Arab Spring have been 
experiencing political, economic and social instability. Overall, over the span of seven years since 
the eruptions of the revolutions, the affected countries did not reach a significant point of stability 
and the transition from autocratic rule to democratic rule is still in its infancy. Since the onset of 
these revolutions, sound and vigorous research has yet to surface and it is an opportunity to explore 
the status of entrepreneurial development as well as the effects of entrepreneurship determinants 
post conflict on these economies, with more general lessons on the impact of institutional disruption 
on entrepreneurship.  
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To illustrate political reforms in Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia, I use the Freedom House rating which 
includes two measures, political rights and civil liberties: The graphs below illustrate these 
measures.  
Graph 2. Political Rights 
 
Note: the higher the FH ratings means the lower the political rights index: 0 = best political rights, 7 = worst political 
rights 
Source: Freedom House: Freedom in the World Scores, 2014  
Graph 3. Civil Liberties 
 
Note: the higher the FH ratings means the lower the civil rights index: 0 = best civil rights, 7 = worst civil rights 
Source: Freedom House: Freedom in the World Scores, 2014 
 
In other countries like Algeria, Jordan, and Morocco, leaders have been pressured into 
decreeing political and economic reforms to try and pacify public anger and demonstrations. Table 
29 and the country sections in the appendix summarizes the conflicts in the countries concerned 
for the purposes of this chapter. 
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The Arab Spring brought transformations to Egypt and Tunisia in a similar fashion, 
through mass protests. Demonstrations spread throughout both countries in addition to the 
collapse of the security forces and the refusal of the military to intervene steering the direction of 
the downfall of the regimes. Tunisia President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia on 
January 14, 2011, and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak resigned a month later, however, from 
that point onwards both countries led different paths of transition (Ottaway, 2013). This 
divergence illustrates the argument about the range of possible outcomes at a ‘critical juncture’, 
after a regime change (Acemoglu et al., 2012). 
4.3 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
4.3.1 Definition of Entrepreneurship 
In the following section, I present, and define the key concepts taken into consideration in 
this chapter starting by firstly defining entrepreneurship.  
There are two distinct categories or notions under which entrepreneurship is classified: the 
behavioural and the occupational notions. In the behavioural point of view, entrepreneurship can 
be defined as ‘the perceptions and creation of economic opportunities’ (Wennekers and Thurik, 
1999). Thus, the emphasis, in this case, is on the managerial behaviours of the individual pursuing 
an entrepreneurial endeavour. The occupational category, on the other hand, defines the individual 
as an entrepreneur by their occupation type; in other words someone who works for their own 
accord (Gartner, 1985, Gartner, 1988, Hébert and Link, 1988). The occupational category 
concentrates on the differences between individuals owning and managing a business of their own 
and individuals in full-time employment. This chapter accentuates the occupational notion of 
entrepreneurship and distinguishes between those potential entrepreneurs that recognize a business 
opportunity in the future and those that do not see such opportunities, as well as those that are 
motivated by self-employment and those that aspire for growth thus also drawing from the 
behavioural notion.  
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One of the main aspects of the definition of entrepreneurship is illustrated by (Bygrave and 
Hofer, 1991); that entrepreneurs are people who recognize an opportunity and pursue this 
opportunity via entrepreneurial activities. This definition takes into consideration that 
entrepreneurship is about new venture/business creation. This chapter, therefore, highlights the 
start-up phase of entrepreneurship in the three chosen countries, described as the nascent 
phase/nascent entrepreneurship. Nascent entrepreneurship is the phase where an individual has 
decided to become an entrepreneur and taken significant steps to start a venture ending either with 
a successful creation of a business or the discontinuation of the venture altogether (Hopp and 
Stephan, 2012, Reynolds et al., 2005).  
The focus of this chapter is on decisions to start a business and the effects of personal 
characteristics on taking these decisions shaped by changes in the business environment due to 
conflict. Some economists have proposed to look at determinants of the phenomena of 
entrepreneurship investigating the institutional environment including formal and informal 
institutions, and social capital (Aidis et al., 2008, Aidis et al., 2012, Estrin et al., 2012, Estrin et al., 
2013). Some of these determinants are based on earlier work in the fields of institutions and 
entrepreneurship as well as political economy such as (Baumol, 1996, Baumol, 1993, Baumol, 
2002b, Baumol, 1968), and (North, 1990, North, 1994, North, 1997) and Acemoglu and Johnson 
in (Acemoglu et al., 2005) and more recently Acemoglu and Robinson (Acemoglu et al., 2012). It 
is argued in some literature that the supply and quality of entrepreneurship is likely to be influenced 
by the institutional framework of a country (Henrekson, 2007, Hessels et al., 2008). The following 
section looks at the definition of institutions and how they are likely to affect entrepreneurship. 
4.3.2 Institutions 
Based on the work of Douglas North (North, 1990, North, 1994, North, 1997), institutions 
can be defined as the structures which provide rules, constraints, and incentives that act as tools of 
governance for exchanges and cooperation. In essence, institutions are considered the implicit or 
explicit “rules of the game” which frame behavior and are deeply embedded in the society, yet, 
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adaptable to change (Estrin et al., 2013). These institutions are often formal, such as rule of law 
and property rights, but also informal such as cultural norms, beliefs, and values (North, 1990, 
North, 1994, North, 1997). Informal institutions can complement formal institutions by increasing 
their effectiveness (Troilo, 2011).  
While research about individual factors enabling or hampering entrepreneurship has 
increased significantly; in contrast, the research regarding the relationship between institutions and 
entrepreneurship is still emerging (Hopp and Stephan, 2012). Recent cross country research has 
produced important insights into formal institutions and their impact on entrepreneurial 
activity/behaviour (Aidis et al., 2008, Estrin et al., 2012, Bowen and De Clercq, 2008).   
The focus of this chapter is on the impact of personal characteristics on entrepreneurial 
start-up decisions influenced by institutional change post the Arab Spring. I examine how cultural 
norms affect individual’s perceptions about the skills and abilities they need for starting a business 
(self-efficacy) (Arenius and Minniti, 2005, Minniti, 2004). I also explore how knowledge of other 
entrepreneurs  or in other words, social connections (Minniti, 2004, Minniti and Nardone, 2007, 
Baron, 2000), lack of fear of failure (Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979) and finally if the individual was 
a business angel in the past, can have an impact on entrepreneurial start-ups pre and post 
institutional change.  
I follow on from (Stephan and Uhlaner, 2010, Arenius and Minniti, 2005) studies and target 
the individual characteristics of social connections, self-efficacy, fear of failure and being a 
business angel in the past that influence entrepreneurial business start-ups. I investigate the effects 
of these factors on business start-up decisions by comparing between the three countries with the 
aim of identifying the extent of influence and capacity of such factors amidst political, economic 
and or social change post the Arab Spring. As already discussed, historically, the three countries 
have been under autocratic/military regimes for several decades but since 2010 and the eruption of 
the Arab Spring Revolutions, the region experienced major instability; more so in Egypt and 
Tunisia compared to Algeria where the older regimes of former president Husni Mubarak who 
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ruled from 1981 to 2011 and Ben Ali in Tunisia who was in power from 1987 to 2011 were 
dissolved. In turn, in Algeria, the effect of the Arab Spring Revolutions did not succumb to full 
removal of the ruling regime but rather led to the creation of several economic and political reforms 
led by Abdel Aziz Bouteflika as president, (for more details refer to context section above).  
Recent research in economics has emphasized the occupational choice aspect of 
entrepreneurship and as a result, this research has identified demographic and economic factors 
such as age, education, income levels and work status as important drivers of this activity. 
Perceptual variables such as self-efficacy, social connections, fear of failure and being a business 
angel are considered personal characteristics because potential entrepreneurs rely extensively on 
the subjectivity and sometimes biased perceptions of these traits rather than objective outcomes of 
success and thus they may have a stronger effect on decisions to start a business venture than other 
human capital variables such as education level, work experience and demographics (Hopp and 
Stephan, 2012, Arenius and Minniti, 2005). 
Arenius and Minniti (2005) have found that subjective perceptions about one’ skills and 
abilities, fear of failure, knowledge of other entrepreneurs (social connections) are highly correlated 
with start-up decisions suggesting that starting a business is a multi-faceted process conditional on 
not just the economic environment but the personal characteristics of individuals. Therefore, I 
examine how these personal characteristics impact the decisions to start a business in light of the 
institutional change (political and economic) before and after the Arab Spring in the three countries. 
Internal conflicts such as the ones following the Arab Spring revolutions in the MENA region 
suggest that formal institutions were weakened and the rule of law, as well as formal authority, 
were undermined and replaced by informal elite structures such as paramilitary groups (Mickiewicz 
et al., 2014) thus warranting further investigation. 
4.3.3 Political change and entrepreneurship 
Mancur Olson argues that there is a distinction between (a) interest groups and/or oligarchs 
that have colluded over time within the elites of a society and seen as leading to effects unfriendly 
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to economic growth, and (b) encompassing coalitions, which are seen as potentially aiding with 
economic growth. He then argues that over time a stable democracy will tend to accrue more of 
these distributional coalitions, gradually hindering economic growth. Olson uses post World War 
II performance of Germany and Japan comparing these two countries to the UK, arguing that the 
overthrow of the ruling regimes at the time in Germany and Japan led to the collapse of oligarchs 
(distributional coalitions). With this collapse, however, the performance of Germany and Japan 
rapidly improved post WWII while the economic performance of the relatively stable UK post-
WWII was relatively weak (Olson, 2008).  
Olson (2008) predicts that over time societies that accumulate more and more of these 
coalition groups will naturally decline in terms of economic growth as the groups tend to avert 
economic resources away from overall economic growth enhancing activities to ones that are 
geared toward group gains (Heckelman, 2007). Nonetheless, Olson (2008) also illustrates that the 
process of breaking down the distributional coalitions is not only attached to instability, war and 
conflict but can also occur in a democratic stable environment such as in the case of the UK under 
Margret Thatcher where the country underwent significant political and economic transformation 
of privatization and marketization (Olson, 2008). The powers of distributional coalitions could be 
dissolved through peaceful democratic means as well, thus not only during times of conflict or via 
revolution. But these oligarchies can also be dissolved during instability times through coups and 
revolutions such as the Arab Spring. These coups are predicted to dissolve the influence of these 
coalition groups on economic resources and open avenues for economic growth. However, 
continuous instability can also lead to rent seeking activities, thus Olson suggests that the best time 
for growth should be when there is a recent revolution/up-rising and where long term stability is 
anticipated to follow (Heckelman, 2007, Olson, 2008).  
Based on Olson’s growth theory (Olson, 2008), the Arab Spring can be considered a form 
of political and economic changes in the MENA region that could lead to the dissolution of the 
oligarchies and to instability; however we still need to wait further to understand the results of these 
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revolutions. Nevertheless, regime change may have resulted in identifying entrepreneurial business 
opportunities in the aforementioned countries. I hypothesized that even if Egypt is currently 
unstable politically, socially and economically, the impact of breaking up oligarchic structure 
implies then the likelihood of business start-ups will increase in light of the political change. 
Likewise in Tunisia, the effects of political change will on balance be equally positive for 
entrepreneurship opportunities. However, I also posit that in Algeria which has not experienced 
significant political change, entrepreneurial business start-ups will increase due to the economic 
reforms implemented by the government, (for a review of these reforms please refer to context 
section above). As discussed by Acemoglu et al. (2012), critical junctures are crucial turning points 
that disrupt the existing political and economic equilibrium in one or many societies. In this chapter, 
the Arab Spring represents this critical juncture. The Algerian regime chose to implement economic 
reforms immediately after the uprisings took place in order to contain the ferocity and vigour of 
the demonstrations. I postulate that these economic changes will reveal business opportunities that 
will be realised by the Algerians, thus increasing entrepreneurial business start-ups.  
Thus, potential entrepreneurs in Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria are believed to be more likely 
to start a business venture post the Arab Spring. Moreover, stemming from long reigns of autocratic 
regimes in the three countries, individuals in such environments tend to have less confidence levels 
in their capacities and abilities to start a business venture as they have passed through the hardships 
imposed by these regimes on the society. Some of the traits of the past autocratic ruling regimes 
imposed harsh limitations on learning, education, and interaction with the outside world to protect 
the regime. Let us consider Egypt as an example. Husni Mubarak’s administration was in control 
of most institutional elements in the country including the media, education, health as well as 
security and intelligence agencies. Constitutional freedoms such as speech among others were 
severely constrained during this reign and so citizens had less motivation and less opportunity to 
express their needs (Kienle, 2012, Korany and El-Mahdi, 2012). With these measures in place, 
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societies are in the long run bound to feel under achieving and unmotivated as institutional support 
become scarce.  
Based on the literature reviewed throughout this thesis, I produce a general understanding 
of entrepreneurial start-up decisions in the context of economies emerging from conflict and 
experiencing dynamic political changes. It is important to stylize the possible factors affecting 
entrepreneurship in more detail to understand the opportunities as well as constraints in this kind 
of environment especially in three countries with complex political, cultural and business 
environments. A comparative approach is used in this chapter to explore empirically the differences 
between Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia in entrepreneurial start-up decisions. It is important to note 
the effects of the Arab Spring revolutions and the ensuing political change as well as other reforms 
it may have caused must be taken into consideration; thus, for the purposes of this chapter the 
analysis includes time differences depicting the political change that took place before and after 
the start of the Arab Spring Revolutions in 2010. Several arguments emerge and are built based on 
intuition initially and will later be tested using appropriate samples and data.  
Before highlighting the factors and arguments that may impact entrepreneurial activity in 
post conflict environments, I look at a general view on business start-up rates in the three countries 
to investigate whether there are change trends taking place in the years following the revolutions 
in every country respectively. Therefore this chapter aims to examine entrepreneurship in the 
economies of regions coming out of conflict.  
Post conflict environments require special attention as they can be a hub for opportunities 
once institutional, social and economic restructuring takes place but they can also easily revert back 
to violence and instability (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Although institutional change (political, 
economic and social) may positively impact entrepreneurship through enhancing the business 
environment and business opportunities, there is also a negative impact of uncertainty in the 
environment (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, Collier, 2007). More specifically, regime change can 
bring about positive effects, however, as in the case of Egypt for instance, the results of the regime 
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change can be ambiguous and the political, social and economic environments are still unstable. 
Thus, change brings about conflicting influences; one is positive effects of institutional change 
breaking up old constraints and the other is uncertainty about the environment due to continued 
instability and/or relapse of conflict (Collier, 2007). However, positive effects of institutional 
change can outweigh negative consequences as time lapses and the change itself becomes stable 
over time. As economic agents familiarize themselves with the institutional change and its ensuing 
consequences a learning effect takes over and individuals adapt to the nature of the changes as well 
as seek opportunities.  
There are two distinct categories or notions under which entrepreneurship is classified: the 
behavioural and the occupational notions. In the behavioural point of view, entrepreneurship can 
be defined as ‘the perceptions and creation of economic opportunities’ (Wennekers and Thurik, 
1999). Thus, the emphasis, in this case, is on the managerial behaviours of the individual pursuing 
an entrepreneurial endeavour. The occupational category, on the other hand, defines the individual 
as an entrepreneur by their occupation type; in other words someone who works for their own 
accord (Gartner, 1985, Gartner, 1988, Hébert and Link, 1988). The occupational category 
concentrates on the differences between individuals owning and managing a business of their own 
and individuals in full-time employment. This chapter accentuates the occupational notion of 
entrepreneurship and distinguishes between those potential entrepreneurs that recognize a business 
opportunity in the future and those that do not see such opportunities, as well as those that are 
motivated by self-employment and those that aspire for growth thus also drawing from the 
behavioural notion.  
High-growth aspiration entrepreneurship as contrasted with low-growth aspiration 
entrepreneurship merits investigation as it prompts the advancement of the job market as well as 
significant market expansion and overall economic growth. Innovation, high job growth, and 
market expansion are some of the potentially many activities of high-growth aspiration 
entrepreneurship that may lead to sustained growth (Troilo, 2011). Entrepreneurs can potentially 
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become high-growth aspiring entrepreneurs planning market expansion and diversification, 
innovation in products, services and solutions and or a combination of all these activities (Troilo, 
2011).  
As institutional change in the form of political, social and economic change takes place in 
the MENA region post the Arab Spring, high-growth aspiring entrepreneurs might realize many 
business opportunities. The quality of the institutional environment impacts entrepreneurial 
activities and the potential of high-growth aspiring ventures (Estrin et al., 2009). As mentioned in 
the context section, before political change, the MENA region was been defined by autocratic 
regimes which suppressed freedoms and had weak rule of law, and corrupt institutions. Due to 
cross-country heterogeneity in entrepreneurship, several strands of literature have investigated the 
significance of institutional settings for entrepreneurship (Estrin et al., 2009). Of these studies, 
investigation on the role of strong property rights has been argued to be an important foundation 
for entrepreneurial activity (Johnson et al., 2002, Aidis et al., 2009).  Desai et al. (2003) suggested 
that entrepreneurship growth takes place in less corrupt countries and countries where strong 
property rights, as well as a strong rule of law, are implemented. The Arab Spring has overthrown 
several autocratic regimes including Egypt and Tunisia as well as influencing economic and 
political reforms in Algeria giving high-growth aspiring entrepreneurship an opportunity to 
increase in these countries. There are two linked facets to the above argument: the effect of 
instability leading on from conflict (the Arab Spring) and creation of a window of opportunities 
after this instability. However, these two forces can potentially be conflicting; uncertainty and 
undermining of property rights stemming from instability may increase in the short run but in the 
long run this effect may decrease as society adapts to the change in the environment and this in 
hand can positively affect expectations of people and restore confidence in the market environment. 
Therefore, I hypothesize the following: 
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H1: the likelihood of starting a business motivated by opportunity recognition will increase 
post political change and/or reform after the Arab Spring revolutions compared to pre-
political change and/or reform. 
H2: the likelihood of starting a business motivated by high growth aspirations will increase 
post political change and/or reform after the Arab Spring revolutions compared to pre 
political change and/or reform. 
The next section sheds light on the impact of personal characteristics of social connections, 
self-efficacy, fear of failure and being a business angel on entrepreneurial business start-ups 
considering institutional change (political and economic change) from which my hypotheses are 
formulated.   
4.3.4 Political change and self-efficacy 
According to several streams of research in diverse fields such as psychology, sociology, 
and more generally human behaviour sciences confidence in one’s abilities or in other words 
perceptions about self-efficacy, play a significant role in decisions to start a business (Bandura and 
Locke, 2003, Baron, 2000). In order to start a business venture, the incumbent must have great 
belief in their skills and capabilities to withstand the pressures of needing to succeed and overcome 
challenges experienced in this crucial phase of entrepreneurship (Arenius and Minniti, 2005). In 
fragile environments characterized by recent political and economic changes such as in Algeria, 
Egypt and Tunisia, confidence in one’s abilities and skills is vital to the progress of an 
entrepreneurial endeavour as it compensates for the weakness/lack of formal rules and property 
rights. The influence of self-efficacy in post conflict versus oligarchic environments is still under 
researched; therefore, this chapter targets this research gap considering a recent major political and 
economic change in the MENA region.  
Taking the decision to start a business venture in a post-conflict environment requires a 
great deal of courage, focus, and self-motivation to resist the instability as well as the changing 
environments. As discussed above, conflicting influences can take place after institutional change 
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(Collier, 2007, Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). The impact of uncertainty can influence individuals to 
lessen the ambiguity of the environment with strong self-motivation, focus, and courage.  Therefore 
it is important for an individual aiming to start a business venture to have positive belief in their 
skills and abilities to be able to start and sustain a successful business venture. Starting a business 
venture, but more specifically sustaining a successful business venture necessitates confidence in 
one’s abilities and skills in order to face the dynamic challenges of such ventures (Hopp and 
Stephan, 2012).  
As already discussed, in Egypt and Tunisia, a major political change took place in which 
both ruling regimes were overthrown and replaced with newly democratically elected governments. 
However, the situation in Egypt is of a different character as the democratically elected government 
was then also ousted via military coup thus the status remains unstable. In contrast, Algeria noted 
several limited political and economic reforms (review Context section above) but no political 
regime change. 
In light of these political and economic changes, I hypothesize that positive perceptions 
about one’s abilities and skills will lead to higher likelihood of an individual to start a business 
venture in light of instability and uncertainty post political change and economic reform 
environments. Accordingly, I formulate the following hypotheses: 
H3: positive perceptions about self-efficacy has a stronger impact on the likelihood of 
starting up a business in post political change and/or reform environments compared to 
pre-political change and/or reform environments. 
4.3.5 Political change and entrepreneurial social connections 
The second factor I investigate is the impact of social connections on decisions to start a 
business. Research in the field of entrepreneurship has revealed that networks between individuals, 
enterprises and government officials or other stakeholders play a significant role in the 
advancement of businesses and their growth (Kets de Vries et al., 2004, Aidis et al., 2008). The 
positive impact of social connections can also be explained by the important function that role 
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models and being part of a social networks. Knowing other entrepreneurs can decrease uncertainty 
during instability and changing political and economic environments. Being part of these 
entrepreneurial networks also provides information for potential entrepreneurs, therefore, 
supporting them in the start-up process.  
Social networks henceforth called social connections have been found to be important for 
attaining resources such as information and finance thus enriching an entrepreneurs’ capacity and 
capabilities leading to more successful endeavours (Aldrich et al., 1987, Ardichvili et al., 2003, 
Hills et al., 1997). Aidis et al. (2008) show that social connections in China and Russia play a vital 
role in defining the success of an entrepreneurial endeavour versus its failure, and illuminate 
informal networks as a powerful means for successful entrepreneurship. Studies have also found 
evidence that supports the role of social connections in terms of their capacity to enhance business 
performance (Batjargal, 2003). 
As illustrated in the context of the Arab Spring in the three countries Algeria, Egypt and 
Tunisia, full democratization is yet to take place but there are encouraging steps taken to introduce 
institutional reforms that enhance market-based economies. However, with the reform process still 
in its early stages, the role of social connections is likely to still be of crucial importance to potential 
entrepreneurs in deciding to start a business venture in all three countries.  
As already discussed, Olson postulates that over time in stable countries with unchanged 
boundaries, distributional coalitions (interest groups, collusive organizations such as entrepreneurs) 
start to form and grow. As these groups grow, their influence will redirect economic resources from 
growth developing activities such as technological advancements and process improvements to 
destructive self-rent seeking activities; therefore hindering economic growth (Olson, 2008) and the 
argument can be easily extended to a negative impact on wider entrepreneurial activities amongst 
the population. 
However, what Olson theorizes is that during turmoil times (war, uprisings, protests etc.) 
these coalitions and groups are broken down. Once peace is restored to a country in turmoil, then 
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growth picks up rapidly (Olson, 2008).Nevertheless, this will only occur if the period of instability 
is not prolonged and is followed by stability. More often than not, however, a period of uncertainty 
ensues post conflict/reform which means that having social connections to offer access to 
information, resources, insurance and knowledge becomes more important for business start-up 
decisions (Djankov et al., 2005, Djankov et al., 2006a, Lin, 2002) and needed as there is now less 
reliability to access these resources through appropriate channels. I hypothesize that positive social 
connections lead to a higher likelihood of an individual to start a business venture in light of 
instability and uncertainty in post political change and economic reform environments. 
Accordingly, I formulate the following hypotheses:  
H4: Social connections have a stronger impact on the likelihood of starting up a business 
in post political change and/or reform environments compared to pre-political change 
and/or reform environments. 
4.3.6 Political change and Fear of failure 
Fear of failure is viewed by Arenius and Minniti (2005) as the perceived risk of 
experiencing failure and its consequences when engaging in entrepreneurship. I utilize this 
definition in this chapter. Furthermore, fear of failure can be argued to be context specific and thus 
displays a reflection of the impact of institutional change (political, social and economic). It has 
also been discussed that fear of failure plays an important in individual’s occupational and 
achievement aspirations including decisions to start a business venture (Welpe et al., 2012, 
Burnstein, 1963) Similar to the above hypothesis, the context I consider for this section is the 
institutional change that took place in Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt post the Arab Spring. As shown 
earlier, the MENA region suffers from autocratic regimes which suppressed freedoms and 
identified with weak property rights, rule of law and corrupt institutions. Nevertheless, more 
economic opportunities might transpire post the Arab Spring, however, these opportunities might 
still be risky and uncertain, therefore fear of failure in these instances matters more meaning that 
with the increase in fear of failure there will be less responsiveness to these potential opportunities 
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and vis versa. Because individuals typically feel more uncertainty post conflict, they are likely to 
respond with more fear of failure. Accordingly, I formulate the following hypothesis: 
H5: Fear of failure will reduce entrepreneurial activity more post political change and/or 
reform environment compared to pre-political change and/or reform environments. 
4.3.7 Political change and Business angels 
Business angels add value to the economy and to potential entrepreneurs. In environments 
where the formal financial institutional framework is missing or is underdeveloped then business 
angels step in and present potential entrepreneurs with the appropriate financing and information 
required to start a business venture (Aidis et al., 2008, Batjargal, 2003). Thus, business angels have 
the opportunity to select and pin point certain projects that they may be interested in funding with 
the preference given to individuals whom they may have encountered or worked with in the past 
and to individuals who they have social connections with (Venkataraman, 1997). This in essence 
is an indirect investment in an entrepreneurial start-up. In light of this, potential entrepreneurs will 
be more likely to decide to a start a business venture if they themselves where business angels in 
the past because they would have accumulated the experience from past endeavours as well as the 
investment capability (Mickiewicz, 2005, Aidis et al., 2012, Mason and Harrison, 2000a, Mason 
and Harrison, 2000b). Due to the weak and unstable institutional environment post conflict (Arab 
Spring), uncertainty can be an outcome. Business angels are endowed with more wealth, 
competence and experience in business start-ups and therefore are less likely to be concerned too 
much with the resulting uncertainty. They are more likely to be interested in identifying new 
opportunities and be more likely inclined to fund potential entrepreneurial ventures. In light of 
these arguments, I hypothesize the following: 
H6: Having been a business angel in the past has a stronger impact on the likelihood of 
starting up a business in post political change and/or reform environments compared to 
pre-political change and/or reform environments. 
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4.4 Methodology 
4.4.1 Data Sources 
Building on the ideas above, the proposed data to test the hypotheses herein is the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), which provides cross-sectional data on attitudes, perceptions, 
and rates of entrepreneurship in many countries over a period of years (Reynolds et al., 2005). The 
GEM dataset has been commonly accepted as a source of data to use for research on 
entrepreneurship (Freytag and Thurik, 2010, Bowen and De Clercq, 2008). Data are collected via 
surveys from a population representative sample of at least 2,000 individuals per country including 
entrepreneurs, non-entrepreneurs, and potential entrepreneurs. These samples are random and 
representative of the adult population between 18 and 64 years of age. GEM database uses a 
harmonized method to measure entrepreneurship (Reynolds et al., 2005). And so, the data measures 
different aspects of the entrepreneurship including types of entrepreneurs (opportunity vs necessity), 
entrepreneurial intentions and other characteristics of entrepreneurial activity (Bosma et al., 2012). 
I view entrepreneurs involved in business start-ups as those pursuing new, nascent start-up activity; 
further categorized as individuals between the ages of 18 and 64 who have taken steps towards 
creating a business venture in the past year (Acs et al., 2004).  
4.4.2 Sample 
I utilize GEM Adult Population Survey data for the following 5 years: 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011 and 2012. The data corresponds to the three countries Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia. For Egypt, 
I use the available data which were for the years 2008, 2010 and 2012; Algeria I use data for 2009, 
2011 and 2012 and finally for Tunisia I use data for 2010 and 2012. I omit 2009 data for Tunisia 
as there are many missing observations from several of the key variables. Additionally, all 
individual level control variables are taken directly from the GEM dataset. Table 17 below 
illustrates a timetable of the events of the Arab Spring for each of the three countries as per the 
years available. 
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Table 17. Timeline of events and data availability 
Year Egypt Tunisia Algeria 
2008 + (coincides with global 
financial crisis) 
  
2009   + 
2010 + + (regime overthrown and 
change of constitution) 
 
Arab Spring: Dec 17, 2010 
2011 (regime overthrown, 
continued instability) 
 + (limited political change, but 
economic reforms introduced) 
2012 + + + 
2013 President Mursi 
overthrown 
  
 
The final samples included a maximum of 5,252 observations/individuals in Egypt for the 
three years combined. In Algeria, the maximum sample size is 6,942 observations/individuals. 
Finally, in Tunisia, the sample size was significantly less due to omitting the year 2009. After 
further investigation of the GEM report and data for Tunisia, there was no explanation provided as 
to why the sample size was very low for Tunisia in 2009. Thus, I include 4,000 
observations/individuals in the Tunisia sample. A total of 16,194 observations were included in the 
final sample. Table 30 in the Appendix shows a description of the variables chosen. 
4.4.3 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is drawn from the GEM data and is business start-ups. Business 
start-ups correspond to those individuals who seek to start a business either on their own or in 
collaboration with partners and have yet to pay any wages or salaries for more than three months 
and thus are also called nascent entrepreneurs (Reynolds et al., 2005). GEM data survey asks a 
question to its respondents about whether they start a business either on their own or in 
collaboration with partners and have yet to pay any wages or salaries for more than three months 
and are given a yes or no option for an answer. Accordingly, the equations analyse the determinants 
of the probability of an individual to be involved in starting a business and test the 
differences/similarities between the three countries following a design by Aidis et al. (2008). 
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Because the data is cross sectional it is only possible to study if there is a relationship between 
business start-ups and perceptual variables and their interaction terms, and causality is not easily 
identified. As both the dependent variable and independent variables are taken from a cross 
sectional data set, endogeneity may arise as a problem (Efendic et al., 2014).  
I also test models which use two categories of business start-ups. The chosen categories of 
business start-ups are (1) recognition of an opportunity and no opportunity start-ups as well as (2) 
high growth aspiration and low growth aspiration start-ups, adopted as differentiating criteria. In 
terms of the first categorization (recognition of an opportunity), I use this classification as a 
robustness measure. Even though entrepreneurship is an occupational choice, it may be a choice 
out of necessity or to capitalize on business opportunity. When there are limited employment 
opportunities, then entrepreneurship may be the occupational route of choice in which case, 
imitation of business ideas and models may be borrowed (Hart and Mickiewicz, 2016). This in 
hand creates competition in the market but can also have a crowding out effect and push existing 
ventures out of the market. As for opportunity motivated entrepreneurship, the environment is more 
attractive for entry because of perceived opportunities for novel business ideas.  
Then I categorize business start-ups into a related typology of high growth aspiring versus 
low growth aspiring business start-ups. I use GEM classification of opportunity motivated 
entrepreneurs: those respondents who say they perceive potential business opportunities in the next 
6 months and can capitalize on this opportunities to start a business venture. Likewise, I also use 
GEM classification of high growth and low growth aspirations. High growth aspiring 
entrepreneurial start-ups are those who have intentions to launch high-growth oriented projects, 
thus creating 10 or more jobs in the first 5 years (Reynolds et al., 2005).   
4.4.4 Independent variables 
As mentioned previously, the study analyses the determinants of the probability of an 
individual to be involved in starting a business against several individual level independent 
variables. The independent variables are as follows, business angel: if you were a business angel 
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in the past 3 years which proxies for past experience (Venkataraman, 1997, Aidis et al., 2008, 
Batjargal, 2003); social connections: if you know an entrepreneur(s) in the past 3 years and it 
measures whether an individual has social connections to an entrepreneur (Arenius and Minniti, 
2005, Baron, 2000, Aldrich, 1999) which proxies for the important of role models in aiding 
potential entrepreneurs with entrepreneurial confidence; self-efficacy: if you believe you have the 
skills required to become an entrepreneur (Arenius and Minniti, 2005, Baron, 2000, Gartner, 1985) 
and finally fear of failure: if you stated that fear of failure would prevent you from starting a 
business venture (Arenius and Minniti, 2005, Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979).  
4.4.5 Other control variables 
I control for the level of educational attainment, as previous research has found that 
individuals with higher educational attainment are more likely to gear their efforts towards starting 
a business venture. In addition, as illustrated in Estrin and Mickiewicz (2011b), being a male may 
affect the decision to start a business, and thus I include a dummy variable for gender.  
4.4.6 Model Specification: logit regression 
I test the above hypotheses by exploring business start-ups rates, the motivation of start-
ups and quality of start-ups (recognition of an opportunity/high aspirations or low aspirations) 
across the sample post the Arab Spring versus the past. The independent variables include controls 
for gender and educational levels of the respondents. The main independent variables are 
perceptions about skill levels (self-efficacy), fear of failure, and social connections by knowing a 
current entrepreneur thus adding to networking capacity. Because the dependent variable business 
start-ups with opportunity/business start-ups with high growth is a categorical variable with 3 
outcomes, I test the data for the first set of hypotheses (H1-H2) using multinomial logistic 
regression. For the remaining hypotheses (H3 – H6), I test the data using a logit regression because 
the dependent variable business start-ups is a 2 category variable. The main independent variables 
for H3-H6 are used in interactions and are perceptions about skill levels (self-efficacy), fear of 
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failure, and social connections by knowing a current entrepreneur thus adding to networking 
capacity. 
A multinomial logistic regression measures the relationship between a multi–categorical 
dependent variable with more than two categories and with one or more independent variables. It 
is in many ways similar to an Ordinary Least Squares regression; however a multinomial logistic 
regression estimates the probability of an event occurring (Arenius and Minniti, 2005). Below are 
the multinomial logit models I use in my analysis: 
Pr(Opportunity recognition entrepreneurship = 1 | X1, X2,….XN) = F(B0 + B1X1 + B2X2 
+ ….+BNXN) 
Pr(High aspiring entrepreneurship = 1 | X1, X2,….XN) = F(B0 + B1X1 + B2X2 + ….+BNXN) 
where X1 = male, X2 = age, X3 = secondary educ, X4 = FT/PT work, X5 = self-efficacy, X6 = fear 
of failure, X7 = social connections, X8 = business angels  
In this chapter, this event is starting a business venture (also, distinguishing between the 
opportunity recognition and not recognizing an opportunity) versus not starting a business. I 
estimate two separate models for each of the two dependent variables (opportunity recognition 
entrepreneurship and high aspiring entrepreneurship). For the opportunity recognition 
entrepreneurship dependent variable, the categories of response are 2 = recognizes an opportunity, 
1 = does not recognize an opportunity, and 0 = no entrepreneurial activity. As for high aspiring 
entrepreneurship, the categories are 2 = high aspiration, 1 = self-employment, and 0 = no 
entrepreneurial activity.  
In H3-H6 I estimate models that test the likelihood of an individual starting a business 
venture by interacting the perceptual variables with the years in question to capture Arab Spring 
time differences.  I test whether an individual’s engagement in a business start-up is associated with 
the perceptions about required skills, fear of failure, social connections and being a business angel.  
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4.5 Summary of descriptive statistics and correlations 
This section reports descriptive statistics of all study variables overall and by countries 
examining changes over time. Table 18 in the appendix gives a brief illustration of country 
differences. Tables 19 and 20 below illustrate these descriptive statistics. As can been seen from 
Table 19, the maximum total number of observations is 16,194 respondents. Nearly 14% of the 
individuals in the sample are in the process of starting a business. Business start-ups who are based 
on opportunity represented 8% of the total sample, while necessity motivated start-ups represent 
6% of the whole sample. High growth aspiring and low growth aspiring start-ups represent 5% and 
8% respectively. Social connections represent a large 43% of the sample. Unsurprisingly and due 
to the economies of the chosen countries (factor driven economies, Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia) 
(Kelley et al., 2012), the percentage of respondents who were business angels in the past is 
approximately 7% of the whole sample. 
Almost 50% of the sample believes they have the required skills to become entrepreneurs 
while 27% of the respondents believe fear of failure would deter them from starting a business. 
Male entrepreneurs represent only a marginally higher percentage than female entrepreneurs at 
51%. And finally, the mean age of the population sample in all three countries is 36.3 years. 
Table 20 illustrates the variation in business start-ups per country. Out of the total 14% of 
business start-ups in all three countries, the share of Egypt was 21%, Algeria was 14% and Tunisia 
was 4%. Business start-ups who are based on opportunity represented 12% in Egypt, 8% in Algeria 
and 3% in Tunisia while necessity motivated start-ups represent 9% in Egypt, 8% in Algeria and 
1% in Tunisia. High growth aspiring start-ups represent 4% in Egypt, 8% in Algeria and 1.5% in 
Tunisia while low growth aspiring start-ups represent 17% in Egypt, 6% in Algeria and 2% in 
Tunisia. Social connections are present among 40% of entrepreneurs in Egypt, 52% in Algeria and 
42% in Tunisia. 
The correlations in Table 21 below suggest that individuals with higher self-efficacy, 
secondary education and those knowing an entrepreneur are more likely to be engaged in business 
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start-ups. Fear of failure is negatively correlated with business start-ups. Males have a slight 
advantage in entrepreneurial start-ups. Overall, all the independent variables indicate a significant 
association with entrepreneurial business start-ups in the directions hypothesized. Thus, these 
correlations may be the first indication of the positive impact of social connections, self-efficacy 
and being a business angel on business start-ups as well as an illustration of the negative impact of 
fear of failure on business start-ups. As literature suggests (Parker, 2009, Aidis et al., 2008), 
knowing an entrepreneur from the past i.e. utilizing social connections and building social capital 
has a positive effect on the likelihood of starting a business. Fear of failure does not seem to prevent 
entrepreneurial development as cultures in Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia are more forgiving and 
accepting of failure due to their collectivist composition and family oriented traditions (Hofstede 
et al., 1997). Finally as suggested by (Stephan and Uhlaner, 2010, Baron, 2000), confidence in 
one’s skills and ability required to become a successful entrepreneur led to more likelihood for 
individuals to attempt starting a business and this is the case in the MENA region countries Egypt 
and Algeria. 
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Table 19. Descriptive Statistics, Aggregate Level 
Variable Observations Frequency Percentage Std. Dev. 
Business start-up 16,194 2,036 12.57 .3315501 
Start-up Opport 16,194 1,177 7.27 .5516506    
Start-up no opport 16,194 854 5.28 .5516506    
Start-up High aspir 16,194 349 2.16   .41073 
Start-up Self-emp 16,194 1,687 10.42 .41073 
Social Connections 16,194 7,685 47.25 .4992562   
Business Angel 16,194 995 6.12 .2396502    
Self-efficacy 16,194 8,709 53.54 .4987598 
Fear of failure 16,194 4,685 28.80 .4528563 
Gender (male) 16,194 8,264 50.81 .4999505 
Age  16,194 Mean: 37.5  30.02122 
Table 20. Country Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable 
 
Observations 
Egypt 
Frequency 
 
Percentage 
Business start-up 5,252 1,057 20.13   
Start-up Opport 5,252 610   11.62 
Start-up no opport 5,252 446 8.49   
Start-up High aspir 5,252 166 3.16 
Start-up Self-emp 5,252 891 16.96 
Social connections 5,252 2,109 40.02 
Business Angel 5,252 284   5.39 
Self-efficacy 5,252 3,043 57.74 
Fear of failure 5,252 1,797 34.10 
Gender (male) 5,252 2,700 51.23 
 
Variable 
 
Observations 
Algeria 
Frequency 
 
Percentage 
Business start-up 6,942 833 12.00 
Start-up Opport 6,942 461 6.64 
Start-up no opport 6,942 368 5.30 
Start-up High aspir 6,942 149 2.15 
Start-up Self-emp 6,942 684 9.85 
Social connections 6,942 3,885 55.54 
Business Angel 6,942 554 7.92 
Self-efficacy 6,942 3,410 48.75 
Fear of failure 6,942 2,005 28.66 
Gender (male) 6,942 3,593 51.37 
Variable Observations Tunisia 
Frequency 
Percentage 
    
Business start-up 4,000 146 3.65 
Start-up Opport 4,000 106 2.65 
Start-up no opport 4,000 40 1.00 
Start-up High aspir 4,000 34 0.85 
Start-up Self-emp 4,000 112 2.80 
Social connections 4,000 1,691 42.26 
Business Angel 4,000 157 3.92 
Self-efficacy 4,000 2,256 56.39 
Fear of failure 4,000 883 22.07 
Gender (male) 4,000 1,971 49.26   
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Table 21. Correlation Matrix 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Business start-up 1 
         
Start-up Opport 0.9484 1 
        
Start-up High aspir 0.9456 0.8989 1 
       
Gender 0.1242 0.1235 0.1165 1 
      
Age -0.031 -0.0294 -0.0288 -0.0007 1 
     
Education -0.0007 -0.0005 0.0051 0.0508 0.0015 1 
    
Self-efficacy 0.1787 0.19 0.1717 0.189 -0.0379 -0.0154 1 
   
Fear of failure -0.005 -0.0127 -0.0069 -0.075 0.0012 -0.0048 -0.0281 1 
  
Social connections 0.1345 0.1371 0.1343 0.1514 -0.0362 0.0209 0.2003 0.0053 1 
 
Business angel 0.0808 0.0838 0.0757 0.0824 0.0051 -0.0017 0.0773 -0.0326 0.1248 1 
Note: Correlations matrix is based on a sample of 16,194 observations. Business start-ups correlations. 
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4.6 Results 
In the following section, I report the regression findings from my hypotheses testing for the 
three countries. I first discuss the set-up for H1 and H2 in Tables 22 and 23. The two dependent 
variables used are the categorical variables opportunity recognition/no recognition and high 
growth/self-employment entrepreneurship using the whole sample. In each table column 1 can be 
seen as a benchmark and columns 2-4 are used correspondingly to test each country effect 
separately. Tables 24-27 illustrate the multinomial logit regression results for Egypt, Tunisia, and 
Algeria focusing on more complex results related to personal characteristics, using 3 separate 
models, one for each country, but still utilising the whole sample. Tables 28 and 29 at the end of 
this section summarize the findings. Finally, Table 31 (in the Appendix) provides a summary of 
support for hypotheses. 
The models in Table 22 tests the likelihood of an individual starting a business venture due 
to recognizing an opportunity, not recognizing one, or not starting a business venture (omitted 
benchmark). Table 23 focuses on high growth vs self-employment motivated entrepreneurship. The 
purpose of these tests is to find out whether that probability increased post the Arab Spring, for 
each country. First column could be seen as a benchmark, while the remaining models test the 
probability of an individual starting a business and the change over time by interacting year effects 
(pre and post the Arab Spring). For each case one country-before change effect is missing to enable 
a simple interpretation of that country post change effect compared with missing / benchmark. 
These models correspond to my first set of hypotheses H1 and H2. For H3-H6 I use logit 
regressions to test the probability of an individual starting a business as driven by Arab Spring 
interacted with the perceptual variables. All findings are reported using odds ratios to aid with 
interpretation and below I discuss all the results corresponding to these findings.   
More specifically, for Tables 22 and 23, corresponding to H1 and H2, I have estimated models 
corresponding for each of the hypotheses. Models 2 – 4 in Table 22 and 5-8 in Table 23 correspond to 
the hypotheses which concern opportunity recognition/no opportunity recognition (H1) and high 
growth/low growth (H2) respectively. In models 2 and 6 in the tables I test how different are Tunisia; 
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models 3 and 7 are for Egypt, and 4 and 8 for Algeria (post change versus pre change each). The missing 
benchmark for these models is the variable representing pre-change situation in each country. All the 
coefficients corresponding to the hypotheses are highlighted in red font to allow for clearer presentation.  
4.6.1 H1 – H2 Political change: Opportunity recognition and high growth entrepreneurship 
Results for H1 are discussed. Model 1 in table 22 indicates significance of all variables 
corresponding to starting a business venture motivated by opportunity recognition except for the 
2012 post change year dummy. Surprisingly, the odds ratio coefficients of the post change year 
dummy suggest that no recognition of opportunity entrepreneurial business start-ups motivated 
decreased post change; however, opportunity recognition start-ups coefficients are insignificant.   
Results from models 2 and 4 corresponding to Tunisia and Egypt respectively suggest that 
entrepreneurial start-ups motivated by opportunity recognition have increased post change after the 
Arab Spring revolutions.  However, a different pattern appears for Algeria. The results for Algeria 
(model 2) suggest that both opportunity recognition and no opportunity recognition motivated start-
ups decreased post reforms. This result is however unexpected. Therefore, H1 is partly supported 
for Egypt and Tunisia but I find no support for increase in entrepreneurial start-ups in Algeria post 
reforms.   
Results for H2 are now discussed in models 5-8 found in table 23. Similar to H1, model 5 
indicates significance of all variables corresponding to starting a business venture motivated by 
opportunity recognition except for the 2012 post change year dummy and fear of failure. However, 
this time, the 2012 post change year dummy is significant but suggests that both high growth and 
self-employment start-ups decreased post the Arab Spring. Results from models 6 suggest that self-
employment motivated start-ups increased post change in Tunisia but high growth start-ups is 
insignificant post change. Akin to H1, Algeria results show in model 7 suggest that entrepreneurial 
start-ups decreased post reforms. However, model 8 for Egypt indicates that both self-employment 
and high growth motivated start-ups increased post change. Thus, H2 is also partly supported for 
Egypt but I find no support for Algeria and Tunisia. Tables 22 and 23 below show these results.  
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4.6.2 H3-H6 Political change: perceptual variables results 
Tables 24-27 present the estimation results for H2-H5. Models 9 to 20 report all estimates 
including the yearly interactions with the perceptual variables illustrating changes in the impact of 
each perceptual variable over time. Post-estimation tests are available in the appendix under the 
headline (Post-estimation tests). All models control for age and gender and yield a negative/positive 
and significant coefficient for the impact of being younger and male respectively in that it increases 
the likelihood of participating in starting a business (Delmar and Davidsson, 2000). This is 
consistent with the literature which suggests that males participate more actively in 
entrepreneurship than their female counterparts and younger individuals also actively participate 
more in entrepreneurship than older individuals.  
In models 9 to 11, I test the interaction of year dummies showing changes over time with 
the independent variable: self-efficacy in the three countries, models 12 to 14 estimate interaction 
of social connections, models 15 to 17 estimate interaction of fear of failure and finally models 18 
to 20 test the interaction of business angels. Model 9 suggests that self-efficacy in Algeria post 
reform is insignificant. However models 10 and 11 for Tunisia and Egypt respectively are above 
one and significant for the impact of self-efficacy post change, ie. positive perceptions of self-
efficacy increase the likelihood of starting a business in Tunisia and Egypt post the Arab Spring. 
These results so far are consistent with H1 and H2 particularly for Algeria. That implies that H3 is 
partially supported and self-efficacy perceptions have an impact on business start-ups in Tunisia 
and Egypt post the Arab Spring.  
 Models 12 is also insignificant for social connections post reforms in Algeria suggesting 
no impact. A similar result can be seen in model 13 for Tunisia. However, model 14 for Egypt is 
significant and above one suggesting positive impact of social connections on business start-ups 
post the Arab Spring. Therefore, H4 is also partially supported and social connections only have 
an impact on business start-ups in Egypt.  
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Models 16 and 17 for Tunisia and Egypt suggest a similar pattern to Algeria; individuals 
are more likely to engage in business start-ups post the Arab Spring when there is less fear of failure.    
Model 15 for Algeria is significant post reform and the odds ratio coefficient suggests that less fear 
of failure increases the likelihood of starting a business venture. Thus, H5 is supported. 
Models 18 to 20 test the impact of being a business angel on entrepreneurial start-ups post 
the Arab Spring for H6. Models for Tunisia and Egypt are positive and below one suggesting that 
being a business angel decreases the likelihood of starting a business venture post the Arab Spring. 
Being a business in Algeria however is insignificant post reforms. These result signify that H6 is 
no supported. In fact, an opposite effect is suggested in Tunisia and Egypt.  
Tables 24-27 correspond to H3-H6. I conducted separate significance post-estimation tests of 
the coefficients for each of the countries to learn the differences between pre and post change influence 
of personal characteristics on entrepreneurship activity in the respective countries. All tests except for 
models 13 and 19 suggest that there is a statistically significant interaction between that before and after 
change variables. Model 13 insignificant test results are not unexpected as the coefficients for the 
interaction are also insignificant as discussed above with regards to Tunisia and the proxy for social 
connections. Model 19 test is also insignificant; however, the hypothesis test was marginally significant.  
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Table 22: Opportunity vs No opportunity pre and post change 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES No_opport opport No_opport opport No_opport opport No_opport opport 
Gender = Male 1.70*** 1.73*** 1.69*** 1.72*** 1.69*** 1.72*** 1.69*** 1.72*** 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) 
Age 0.99*** 0.98*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Secondary education 0.93 1.12 0.91 1.11 0.91 1.11 0.91 1.11 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Self-efficacy 1.74*** 4.25*** 1.83*** 4.42*** 1.83*** 4.42*** 1.83*** 4.42*** 
 (0.14) (0.36) (0.15) (0.38) (0.15) (0.38) (0.15) (0.38) 
Fear of failure 1.12 0.81** 1.19* 0.85* 1.19* 0.85* 1.19* 0.85* 
 (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) 
Social connections 1.56*** 2.11*** 1.72*** 2.31*** 1.72*** 2.31*** 1.72*** 2.31*** 
 (0.12) (0.15) (0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.16) 
Business angels 1.45** 1.77*** 1.57*** 1.92*** 1.57*** 1.92*** 1.57*** 1.92*** 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Pre change Tunisia 0.14*** 0.37***   0.06*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.04)   (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Pre change Egypt 1.52*** 2.25*** 12.07*** 8.91*** 0.71*** 0.85   
 (0.12) (0.17) (2.84) (1.79) (0.07) (0.09)   
Pre change Algeria   17.01*** 10.44***   1.41*** 1.17 
   (4.03) (2.15)   (0.14) (0.13) 
Post change (2012) 0.41*** 1.04       
 (0.03) (0.07)       
Post change Tunisia   1.11 3.01*** 0.07*** 0.29*** 0.09*** 0.34*** 
   (0.36) (0.67) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) 
Post change Egypt   10.70*** 16.22*** 0.63*** 1.55*** 0.89 1.82*** 
   (2.57) (3.25) (0.07) (0.17) (0.09) (0.17) 
Post change Algeria   2.67*** 3.90*** 0.16*** 0.37*** 0.22*** 0.44*** 
   (0.65) (0.78) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 
Constant 0.07*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.10*** 0.04*** 0.07*** 0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Observations 16,189 16,189 16,189 16,189 16,189 16,189 16,189 16,189 
Odds ratios *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Table 23: High aspirations vs Low aspirations pre and post change 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES self_employment job_for_others self_employment job_for_others self_employment job_for_others self_employment job_for_others 
Gender = Male 1.74*** 1.54*** 1.74*** 1.52*** 1.74*** 1.52*** 1.74*** 1.52*** 
 (0.10) (0.18) (0.10) (0.18) (0.10) (0.18) (0.10) (0.18) 
Age 0.98*** 0.99* 0.98*** 0.99* 0.98*** 0.99* 0.98*** 0.99* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Secondary education 0.98 1.31+ 0.97 1.28+ 0.97 1.28+ 0.97 1.28+ 
 (0.08) (0.19) (0.08) (0.19) (0.08) (0.19) (0.08) (0.19) 
Self-efficacy 2.65*** 3.13*** 2.75*** 3.44*** 2.75*** 3.44*** 2.75*** 3.44*** 
 (0.17) (0.43) (0.18) (0.48) (0.18) (0.48) (0.18) (0.48) 
Fear of failure 0.94 0.86 0.99 0.95 0.99 0.95 0.99 0.95 
 (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.12) (0.06) (0.12) (0.06) (0.12) 
Social connections 1.72*** 2.41*** 1.88*** 2.88*** 1.88*** 2.88*** 1.88*** 2.88*** 
 (0.10) (0.30) (0.11) (0.37) (0.11) (0.37) (0.11) (0.37) 
Business angels 1.66*** 1.47* 1.78*** 1.73** 1.78*** 1.73** 1.78*** 1.73** 
 (0.15) (0.27) (0.17) (0.32) (0.17) (0.32) (0.17) (0.32) 
Pre change Tunisia 0.24*** 0.31***   0.07*** 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.26*** 
 (0.03) (0.06)   (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.07) 
Pre change Egypt 1.94*** 1.60*** 13.69*** 3.86*** 0.90 0.38***   
 (0.12) (0.21) (2.56) (1.06) (0.08) (0.06)   
Pre change Algeria   15.18*** 10.28***   1.11 2.66*** 
   (2.90) (2.73)   (0.10) (0.44) 
Post change (2012) 0.74*** 0.51***       
 (0.04) (0.06)       
Post change Tunisia   2.76*** 1.20 0.18*** 0.12*** 0.20*** 0.31*** 
   (0.59) (0.42) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) 
Post change Egypt   16.60*** 8.25*** 1.09 0.80 1.21* 2.14*** 
   (3.14) (2.22) (0.10) (0.13) (0.09) (0.35) 
Post change Algeria   4.74*** 0.83 0.31*** 0.08*** 0.35*** 0.22*** 
   (0.89) (0.25) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) 
Constant 0.07*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.10*** 0.02*** 0.09*** 0.01*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Observations 16,194 16,194 16,194 16,194 16,194 16,194 16,194 16,194 
Odds ratios *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Table 24. Logit results predicting effects of self-efficacy on  
entrepreneurial start-ups 
VARIABLES (9) (10) (11) 
               
Gender = Male 1.71*** 1.70*** 1.72*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Age 0.99*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Secondary education 1.02 1.02 1.02 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Self-efficacy 2.42*** 2.42*** 2.42*** 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Fear of failure 0.98 0.99 0.99 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Social connections 2.02*** 2.02*** 2.01*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Business angels 1.78*** 1.78*** 1.78*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Self-efficacy post change Algeria 1.15   
 (0.16)   
Self-efficacy pre change Algeria 1.87***   
 (0.30)   
Self-efficacy post change Tunisia  1.31*  
  (0.16)  
Self-efficacy pre change Tunisia  4.88**  
  (2.53)  
Self-efficacy post change Egypt   2.06*** 
   (0.32) 
Self-efficacy pre change Egypt   0.99 
   (0.14) 
Constant 0.14*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 16,194 16,194 16,194 
Test 0.0006 0.0014 0.000 
Odds ratios *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 25. Logit results predicting effects of social connections on 
entrepreneurial start-ups 
VARIABLES (12) (13) (14) 
    
Gender = Male 1.70*** 1.70*** 1.70*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Age 0.99*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Secondary education 1.02 1.02 1.02 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Self-efficacy 2.85*** 2.86*** 2.85*** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Fear of failure 0.98 0.98 0.98 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Social connections 1.91*** 1.91*** 1.91*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Business angels 1.75*** 1.77*** 1.76*** 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) 
Social connections post change Algeria 0.85   
 (0.10)   
Social connections pre change Algeria 1.94***   
 (0.32)   
Social connections post change Tunisia  1.17  
  (0.13)  
Social connections pre change Tunisia  0.80  
  (0.18)  
Social connections post change Egypt   1.47** 
   (0.20) 
Social connections pre change Egypt   0.87 
   (0.11) 
Constant 0.13*** 0.01*** 0.10*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Observations 16,194 16,194 16,194 
Test 0.0001 0.14 0.002 
Odds ratios *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Table 26. Logit results predicting effects of fear of failure on  
entrepreneurial start-ups 
VARIABLES (15) (16) (17) 
    
Gender = Male 1.71*** 1.71*** 1.71*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Age 0.99*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Secondary education 1.03 1.02 1.03 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
Self-efficacy 2.86*** 2.83*** 2.87*** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Fear of failure 1.20* 1.20* 1.20* 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Social connections 2.02*** 2.02*** 2.02*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Business angels 1.77*** 1.77*** 1.76*** 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) 
Fear of fail post change Algeria 0.78+   
 (0.10)   
Fear of fail pre change Algeria 0.60***   
 (0.09)   
Fear of fail post change Tunisia  0.72**  
  (0.08)  
Fear of fail pre change Tunisia  0.31**  
  (0.14)  
Fear of fail post change Egypt   0.57*** 
   (0.08) 
Fear of fail pre change Egypt   0.85 
   (0.12) 
Constant 0.12*** 0.01*** 0.09*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Observations 16,194 16,194 16,194 
Test 0.0015 0.0012 0.0003 
Odds ratios *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 27. Logit results predicting effects of business angels on 
entrepreneurial start-ups 
VARIABLES (18) (19) (20) 
    
Gender = Male 1.70*** 1.70*** 1.70*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Age 0.99*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Secondary education 1.02 1.02 1.02 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Self-efficacy 2.84*** 2.85*** 2.84*** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Fear of failure 0.98 0.98 0.98 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Social connections 2.01*** 2.01*** 2.01*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Business angels 2.13*** 2.13*** 2.13*** 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
Business angel post change Algeria 1.00   
 (0.23)   
Business angel pre change Algeria 0.55**   
 (0.11)   
Business angel post change Tunisia  0.68*  
  (0.12)  
Business angel pre change Tunisia  0.92  
  (0.43)  
Business angel post change Egypt   0.58** 
   (0.12) 
Business angel pre change Egypt   1.02 
   (0.26) 
Constant 0.12*** 0.01*** 0.09*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Observations 16,194 16,194 16,194 
Test 0.010 0.094 0.016 
Odds ratios *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10
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The tables below summarize the impact of self-efficacy, social connections, business angels 
and fear of failure on business start-ups. 
Table 28. Pre and post change summary 
Country Algeria Egypt Tunisia 
Variable Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre 
Self-efficacy N/A √ √ N/A √ √ 
Social connections N/A √ √ N/A N/A N/A 
Fear of failure √ √ √ N/A √ √ 
Business angels N/A √* √* N/A √* N/A 
Post and pre change: N/A = insignificant,  
√ = significant and correct sign,  
√* = significant and incorrect sign 
 
Table 29. Opportunity recognition and high growth summary 
Country Algeria Egypt Tunisia 
Variable Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre 
Opportunity recognition  N/A N/A √ N/A √ N/A 
High growth N/A N/A √ √ N/A √ 
Post and pre change: N/A = insignificant,  
√ = significant and correct sign 
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4.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
Based on the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) Adult Population Survey (APS) 
individual data samples for the years 2008 to 2012 for Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia, this chapter tests 
the impact of the motivation and quality of entrepreneurship (opportunity recognition/high growth) 
amidst institutional change on business start-ups. The chapter also examines the mechanisms by 
which personal characteristics such as social connections and positive self-efficacy influence the 
decisions to start a business venture in the aforementioned countries following institutional political, 
economic and social change ensuing post the Arab Spring compared with the earlier period. The 
study and testing procedure takes into consideration how these characteristics differ in their impact 
comparatively before and after the transition.  
The hypotheses are tested via models where I measure interaction effects between 
independent and yearly dummy variables (business angels, self-efficacy, social connections and 
fear of failure). The results for Egypt suggest that political change after the Arab Spring ensued by 
the election of Dr. Mohamed Mursi as president in 2012 played an important role in increasing the 
likelihood of starting a business motivated by recognition of an opportunity and high growth 
aspirations.  The findings for Egypt for example, suggest that social connections play an important 
role in high growth aspiring business start-up decisions post the transition. This finding also shows 
that the entrepreneurship environment post transition was more open to high-growth aspiring 
endeavours in a sense that individuals in the Egyptian sample may see potential in high aspiring 
business opportunities. This finding is in broad agreement with (Estrin et al., 2009), where the 
larger the growth aspiring endeavour is more dependent on stable and strong formal institutional 
environments which may have been the case in Egypt after the first revolution but before the second 
military coup. 
These results are further supported by the findings which indicate that positive perceptions 
of self-efficacy played an important role in increasing the likelihood to start opportunity-motivated 
businesses post transition. According to Olson, distributional coalitions and/or the oligarchs which 
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form during long standing regimes such as in the case in Egypt during the military reign (Mubarak 
regime and military elite) had accumulated and colluded to advocate for personal interests which 
led to an unfriendly economic environment that hindered growth (Olson, 2008). Due to the fact that 
the political situation in Egypt is still volatile with the military regaining power once again, 
oligarchs that formed in the Mubarak reign are still in power and control of economic, political and 
social institutions in spite of the Arab Spring revolutions; however, due to the short-term incidence 
of change since the start of the revolution, social connections still played an important role in 
decisions to start a business after the Arab Spring.  
The findings suggest that individuals in the Egyptian sample perceive the political, 
economic and social environments to be conducive to entrepreneurial opportunities and that there 
is a more optimistic outlook about the environment post the revolution and with election of Dr. 
Mohamed Mursi as president. This finding agrees with the literature about networks and social 
connections which emphasizes the importance of capping into social networks to attain support, 
information and experience spill overs in pursuing business opportunities (Aidis et al., 2008, 
Arenius and Minniti, 2005, Morales-Gualdrón and Roig, 2005, Baron, 2000). However, further 
studies need to be conducted to confirm whether high aspiring entrepreneurship will grow once 
stability occurs in Egypt or whether informal institutional determinants such as culture impact on 
self-efficacy and social connections influence these endeavours more directly. 
In the period after the transition, being a business angel was not impactful to business start-
ups. According to (Verheul et al., 2010), individuals that have previous professional experience 
and or were business angels in the past are less likely to engage in business start-ups which applies 
to the case of Egypt as illustrated in the results section above. The results only suggest that business 
start-ups increased when the respondents indicated they have access to social connections (Aidis et 
al., 2008, Arenius and Minniti, 2005, Estrin et al., 2012, Estrin et al., 2013, Hopp and Stephan, 
2012, Stephan and Uhlaner, 2010). This infers that past experience and personal reputation play an 
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important role in Egypt in general and ascertains the collectivist vs. individualist society argument 
(Hofstede et al., 1997, Pinillos and Reyes, 2011).  
 Results for Algeria point out to several conclusions. Perceptions about self-efficacy, being 
a business angel in the past and having social connections have no significant influence on 
decisions to start a business venture in Algeria post economic and political reforms. In the case of 
Algeria, there remains a stable regime that was put under pressure by relatively peaceful 
demonstrations to implement reformative agenda, which minimized the impact of a revolution that 
would have potentially toppled the Bouteflika regime. Even though the Arab Spring did not lead to 
a regime change in the country, it did, however, lead to increasing pressures for the government of 
Bouteflika to implement a reformative agenda. However, the findings are not consistent with Olson 
(2008); even though economic development is boosted in recently unstable environments where 
long term stability is anticipated, it may not always happen in a long-standing stable environment 
even if reforms take place. This suggests that because the Algerian regime remains in power and 
no official political change has occurred, the impact of a reformative agenda has not identified 
business opportunities and may have actually given the Algerians less aptitude to start business 
ventures. 
Not surprisingly, the results also indicate that social connections do not play an important 
role in business start-up decisions post economic and political reforms. This is expected because 
the ruling regime has remained in power and no significant political change has taken place, 
however, this is also not in line with the literature which argues for the dependency on social 
connections and networks for acquiring funding, role model figures and as a substitute to the weak 
institutional frameworks exhibited in a developing country like Algeria (Aidis et al., 2008, Arenius 
and Minniti, 2005, Desai, 2009, Desai, 2011).  
An interesting result is the one on the influence of fear of failure post reform on decisions 
to start a business. Research on entrepreneurial culture has shown that emotional support is key to 
the success of a business venture (Aldrich et al., 1987, Stephan and Uhlaner, 2010).  It seems that 
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in Algeria after the Arab Spring, individuals were less affected by the fear of a failing business. 
Due to the collectivist culture and traditions (Hofstede et al., 1997) experienced in Algeria, family 
and friends support is important and thus if an individual were to fail in their business, they would 
find psychological and financial support from friends and family to get them through failure. It is 
important to note that these cultural traditions of support and collectivism do not simply dissolve 
along with the past regime but are rather socially embedded; however, the impact before the Arab 
Spring may have not been as significant, as society may have been suppressed by weak 
entrepreneurial support institutions thus discouraging business start-ups in the first place.  
The case of Algeria seems to be strongest in lack of support for the respective hypotheses. 
Both high-growth aspiring and self-employment motivated entrepreneurship seems to have 
decreased slightly in 2012 (after economic and political reforms. In line with (Efendic et al., 2014), 
perceptions of entrepreneurship in Algeria may have changed among business people in the era 
post the economic and political reforms implemented by the Algerian government. In post-conflict 
environments, the formal institutional framework is usually weaker and is in the beginning stages 
of being rebuild leading to different people having a diverse range of experiences of which some 
may have found it conducive to high aspiring activities while others may see it as a hindrance 
(Efendic et al., 2014).  
We now turn to results for Tunisia. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, Tunisia is where 
the Arab Spring revolts initially started leading former president Ben Ali to step down and move 
to exile in Saudi Arabia. Tunisia’s government has been relatively stable since the departure of Ben 
Ali with free elections taking place for both the government cabinet and the president positions. 
Nonetheless, the findings show that social connections are not significant to business start-up 
decisions post the transition (review Table 25). This may indicate that with the dissolution of an 
ex-authoritarian regime and the installment of a democratic consensus regime, social connections 
are not as important post the political change. Formal institutions such as rule of law and property 
rights could have possibly been on the path of developing to accommodate society’s needs 
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lessening dependence on social connections and other entrepreneurial business networks. This is 
in contrast with Algeria, and consistent with my expectations grounded in Olsonian theory. 
Interestingly, however, the findings in Tunisia also strongly suggest that the main outcomes of the 
institutional change that occurred post the Arab Spring in Tunisia give individuals in the Tunisian 
sample a positive outlook on the economic and political landscape in the country and this 
environment is seen as one of business opportunities but less so for high aspiration projects and 
more of a self-employment opportunity.  
After the political change took place, self-employment seems to have increased. One 
explanation is that more widespread participation in entrepreneurship could be associated with 
more self-employment (additional entrepreneurs may be motivated by self-employment, to 
understand it better we would also need to look how the situation on the labour market evolved). 
The rise in self-employment motivated entrepreneurship after the fall of the Ben Ali regime may 
suggest that due to the dissolving of the oligarchs of the Ben Ali era, the general population are 
now starting to see prospects of starting their own businesses where an involvement with the 
oligarchs is not required. As the oligarchs dissolved and Tunisia faces a freer political and economic 
environment, the business environment gradually becomes friendlier and economic growth is 
enhanced. One limitation of this analysis is that the data available as of yet goes only as far as 2012.  
Most of the signs and significance of the independent variables as well as controls are 
consistent with the literature, however, the regressions fit slightly better with the opportunity versus 
necessity business start-up decisions than with the high versus low aspiring entrepreneurship in the 
three countries. Thus, in general terms, the likelihood of an individual starting a business is 
improved by social connections, by having been a business angel in the past and by having positive 
perceptions about the skills required for running a business (self-efficacy). This is evident as high-
growth aspiration decreased in the final year according to the tests when looking at the year 2012 
due to continuous instability which led to further fragility of the formal institutional framework 
such as property rights, rule of law and business start-up procedures.  
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Social connections, self-efficacy, fear of failure and being a business angel in the past also 
reveal very small to no impact on high aspiration growth entrepreneurship in Egypt due to the 
continuous instability. Nevertheless, the effects of social connections, self-efficacy, and being a 
business angel are consistently indicating that they are important for encouraging both 
entrepreneurial entry and high-growth aspiring entrepreneurship (Aidis et al., 2008, Arenius and 
Minniti, 2005, Estrin et al., 2012, Aidis et al., 2009, Wennberg et al., 2013).  
Findings in Tunisia displayed unexpected results when it came to high-growth aspirations 
and low-growth aspiration entrepreneurship.  
Another explanation could be that the oligarchs during the Ben Ali regime held the tools 
and mechanisms to market entry which gave rise to individuals attempting to start high-growth 
aspiring businesses. Through utilization of networks with the oligarchs (Olson, 2008, Aidis et al., 
2012, Aidis et al., 2009, Williamson, 2000) and bypassing the weak institutional framework (rule 
of law, property rights) during Ben Ali’s government, individuals would resort to informal relations 
with business owners and people of power in the Ben Ali administration showing allegiance, giving 
them the opportunity aspire for high growth businesses.  
This chapter contributes to the existing literature by exploring how radical institutional 
change after conflict (revolutions, war, and uprisings) and personal characteristics interact with 
each other to influence entrepreneurial activity growth. Olson’s theory of economic growth 
suggested that when a country experiences prolonged periods of stability, economic growth suffers. 
Thus, over time a stable democracy will tend to amass more and more rent-seeking special interest 
groups or elite oligarchs whose political power will gradually grow, causing the impediment of 
economic growth. This theoretical argument is line with the main findings in this chapter and there 
is evidence that personal characteristics such as social connections, being a business angel and self-
efficacy may have an important influence on entrepreneurial activity post transition and thus 
leading to a surge of growth.  
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These findings have some policy implications. First, there should be a greater focus in 
countries coming out of conflict on how to best leverage the benefits of social and business 
networks for stimulating growth through entrepreneurial activity. This is particularly important for 
entrepreneurs who will likely be facing an unstable economic, political and social environment 
after incidents of conflict and institutional change, and may be unable to reap the benefits of formal 
government programs. Second, to improve overall firm performance and economic growth, 
governments and entrepreneurs should work towards making their joint efforts more harmonizing, 
rather than substitutable. The substitution of formal institutional frameworks such as property rights 
for informal resources (e.g. social connections, business angels) means that when one or the other 
form of resources and assistance is absent or lacking, entrepreneurs use the second form of 
assistance to try to make up for the insufficiency. In order to overcome these deficiencies, 
government support should promote appropriate business start-up support networks and programs 
and vice versa. 
The main limitation of this study is that we cannot be sure that the results can be generalized 
among all Arab Spring MENA region countries and other post conflict countries with different 
institutional arrangements and cultural contexts. In order to fully capture and understand the effects 
and impact of the Arab Spring on the MENA region’s political, economic and social scope more 
data years are needed. Another limitation of this analysis is that the data available as of yet goes 
only as far as 2012. 
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4.8 Appendices 
Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators, 2017 
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Table 29. Summary of conflicts in Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia 
Country Population 
(2012) 
Start date End date Outcome  Situation 
T
u
n
is
ia
 
10.78 
million  
December 
18, 2010 
Government was 
overthrown on 14 
January 2011 
Overthrow of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali; 
Ben Ali flees into exile in Saudi Arabia 
 Resignation of Prime 
Minister Ghannouchi 
 Dissolution of the political 
police 
 Dissolution of the RCD, the 
former ruling party of Tunisia 
and liquidation of its assets 
 Release of political prisoners 
 Elections to a Constituent 
Assembly on 23 October 2011 
2013-2014 protests against the 
interim Islamist-led 
government. 
 Adoption of a new constitution 
Government 
overthrown, new 
government 
installed via 
elections on 
December 12, 
2011, under 
human rights 
activist Moncef 
Marzouki as 
president. New 
Constitution of 
Tunisia adopted 
January 26, 
2014.  
A
lg
er
ia
 
38.48 
million  
December 
29, 2010 
January 2012 The lifting of the 19-year state of 
emergency rule, economic reforms: 
 Increase in public spending by 
27% annually.  
 Expansionary fiscal policy.  
 Growth in construction and 
public-works sector due 
increase in public spending. 
Major protests 
pressuring the 
government to 
lift a 19-year 
state of 
emergency rule 
as well as 
initiating 
economic and 
political reforms. 
E
g
y
p
t 
80.72 
million  
January 
25, 2011 
The government 
was overthrown 
on Feb 11, 2011. 
Replacement 
government of 
Dr. Mohamed 
Mursi ousted by 
military on July 
3, 2012, leading 
to ongoing 
violence in 
response to the 
coup 
Hosni Mubarak steps down as president; 
later sentenced to life imprisonment. 
Muslim Brotherhood candidate Dr. 
Mohamed Mursi wins election as 
president. 
 Resignation of Prime 
Minister(s) Nazif and Shafik 
 Assumption of power by 
the Armed Forces 
 Suspension of the Constitution, 
dissolution of the parliament 
 Disbanding the State Security 
Investigations Service 
 Prosecution of Mubarak and 
his family and cabinet 
 Lifting of 31-year state of 
emergency rule 
 Democratic elections take place 
and Mohamed Mursi elected as 
president  
 Mohamed Mursi overthrown 
by military coup following 
demonstrations 
 Ongoing unrest and violence 
since the second coup in protest 
Government 
overthrown as 
well as 
replacement 
government also 
overthrown 
Source: (Mediterranean, 2013) 
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Context 
Egypt 
The first major protests in Egypt took place on the 25th of January, 2011 bringing about 
tens of thousands of people to Tahrir Square in Cairo holding up slogans that called for freedom, 
human dignity, and bread. On the 10th of February, after almost 3 weeks of protests all throughout 
Egypt, former president Mubarak announced that he has lost authority of the government and 
immediately after, an announcement was made by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF) indicating that Mubarak has stepped down from the presidency; a new era in the history of 
Egypt was to follow (Dalacoura, 2012). At the time of writing, it is however debatable whether 
Egypt has been undertaking a constructive transition or whether it will go back to the authoritarian 
rule of the military command. Its prospects of fully transitioning into a democratic state are faced 
with several hurdles and seem less viable than the chances in neighboring Tunisia. Although there 
seems to be some change in some areas such as more freedom of speech (freer journalism, more 
private news agencies) and police accountability, this change seems to be limited due to the still 
very dominant position of the Egyptian army, more so after the controversial military coup against 
the democratically elected president Dr. Mohamed Mursi and the restoration of another military 
figure in General Abdelfatah Al Sisi as president.  
In order to put the several phases of the Arab Spring in Egypt in perspective I use 
Acemoglu’s periodization of four stages of the Arab Spring: the fall of Mubarak, the rule of the 
military, the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood Party in Dr Mohamed Mursi, the recovery of power 
by the military (Acemoglu, 2014). Acemoglu (2014) has identified that one year after the beginning 
of the military rule in Egypt there were fewer members of Mubarak’s party on the boards of 
companies and more members detaching themselves from the party and instead building military 
connections (phase two of the revolution). In phase three, there was a small decrease in the number 
of military affiliated members but not much of an increase in Muslim Brotherhood party members 
in boards of firms. During phase three where the Muslim Brotherhood party was in power, there 
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seems to have been a decrease in profitability of older regime affiliated firms as well as military-
affiliated firms accompanied by an increase in profitability for Islamist's firms and additionally a 
general increase in profitability of non-affiliated firms (Acemoglu, 2014). 
The transition in Egypt has been marred with conflict as indicated in the previous paragraph 
but not resulting in any concrete or at least progressive future after four years since the revolution, 
at the time of writing this thesis. The sequence of events includes: a parliament elected but soon 
after disbanded, a constitution enacted but not accepted and a second coup by the military forces 
of Egypt against the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood government. Street protests still 
remain a daily event by supporters of the secularists and supporters of the ousted Muslim 
Brotherhood (Mediterranean, 2013). Along with that, the promised freedoms of speech, 
institutional and economic reforms, as well as political developments, did not materialize due to 
continued instability and the firm hand of control of the military in the country (Ottaway, 2013). 
Nevertheless, an important reform activity that took place was that the 1971 Constitution was 
abolished in 2011 by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and a new constitution 
was enacted. Further promising reforms included the fact that citizens of Egypt were able to go to 
polls and vote in electoral processes which were probably the most transparent, fairest and freest 
in the modern history of the MENA region (Mediterranean, 2013). Despite what seems to be a 
change of large scale magnitude, there are still major representatives of the old regime that continue 
to exercise power and influence (Kienle, 2012). 
Tunisia 
Following the overthrowing of the Ben Ali regime and his exile to Saudi Arabia, several 
developments in the political environment of Tunisia created an encouraging political atmosphere 
and enabled the newly legalized moderate El Nahda Renaissance Party to win the elections to 
Constituent Assembly in October 2011. The assembly undertook the job of drafting a new 
constitution and appointment of a new government (Beck and Hüser, 2012). Historically, Tunisia 
compared to other Arab states, has had a relatively well endowed civil and political society structure 
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including a labour movement represented by a strong labour union organization, the Tunisian 
General Labour Union (Beck and Hüser, 2012). This encouraged a successful transition of Tunisia 
to a more democratic state due to the rich political, economic and social structures of the country 
(Beck and Hüser, 2012). This is evidenced by the number of civil society organizations in the 
country which increased from 2,000 to more than 9,000 between years 1998 and 2009 (Henry, 
2011), many of which were very active and well organized. At the same time, the influence of the 
old regime had gradually subsided unlike the situation in Egypt. Progressively, members of the 
older regime were released from their duties in government due to large public pressure (Kienle, 
2012). With the new constitution put in place, new members replacing the older regime affiliated 
ones emerged from the former opposition to Ben Ali as well as other following the introduction of 
new parties. With that in place, new legislations in the constitution were ratified with the sole 
purpose of excluding individuals who have over 10 years of tenure in leadership positions in the 
government, to allow for new and younger people to serve (Kienle, 2012). 
In terms of global connectivity, Tunisians are considered more interconnected than the 
other Arab States because almost one-third of the Tunisia population uses the internet on a regular 
basis, serving “as a forum for the politically interested to discuss grievances about the political 
system” (Beck and Hüser, 2012). Many exiled political activists returned to Tunisia after the 
collapse of the Ben Ali regime leading to the creation of several political parties and unlocking of 
the political, economic and social domain in the country. After the October 2011 elections, the 
moderate Islamist party Al Nahda won 89 of 217 seats in the parliament making it the strongest 
party in the government. Many Tunisians voted for the party not because of their religious 
affiliations but rather perceiving it as a strong challenger to the French-speaking elite of the country 
(Beck and Hüser, 2012). With that in mind, the leaders of the party promptly collaborated with 
other non-religious parties to develop a moderate Islamic party that puts forth the voice of the 
Tunisian people.  
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Nevertheless, the transition to this new political system has not been an easy journey. 
Socioeconomic problems remained unaddressed while the economy recovered at a very slow rate. 
The writing of the new constitution has been a very slow process while tensions between secularists 
and Islamists remaining high; however recognizing each other’s legitimacy (Mediterranean, 2013).  
Algeria 
In contrast to Egypt and Tunisia, the Algerian regime was able to withstand the revolutions 
and preserved its authoritarian government. Small protests took to the streets in January 2011 when 
protesters shouted slogans against the poor living conditions, corruption and repressive measures 
taken by the government over the years. Approximately 3,000 people participated in these mini 
demonstrations and thus, mobilization of people did not reach the standards amassed in Egypt and 
Tunisia.  
According to (Beblawi, 1987), the rentier state approach can explain why the regime was 
not toppled. Rents are incomes which are considered unearned revenue. The oil producing countries 
of the world like Algeria can produce significant rents from their abundance in oil, in periods where 
prices remain high. Beblawi illustrates that authoritarian socio-economic systems that are based on 
a high incursion of rents have a strong tendency to remain relatively stable resisting revolutions 
due to their oil power. Due to its oil resources, the Algerian regime could maintain its authoritarian 
rule over the country. President Bouteflika responded to the mini demonstrations in 2011 with a 
“mixture of sticks and carrots: on the one hand massive repression and on the other hand limited 
political and financial concessions in the form of wage increases, a reduction in food prices, the 
dissolution of the state of emergency law in existence since 1992 and the announcement of political 
reforms” (Beck and Hüser, 2012). Additionally, the president undertook to introduce a series of 
amendments to the constitution to bolster democracy by establishing a constitution commission to 
oversee the drafting of amendments as well as present final recommendations back to the president 
to decide on the final version; however due to the absence of the president for health reasons since 
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April 2013 many of these reform processes have been put on hold, as at the time of writing 
(Mediterranean, 2013).   
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Table 30. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition Variable Label Measurement Mean/SD 
Business 
Start-up 
( Y 1  variable 
dependent 
variable 1) 
1 = the respondent has been 
working on starting a new business 
in the past year, zero otherwise 
Bstart == yes Number of 
individuals starting 
in the process of 
starting a business 
from the country 
samples 
.1367504    .3435907 
Business 
Start-up for 
opportunity 
reasons 
( Y 1  
variable 
dependent 
variable 1) 
2 = the respondent perceives a 
business opportunity within the 
next 6 months,  
1 =  the respondent perceives no 
opportunity within the next 6 
months 
0 = respondent is not participating 
in entrepreneurship 
Business          start-
ups        opportunity 
vs.   necessity       
Number of 
individuals who 
perceive that there is 
a new business 
opportunity in the 
next 6 months 
.2155863   .5716592 
High growth 
aspirations vs. 
low growth 
aspirations  
( Y 2  
variable 
dependent 
variable 2) 
2 = the respondent have intentions 
to launch high-growth oriented 
projects (thus creating 10 or more 
jobs in the first 5 years), 1 = the 
respondent does not have 
intentions to launch high-growth 
oriented projects (thus creating 10 
or more jobs in the first 5 years), 0 
= respondent is not participating in 
entrepreneurship 
High growth 
aspirations vs. low 
growth aspirations 
Number of 
individuals who 
have intentions to 
launch high-growth 
oriented projects 
(thus creating 10 or 
more jobs in the first 
5 years) 
.1877595    .5045141    
Self-efficacy 
(Skills) ( X 1
or independent 
variable)  
1 = respondent perceives 
themselves to have the required 
skills to be an entrepreneur, zero 
otherwise 
Suskill== yes  Number of 
individuals who 
believe they have the 
skills required to 
start a business  
.4949238    .4999845 
Social 
connections 
( X 2   
Variable) 
1 = personally knows 
entrepreneur(s) in the past 2 years, 
zero otherwise 
Knowentdummy 
== yes 
Number of 
individuals who 
responded that they 
know an 
entrepreneur already 
.426528    .4945826 
Fear of Failure 
( X 3
Variable) 
1 = fear of failure will prevent 
respondent from starting a 
business, zero otherwise 
Fearfail == yes Number of 
individuals who 
believe fear of 
failure does not 
prevent them from 
starting a business 
.2707057    .4443335 
Gender 
( X 4 ) 
1 = male, zero otherwise Sex Gender of 
respondent 
.5190924    .4996456 
Business 
Angel 
( X 5 ) 
1 = respondent has been a business 
angel in the past three years, zero 
otherwise 
Bussangel == yes Has the respondent 
been a business 
angel in the past or 
not 
.066505    .2491679 
Educational 
Attainment 
( X 6 ) 
Different educational levels Education level of 
respondent 
What is the highest 
educational 
attainment of the 
respondent 
.1834025    .3870041 
Work Status 
( X 7 ) 
Work status: full-time or part-time Gemwork = full-
time or part-time 
What is the 
respondent’s work 
status 
.4234042    .4941084 
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Table 18. Country Differences 
Variable Egypt 
(2008) 
Egypt 
(2010) 
Egypt 
(2012) 
Algeria 
(2009) 
Algeria 
(2011) 
Algeria 
(2012) 
Tunisia 
(2010) 
Tunisia 
(2012) 
Business start-up (%) 22.38 19.39 20.79 21.60 18.94 8.03 2.45 4.85 
Social connections (%) 38.58 47.60 31.63 50.55 46.25 57.54 51.02 33.50 
Business Angel (%) 3.45 6.68 3.96 6.20 12.14 8.61 5.20 2.65 
Self-efficacy (%) 50.19 59.62 55.66 41.35 55.68 51.71 51.87 60.90 
Fear of failure (%) 21.81 34.63 33.51 21.15 21.15 31.67 25.04 19.10 
Secondary education (%) 27.96 32.36 28.47 34.45 33.15 22.36 10.00 30.10 
Work status (%) 47.46 43.91 35.75 42.90 42.72 39.06 44.68 39.50 
Gender: Male (%) 52.01 51.43 51.02 50.40 58.74 51.75 49.28 49.25 
Age 35 38 38 33 36 35 36 36 
GDP per capita (US$)  2,157 2,804 3,256 3,771 5,272 5,309 4,211 4,197 
Source of GDP: World Bank Economic Indicators, 2014 
Table 31. Summary of support for hypotheses 
Hypotheses  Variables Sign Support 
H1: The likelihood of starting a business motivated by opportunity recognition 
will increase post political change and/or reform after the Arab Spring 
revolutions compared to pre-political change and/or reform. 
Year 
dummies 
- Partial support: 
Tunisia and 
Egypt 
H2: the likelihood of starting a business motivated by high growth aspirations 
will increase post political change and/or reform after the Arab Spring 
revolutions compared to pre political change and/or reform. 
Year 
dummies 
- Partial support: 
Egypt 
H3: positive perceptions about self-efficacy has a stronger impact on the 
likelihood of starting up a business in post political change and/or reform 
environments compared to pre-political change and/or reform environments. 
Year 
dummies 
+ Partial support: 
Tunisia and 
Egypt 
H4: Social connections have a stronger impact on the likelihood of starting up 
a business in post political change and/or reform environments compared to 
pre-political change and/or reform environments. 
Year 
dummies 
- Partial support: 
Egypt 
H5: Fear of failure will reduce entrepreneurial activity more post political 
change and/or reform environment compared to pre-political change and/or 
reform environments. 
Year 
dummies 
+ Yes 
H6: Having been a business angel in the past has a stronger impact on the 
likelihood of starting up a business in post political change and/or reform 
environments compared to pre-political change and/or reform environments. 
Year 
dummies 
+ 
and - 
No: opposite 
result 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 CHAPTER SUMMARIES 
 This final chapter provides a general discussion and conclusion that assimilates the findings 
from the three empirical chapters of this thesis about the influence of formal institutions and change 
on entrepreneurial activity. The chapter begins by providing an overall summary of the findings; 
then it is followed by a summary of the theoretical and practical implications. I conclude by 
presenting the strengths and limitations of this research and follow those by opportunities for future 
research.  
 The conceptual framework identified in this thesis has been informed and adapted as an 
extension of Coleman’s “boat” social pathways model (Coleman, 1988, Coleman and Coleman, 
1994). This framework (figure 8) presents the constructs identified in this thesis and their unique 
interactions as examined in the three empirical chapters (2, 3, and 4). It illustrates the variables 
used in this research and how they influence both the dependent variables but also how they may 
influence each other or interact as a holistic picture. Using this model, I propose micro, and macro 
level analysis of the interactions between institutions and entrepreneurship.  
At the macro level, I analyse formal political institutional change and its interaction with 
entrepreneurial development whilst controlling for micro level personal characteristics (Chapter 2). 
In chapter 3, I examine the link between macro formal political institutions, economic freedom, 
and corruption and entrepreneurial behaviour of immigrants. Whilst in chapter 4, I analyse the 
integration of institutional change and opportunity recognition as well as high growth aspirations. 
Additionally I examine institutional change and the influence of micro level personal characteristics 
represented by self-efficacy, lack of fear of failure (De Clercq and Arenius, 2006, Minniti and 
Nardone, 2007, Stephan and Uhlaner, 2010), entrepreneurship-relevant social resources (social 
connections) (Minniti and Nardone, 2007), and financial resources (business angels) on 
entrepreneurship in three countries affected by the Arab Spring. Mainly, I set out to explore how 
these personal characteristics influence entrepreneurial start-ups and how this relationship is 
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influenced by changing political, social and economic formal institutions due to conflict. Figure 
5.1 below illustrates the unique relationships examined in the thesis. 
Figure 5.1 Main theoretical model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on (Coleman and Coleman, 1994) 
Economic development literature has stressed that the importance of political institutions 
as a key barrier to economic growth and development of a nation (Dutta et al., 2013, Aisen and 
Veiga, 2006). Some of this literature suggests that more socio-political instability can potentially 
lead to lower investments, higher inflation and lack of appropriate financial development in 
financial institutions which in hand is negatively associated with economic growth (Dutta et al., 
2013, Aisen and Veiga, 2006, Alesina and Perotti, 1996). Likewise, unstable and weak political 
institutions can sometimes lead to an increase in risk and uncertainty, inadequate enforcement of 
rule of law and weak protection of property rights (Dutta et al., 2013). On the other hand, stability 
in political institutions reduces the risk and uncertainty and decreases transaction costs permitting 
individuals to attain gains from exchanges in market transactions (Boettke and Coyne, 2003). 
Baumol (1990) emphasizes that the productivity of a country’s entrepreneurial activity and 
processes depends highly on the quality of its institutions, of which political ones present an 
important type.  
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As defined earlier in the thesis, political institutions are institutional structures which 
allow for the establishing and standardization of access to economic opportunities, entrepreneurial 
rents and rule of law (Autio and Fu, 2015). Stability and a high quality political institutional 
environment offers a positive and conducive environment for entrepreneurs to thrive in. High 
quality political institutions are these characterized by comprehensive political representation 
without interference by governments, military, economic and or other self-interest groups, 
safeguarding individuals from being inhibited by monopolized control from powerful interest 
groups and affording inclusive access to economic opportunities (Puddington, 2013). However, 
research has found that insecurity coupled with lower economic growth rates arising from 
instability of institutions leads to weak formal enforcement of political rights and freedoms, 
therefore, deterring potential entrepreneurs from actively pursuing entrepreneurial activity in a host 
country (Aidis et al., 2008).  
Some of the key concepts discussed in this this thesis are as follows. Short-term institutional 
change, (year on year) variations, are more frequent and gradual changes in institutional 
frameworks, which can accumulate to significant increases. These changes can help in 
understanding how some nations (but not others) build entrepreneurship over time and thereby 
providing for insightful policy outputs in support of entrepreneurship activity. Constitutional level 
institutions are higher order formal institutions that deal with aspects such as political freedom, 
political stability, freedom from corruption, democracy and autocracy. Personal characteristics of 
individuals related to potential entrepreneurship capabilities, motivations and intentions are also a 
key concept assessed, including self-efficacy, fear of failure, social connections and being a 
business angel. These key concepts are discussed in further details in the relevant empirical 
chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
In the first empirical study in this thesis (chapter 2), I set out to examine the ways in which 
formal short-term political institutional change over time influences (at the macro level in the 
framework) entrepreneurial activity, controlling for the following personal characteristics of 
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entrepreneurs: self-efficacy and fear of failure, in a panel of countries. I draw my conclusions based 
on estimating panel regressions models using a combination of data sets and estimate several 
models using measures of political institutional change over time (democratization, political 
freedom, regulation/stability of property rights through executive constraints, political rights, 
freedom from corruption, political stability and political legitimacy), on the development of Total 
Early-Stage Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) over a 14 year time frame. I postulate that political 
institutions (Aron, 2000, Autio and Fu, 2015) are essential in explaining the differing development 
of entrepreneurship between countries. The findings suggest that short-term changes in political 
institutions are essential in explaining the development of entrepreneurship activity. More 
importantly, positive change over time in political stability, freedom from corruption and political 
legitimacy seems to play the most significant role in explaining differences in the growth of TEA 
rates among countries. Therefore, I argue that positive changes in fundamental political institutions 
of political freedom and stability positively influences entrepreneurship development and 
subsequently provide policy makers with a better understanding of economic growth attributed to 
entrepreneurship development, reinforcing important links between practitioners, academics and 
policy makers.  
In chapter 3, I present the second empirical study in the thesis. Here, I examine the 
relationship between political institutions at the macro level, freedom from corruption at the micro 
level and the prevalence of immigrant entrepreneurial start-ups. Political institutions are reflected 
by a system of politics and government, and the sets of rules, regulations, and norms that organize 
political activity. They explain aspects of political activity such as political legitimacy, political 
freedoms, stability and differences between government systems (democracies, autocracies). I 
utilize multilevel analysis using binary response logit models with random effects (Cox, 1958) to 
estimate the impact of the host macro (country) level political freedom, corruption, and economic 
freedom and controlling for the immigrant’s individual characteristics. I collate the data five 
independent data sets: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), Quality of Government (QoG), 
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Polity IV, World Bank and Freedom House. I develop several models that estimate the interaction 
between macro level political institutions (political freedom), economic freedom (business and 
financial freedom), and corruption with immigrant status to test changes in Total Early-Stage 
Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) rates. What I find is strong support for the hypotheses tested 
confirming the positive relationship between strong political institutions, freedom from corruption 
and prevalence of immigrant entrepreneurial activity compared to nonimmigrants in host countries. 
The findings are central to policy makers in their attempts not only to integrate and assimilate 
immigrants into host country social environments but also to contribute to long term economic 
growth of a host country through targeted policies that aim to attract immigrant entrepreneurial 
efforts. 
  Chapter 4 in the thesis presents the third empirical study which looks at the effects of 
institutional change caused by the Arab Spring on entrepreneurial activity in Egypt and Tunisia 
compared to Algeria. This chapter accentuates the occupational notion of entrepreneurship and 
distinguishes between those potential entrepreneurs that recognize a business opportunity in the 
future and those that do not see such opportunities, as well as those that are motivated by self-
employment and those that aspire for growth. In this study, I examine the influence of different 
facets of institutional change stemming from the Arab Spring on opportunity recognition and high 
growth aspiring entrepreneurial activity. I also study the influence of personal characteristics of 
self-efficacy, the lack of fear of failure, social connections and having been a business angel in the 
past, on decisions to start a business in Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia before and after the 
political/economic change resulting from the Arab Spring revolutions. The findings indicate that 
regime change in Egypt and Tunisia has affected entrepreneurial activity compared to only 
marginal effects in Algeria which only experienced political and economic reforms rather than 
regime change. The hypotheses Table 32 in the appendix summarizes all the hypotheses developed 
in this thesis in terms of support. 
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5.2 Key contributions 
 This thesis makes several important theoretical contributions to the entrepreneurship and 
institutions literature. It also has implications for policies to support entrepreneurship.  
 The thesis first introduces the effects of short-term institutional change on entrepreneurship. 
The dominant stance in literature is that institutional stability over long periods of time tends to 
change very slowly (North, 1990). This perspective, however, is possibly biased because 
institutional economics literature has focused on a relatively small but important group of high-
income countries that have experienced institutional stability from the mid-twentieth century until 
the time of writing. Investigating the effects of short-term institutional changes on entrepreneurship 
provides an important complementary perspective to the aforementioned dominant stance.  
Two contributions to comparative entrepreneurship research and institutional theory 
literature are introduced. First, a unique and dynamic perspective emphasizing the dynamic short-
term change in both institutions and entrepreneurship is developed. Secondly, the thesis aids in 
understanding which changes in which institutions are most significant for entrepreneurship. The 
focus on short-term institutional change enriches and advances both institutional theory and 
comparative entrepreneurship research. 
 The novelty of these contributions is that more attention is focused on the short-term effects 
of institutional change rather than the dominant long term analysis angle discussed in institutional 
economics (e.g. North, 1990). The perspective introduced in this thesis proposes that institutions 
do not only change slowly, but they can also change over shorter time periods (Mickiewicz et al., 
2017). Radical institutional changes in the form of constitutional changes that take place because 
of conflict, war, etc., may be variable but can also be unique and detectable in a year on year change 
unlike change in informal institutions. Therefore, an interesting question arises and it is: why do 
constitutional changes influence entrepreneurial activity, given their impact is usually indirect? An 
entrepreneur is likely to be faced with business regulations directly rather than constitutions; 
however, constitutions by nature define the boundaries of regulations, where for example, change 
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in political regime to democratization may affect expectations of how these regulations and 
business environments are perceived by the entrepreneurs (Mickiewicz et al., 2017). This short-
term change perspective thus offers exciting new avenues for research as well as for policy makers 
interested to develop and grow entrepreneurship in their countries.   
 The second empirical chapter contributes to our knowledge of the influence of what types 
of host country institutions facilitate immigrant entrepreneurship. Immigration is increasing, 
currently due to the crises in the Middle East (e.g. Syria, Yemen, Iraq) but also due to growing 
resource pressures and crises in Africa. Research has shown that large waves of immigration can 
lead to aggregate social changes. For the individual, immigration means that they are suddenly 
faced with a different institutional framework. I provide first insights on what institutions facilitate 
immigrants to start a business, and hence make positive contributions to the host country economy 
(Wennekers and Thurik, 1999, Peri, 2012, Peroni et al., 2016). Past research on entrepreneurship 
has suggested that macro-level institutions are crucial in explaining cross-country differences in 
entrepreneurship; however, where the gap in this knowledge becomes apparent is that institutions 
can also influence immigrant entrepreneurial activity across countries. Specifically, I examined 
how political institutions, economic freedom, and corruption influence immigrant entrepreneurial 
activity compared to nonimmigrants in a host country environment. More specifically, I also aimed 
to gain insights on how the prevailing political and institutional uncertainty within the Western 
developed countries shapes immigration, entrepreneurship and economic growth in the host 
countries. 
 The main finding in this chapter suggests that immigrant entrepreneurs thrive in 
environments characterized by democratic and politically free institutions which in turn provide 
for a supporting mechanism in an unfamiliar cultural, economic and political setting that 
immigrants usually experience. ‘Democratic political institutions in contrast to autocratic ones 
allow for a representative political agenda in which property rights are universally protected and 
abuse of power is repressed and thus creating a better environment for entrepreneurship’ (Autio 
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and Fu, 2015). This produces important policy implications for both host and immigrant 
contributing countries. I summarized that some of these policy contributions link immigrant 
entrepreneur’s skills and knowledge with business start-ups but also advocate for policies that 
attract highly skilled immigrants to promote innovation as a mechanism and stimulus for economic 
growth. Hosting countries can raise awareness about what is required to become an entrepreneur 
in their countries. For example, through the provision of publicly accessible information on 
eligibility requirements, the business start-up procedures and regulations, types of industry sectors, 
etc. This in hand is advantageous to host countries as entrepreneurial activity increases and most 
likely contributes to economic growth. Additionally, this can also open up role for private sector in 
the form of science parks and business incubators as they stimulate economic growth and 
development (Ratinho and Henriques, 2010).     
 The third empirical chapter focuses on three countries in the MENA region in which two 
have directly been affected by regime change due to the Arab Spring while one remains a strong 
hold of power with demonstrable economic and political reform. The Arab Spring Revolutions are 
considered to have created a change in the political and economic fabric in the MENA region. Thus, 
the main contributions of this chapter are identifying how opportunity recognition and high growth 
aspiring entrepreneurship is influenced by different types of institutional change through conflict.  
This chapter also contributes to the existing literature by exploring how radical institutional 
change after conflict (revolutions, war, and uprisings) and personal characteristics interact with 
each other to influence entrepreneurial activity growth and how this impact can substitute local 
social structures when the institutional environment in place is weak. Olson’s theory of economic 
growth suggested that when a country experiences prolonged periods of stability, economic growth 
suffers. Thus, over time a stable democracy will tend to amass more and more rent-seeking special 
interest groups or elite oligarchs whose political power will gradually grow, causing the 
impediment of economic growth. This theoretical argument is partly in line with the main findings 
in this chapter and there is evidence that personal characteristics such as social connections, being 
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a business angel and self-efficacy may have an important influence on entrepreneurial activity post 
transition and thus leading to a surge of growth. However, the most important contribution of this 
chapter is that the essence of institutional change is important at identifying how a country is 
influenced by said change. As seen in chapter 4, each of the studied countries had a unique 
experience which motivated how entrepreneurship was impacted.  
The thesis draws attention to the importance not just in the level and quality of institutions 
but how entrepreneurship reacts to change in political institutions - be it through slowly evolving 
changes through reforms (chapter 2), more rapid change through revolution and crises (chapter 4) 
or through the individual changes in its institutional context through migration (chapter 3). 
Collectively these studies contribute to an overarching theme of institutions and entrepreneurship 
research with a particular focus on unique types of changes in these institutions and open up new 
avenues for future research.  
5.3 Limitations of research 
 All three empirical chapters utilize a number of datasets of which the most important is the 
GEM data. GEM is a project introduced by a research consortium to provide data to aid in 
understanding the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic development across 
countries. GEM was launched in 1998 and has since provided globally comparable data across 
countries on several aspects of entrepreneurship including the attitudes, intentions, and motivations 
of entrepreneurs towards business start-ups. “The growing databases increasingly allow for in-
depth academic research and this is mirrored by the rapidly increasing amount of GEM-based 
scientific publications in a wider range of academic journals” (Bosma, 2013). 
Even though GEM provides the most comprehensive dataset for comparative 
entrepreneurship, one of the main limitations of this dataset is the lack of longitudinal data 
availability across countries and the orientation towards surveying of more developed countries 
than developing thus creating a discourse between levels of economic development as well as a 
possible selection bias. Therefore, these shortcomings have made it more challenging to construct 
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appropriate panel data models in the last two empirical chapters (Immigration and Arab Spring 
respectively). These drawbacks merit a great need for an interdisciplinary approach to the research, 
which may require the use of various measurement approaches including quantitative and 
qualitative data and other unique methods. Additionally, examining further research avenues using 
micro-level data about institutions to compare with macro level data can give deeper insights on 
the individual’s encounters with formal institutions rather than the ‘experts’ view captured by 
macro level institutional variables.  
Perceptual variables surveyed in GEM such as fear of failure, self-efficacy and social 
connections are also limited in their design elements. GEM questionnaires use dichotomous 
question types to extract information about such perceptual variables which may not capture the 
whole spectrum and breadth of the phenomena (eg. Self-efficacy is captured by asking the 
respondents whether they believe they have the skills required to start a business; what this question 
lacks however, is what are these skills, how are they defined and captured, etc.). Another important 
limitation is the measure of social connections. GEM defines social connections as whether a n 
individual knows other entrepreneurs and is also dichotomous in nature. Therefore, the question 
lacks details as to what these potential connections with other entrepreneurs actually entail and how 
can these connections influence or impact a potential entrepreneur. The design in GEM does not 
allow for capturing these important nuances that can define how important a social connection is 
to the potential entrepreneur. Without more detail, we can not learn how knowing another 
entrepreneur and what capacity can they enhance self-efficacy for instance or provide access to 
resources and support etc (Baron, 2000, Aldrich, 1999, Minniti, 2004). However, we use the 
entrepreneurs’ knowledge of other entrepreneurs as a proxy for social networks as knowing other 
entrepreneurs can provide a role model effect which can lead to an increase in skills, confidence 
and knowledge (Kwong et al., 2009). Furthermore, the data does not allow to establish a causal 
relationship, ie. I cannot determine whether for example self-efficacy is a driver of entrepreneurial 
activity or otherwise a result of this entrepreneurial endeavour (experience accumulated 
194 
 
throughout). Thus, even though these variables are the most appropriate and most utilized in 
literature, they still lack some depth associated due to the dichotomous nature of the questions. In 
terms of the migrant measure, GEM attempts to consolidate the question in the Adult Population 
Survey but again uses a dichotomous design where a respondent is asked whether or not they were 
born in the country they currently reside in. This measure has its limitations in that researchers do 
not have a complete picture of which country the immigrant came from or when this move 
happened (first generation vs. third generation immigrants). 
Another main limitation to this thesis is related to the imperfect measures of institutions 
and the data design. Some of the main issues with the institutional variables discussed is that some 
of them may be highly correlated and therefore can potentially lead to challenges in making casual 
inferences. However, I attempted to conceptualize the institutional measures more thoroughly by 
examining the relationships between these measures and how they can relate to economic 
development and economic freedom. I believe, there is great scope for developing political 
institutional measures further and mitigating endogeneity issues, therefore becoming more 
appealing to researches but also allowing for advances in the interplay between political institutions 
and their relationship with entrepreneurship development. However, this entails that the academic 
world is interested and demands modifying current surveys and/or conducting new ones as well as 
employing new and innovative experiments.  
5.4 Future research and policy directions 
 This thesis mainly investigates how and what formal institutions influence entrepreneurial 
activity in several countries. The research examines the macro level political, economic and social 
formal institutions. This leaves an abundance of ground to study an important part of institutions 
which are informal institutions in further rigour to contribute to the literature on these institutions 
and how they influence entrepreneurship. As immigration policies in developed countries face 
tougher scrutiny in light of important ‘critical junctures’ such as Brexit, protectionism measures 
associated with the new president of the United States, President Trump, the war on terrorism and 
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the continued instability in the MENA region, it is ever more imperative to understand the role of 
a country’s institutions of economic growth driven by immigration through entrepreneurship 
(Wennekers et al., 1997, Wennekers and Thurik, 1999, Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2008, Peroni 
et al., 2016). Additionally, further research is necessary for (1) testing the generalizability of the 
interaction between formal political institutional change and entrepreneurship in developing 
country contexts and (2) understanding the mechanisms behind the use of personal characteristics 
as factors bridging the gap between formal institutions and entrepreneurship (e.g. social 
connections) in the context conflict/change (e.g. Arab Spring, Brexit, war, etc.). Moreover, to 
address the shortcomings of the lack of comparative studies between developed, developing and 
emerging economies, future research could benefit from expanding the sample size and controlling 
for regional and country economic stages. This can be complemented by considering additional 
variables and measures for formal assistance and network size to aid with identifying policy reform 
avenues for governments in both developed and developing countries.  
 Another important insight to consider in future research is the comparison between 
commercial and social entrepreneurs in both immigrants and natives in a host country in a 
longitudinal study format. This will aid in finding corresponding similarities and differences 
between social and commercial enterprises over the long term and how these are influenced by 
generations of immigration. Additionally, this kind of future research could help in uncovering the 
influence of institutional change on entrepreneurs’ behaviour, motivation, and intentions with 
regards to the type business venture they seek.  
 An important policy implication of this research is that the research conducted about the 
institutional environment and how it changes will aid policy makers to reform the support programs 
available for entrepreneurs. With knowledge accumulated from this research about the influence of 
formal political institutions on entrepreneurial activity, policy makers can use this knowledge to 
strategize support policies accordingly to meet the gap in institutional weakness post conflict and 
change.  
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 This thesis extends the possibilities of further quantitative research that examines 
entrepreneurial activity by providing deeper insights and the backbone into the many institutional 
factors, differences associated and ensuing influence on entrepreneurship. The thesis therefore 
sheds light onto the key institutional variables that influence both home nation and immigrant 
entrepreneurs providing the opportunity to reform support programs and initiatives to promote 
entrepreneurship to stimulate economic growth in a highly dynamic and evolving socioeconomic 
and political globalised world. 
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5.5 Appendices 
Table 32. Hypotheses Summary 
Hypothesis (Institutional Change Chapter) Variables Sign Support 
H1a: Countries characterized by increasingly politically free 
environments are likely to experience positive change in 
entrepreneurial activity rates. 
Political freedom: 
Polity2 
+ Yes 
H1b: Countries characterised by increasing constraints on the 
executive are likely to experience positive change in entrepreneurial 
activity rates. 
Executive Constraints + Yes 
H1c: Countries which develop more democratic institutions over 
time are likely to experience positive change in entrepreneurial 
activity rates. 
Democracy vs 
Autocracy 
+ Yes 
H1d: Countries with increased political stability over time are likely 
to experience positive change in entrepreneurial activity rates. 
Political Stability + Yes 
H2: Countries which exhibit a decrease in corruption over time are 
likely to experience positive change in entrepreneurial activity rates. 
Freedom from 
corruption 
- Yes 
H3: Countries with increased political legitimacy over time are 
likely to experience positive change in entrepreneurial activity rates. 
Political legitimacy - Yes 
Hypothesis (Immigration & Entrepreneurship Chapter) Variables Sign Support 
H1a: Strong political freedom in recipient economies positively 
influences immigrant entrepreneurial activity compared to home 
country entrepreneurs. 
Political Freedom 
interacted with migrant 
+ Yes 
H1b: Democratic institutions in recipient economies positively 
influence immigrant entrepreneurial activity compared to home 
country entrepreneurs. 
Democracy interacted 
with migrant 
+ Yes 
H1c: Greater political globalization in recipient economies 
positively influences immigrant entrepreneurial activity compared to 
home country entrepreneurs. 
Political Globalization 
interacted with migrant 
+ Yes 
H1d: Parliamentary political systems in recipient economies 
positively influence immigrant entrepreneurial activity compared to 
home country entrepreneurs. 
Political System 
interacted with migrant 
+ Yes 
H1e: High regime durability in recipient economies positively 
influences immigrant entrepreneurial activity compared to home 
country entrepreneurs. 
Regime durability 
interacted with migrant 
+ Marginal 
support 
H2a: More freedom from corruption in recipient countries 
positively influences immigrant entrepreneurial activity compared to 
home country entrepreneurs. 
Freedom from 
Corruption interacted 
with migrant 
+ Yes 
H2b: Stronger government effectiveness in recipient countries 
positively influences immigrant entrepreneurial activity compared to 
home country entrepreneurs. 
Government 
Effectiveness interacted 
with migrant 
+ Yes 
H3a: Strong economic freedom in recipient economies positively 
influences immigrant entrepreneurial activity compared to home 
country entrepreneurs. 
Business and Financial 
Freedom interacted 
with migrant 
+ Yes 
Hypotheses (Arab Spring Chapter) Variables Sign Support 
H1: the likelihood of starting a business motivated by opportunity 
recognition will increase post political change and/or reform after 
the Arab Spring revolutions compared to pre-political change and/or 
reform. 
Year dummies - Partial 
support: 
Tunisia and 
Egypt 
H2: the likelihood of starting a business motivated by high growth 
aspirations will increase post political change and/or reform after 
the Arab Spring revolutions compared to pre political change and/or 
reform. 
Year dummies - Partial 
support: Egypt 
H3: positive perceptions about self-efficacy has a stronger impact 
on the likelihood of starting up a business in post political change 
and/or reform environments compared to pre-political change and/or 
reform environments. 
Year dummies + Partial 
support: 
Tunisia and 
Egypt 
H4: Social connections have a stronger impact on the likelihood of 
starting up a business in post political change and/or reform 
environments compared to pre-political change and/or reform 
environments. 
Year dummies - Partial 
support: Egypt 
H5: Fear of failure will reduce entrepreneurial activity more post 
political change and/or reform environment compared to pre-
political change and/or reform environments. 
Year dummies + Yes 
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H6: Having been a business angel in the past has a stronger impact 
on the likelihood of starting up a business in post political change 
and/or reform environments compared to pre-political change and/or 
reform environments. 
Year dummies + 
and - 
No: opposite 
result 
 
Table 33. Thesis variables 
Chapter 2 Measurement Description Details Source 
Total Early-stage 
Entrepreneurial 
Activity (TEA) 
Measured as 
change over 
time (year on 
year change)  
Change in % prevalence 
rate of individuals in the 
working age population 
who are actively involved 
in business start-ups, either 
in the phase of starting a 
new firm (nascent 
entrepreneurs) or in the 
phase spanning 42 months 
after the birth of the firm 
(owner- manager of new 
firms). 
Change in % prevalence 
rate of individuals in the 
working age population who 
are actively involved in 
business start-ups, either in 
the phase of starting a new 
firm (nascent entrepreneurs) 
or in the phase spanning 42 
months after the birth of the 
firm (owner- manager of 
new firms). 
GEM  
Political Rights/ Civil 
Liberties Indices 
(Political Freedom) 
Measured as 
change over 
time (year on 
year change)  
PR = Scores countries on a 
7 to 1 ranking scale, with 1 
representing the greatest of 
political freedom and 7 the 
smallest degree of political 
freedom (House, 2014a). 
 
CL = Scores countries on a 
7 to 1 ranking scale, with 1 
representing the greatest of 
civil liberties and 7 the 
smallest degree of civil 
liberties (House, 2014a). 
Political rights enable 
people to participate freely 
in the political process: the 
right to vote freely for 
distinct alternatives in 
legitimate elections, 
compete for public office, 
join political parties and 
organizations, and elect 
representatives who have a 
decisive impact on public 
policies and are accountable 
to the electorate. 
Civil liberties: freedom of 
expression and belief, 
associational and 
organizational rights, rule of 
law, and personal autonomy 
without interference from 
the state. 
Freedom 
House  
Executive constraints 
index 
Measured as 
change over 
time (year on 
year change)  
Scores from 1 = “unlimited 
authority” to 7 = “executive 
parity”; the higher the 
value, the less arbitrariness 
(Marshall and Cole, 2008). 
This variable refers to the 
extent of institutionalized 
constraints on the decision-
making powers of chief 
executives, whether 
individuals or collectivities. 
Such limitations may be 
imposed by any 
“accountability groups”. It 
is therefore concerned with 
the checks and balances 
between the various parts of 
the decision-making 
process. 
Polity IV 
Polity2 Index 
(Democracy vs. 
Autocracy) 
Measured as 
change over 
time (year on 
year change) 
Combines scores of 
Autocracy and subtracting 
scores of Democracy with a 
resulting unified polity 
scale ranging from +10 
(strongly democratic) to -10 
(strongly autocratic) 
(Marshall and Cole, 2008). 
Democracy has three 
essential, interdependent 
elements. (1) Presence of 
institutions and procedures 
through which citizens can 
express effective 
preferences about 
alternative policies and 
leaders. (2) Existence of 
institutionalized constraints 
on the exercise of power by 
the executive. (3) Guarantee 
of civil liberties to all 
Polity IV 
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citizens in their daily lives 
and in acts of political 
participation.  
Autocracy is defined 
operationally as a set of 
political characteristics. (1) 
Restricting or suppressing 
competitive political 
participation. (2) Chief 
executives are chosen in a 
regularized process of 
selection within the political 
elite; once in office they 
exercise power with few 
institutional constraints. (3) 
High degree of control over 
social and economic 
activity. 
Political Stability 
Index 
Measured as 
change over 
time (year on 
year change) 
Political stability: uses a 
scoring scales from -2.5 to 
2.5, with higher scores 
corresponding to better 
outcomes; thus -2.5 is least 
politically stable and 2.5 
most politically stable 
(Charron et al., 2010) 
Measures perceptions of the 
likelihood that the 
government in power will 
be destabilized or 
overthrown by possible 
unconstitutional and/or 
violent means which may 
include domestic violence 
and terrorism.  
Quality of 
Government 
Dataset 
Freedom from 
corruption index 
Measured as 
change over 
time (year on 
year change) 
Freedom from corruption 
uses a 100 point scale; 
higher freedom from 
corruption score means less 
corruption; thus 1 = very 
corrupt government, 100 = 
very little corruption 
(Miller, 2015) 
The score for this 
component is derived 
primarily from 
Transparency 
International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) for 
2011, which measures the 
level of corruption in over 
183 countries. The higher 
the level of corruption, the 
lower the level of overall 
economic freedom and the 
lower a country’s score. 
Quality of 
Government 
Dataset 
Political legitimacy 
index 
Measured as 
change over 
time (year on 
year change) 
Uses a scale from 0-3, with 
0 = highest political 
legitimacy and 3 = least 
political legitimacy 
(Marshall and Cole, 2011) 
Measurements include 
corruption or profiteering by 
ruling elites, resistance to 
transparency, level of 
democracy, illicit economy, 
and protests and 
demonstrations.  
Polity IV 
Robustness     
Control of corruption  Measured as 
change over 
time (year on 
year change) 
It is measured using a 
scoring mechanism where 
scores range between -2.5 
(worst outcomes) to 2.5 
(best outcomes, hence, least 
corruption) (Charron et al., 
2010). 
Measures perceptions of 
corruption, conventionally 
defined as the exercise of 
public power for private 
gain. The particular aspect 
of corruption measured by 
the various sources differs 
somewhat, ranging from the 
frequency of “additional 
payments to get things 
done”, to the effects of 
corruption on the business 
environment, to measuring 
“grand corruption” in the 
political arena or in the 
tendency of elite forms to 
engage in “state capture”. 
Quality of 
Government 
Dataset 
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Voice and 
accountability 
Measured as 
change over 
time (year on 
year change) 
Measured using a scoring 
system ranging between -
2.5 (worst outcomes) to 2.5 
(best outcomes) (Charron et 
al., 2010). 
Includes a number of 
indicators measuring 
various aspects of the 
political process, civil 
liberties and political rights. 
These indicators measure 
the extent to which citizens 
of a country are able to 
participate in the selection 
of governments. This 
category also includes 
indicators measuring the 
independence of the media, 
which serves an important 
role in monitoring those in 
authority and holding them 
accountable for their 
actions. 
Quality of 
Government 
Dataset 
Controls     
Self-efficacy Measured as 
change over 
time (year on 
year change) 
% of individuals who 
answer whether they 
believed they have the 
knowledge, skill, and 
experience required to start 
a new business. 
% of individuals who 
answer whether they 
believed they have the 
knowledge, skill, and 
experience required to start 
a new business. 
GEM 
Fear of failure Measured as 
change over 
time (year on 
year change) 
% of individuals who 
answer whether fear of 
failure would stop them 
from starting a business or 
not. 
% of individuals who 
answer whether fear of 
failure would stop them 
from starting a business or 
not. 
GEM 
High aspirations Measured as 
change over 
time (year on 
year change) 
% of individuals who 
answer whether they have 
high aspirations and expect 
to generate 10 or more jobs 
in first 5 years. 
% of individuals who 
answer whether they have 
high aspirations and expect 
to generate 10 or more jobs 
in first 5 years. 
GEM 
Established business Measured as 
change over 
time (year on 
year change) 
% of owners/managers of 
established business 
 GEM 
GDP per capita Measured as 
change over 
time (year on 
year change) 
GDP per capita in current 
$US.  
GDP per capita in current 
$US. 
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators 
Chapter 3     
Total Early-stage 
Entrepreneurial 
Activity (TEA) 
Measured in 
levels and not 
change, 
therefore raw 
scores are 
measured 
The prevalence rate of 
individuals in the working 
age population who are 
actively involved in 
business start-ups, either in 
the phase of starting a new 
firm (nascent 
entrepreneurs) or in the 
phase spanning 42 months 
after the birth of the firm 
(owner- manager of new 
firms). 
The prevalence rate of 
individuals in the working 
age population who are 
actively involved in 
business start-ups, either in 
the phase of starting a new 
firm (nascent entrepreneurs) 
or in the phase spanning 42 
months after the birth of the 
firm (owner- manager of 
new firms). 
GEM 
Immigration status Measured in 
levels and not 
change, 
therefore raw 
scores are 
measured 
Coded (1 = migrant or 0 = 
native). 
Individuals are asked 
whether they were born in 
the country they are living 
in currently or born 
elsewhere. 
GEM 
Polity2 Index 
(Democracy vs. 
Autocracy) 
Measured in 
levels and not 
change, 
therefore raw 
Combines scores of 
Autocracy and subtracting 
scores of Democracy with a 
resulting unified polity 
Democracy has three 
essential, interdependent 
elements. (1) Presence of 
institutions and procedures 
Polity IV 
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scores are 
measured 
scale ranging from +10 
(strongly democratic) to -10 
(strongly autocratic) 
(Marshall and Cole, 2008). 
through which citizens can 
express effective 
preferences about 
alternative policies and 
leaders. (2) Existence of 
institutionalized constraints 
on the exercise of power by 
the executive. (3) Guarantee 
of civil liberties to all 
citizens in their daily lives 
and in acts of political 
participation.  
Autocracy is defined 
operationally as a set of 
political characteristics. (1) 
Restricting or suppressing 
competitive political 
participation. (2) Chief 
executives are chosen in a 
regularized process of 
selection within the political 
elite; once in office they 
exercise power with few 
institutional constraints. (3) 
High degree of control over 
social and economic 
activity. 
Political globalization Measured in 
levels and not 
change, 
therefore raw 
scores are 
measured 
Measured by the number of 
embassies and high 
commissions in a country, 
the number of international 
organizations of which the 
country is a member, the 
number of UN peace 
missions the country has 
participated in, and the 
number of international 
treaties that the country has 
signed since 1945. 
Measured by the number of 
embassies and high 
commissions in a country, 
the number of international 
organizations of which the 
country is a member, the 
number of UN peace 
missions the country has 
participated in, and the 
number of international 
treaties that the country has 
signed since 1945. 
Quality of 
Government 
Dataset 
Political system Measured in 
levels and not 
change, 
therefore raw 
scores are 
measured 
Measured using:  
0. Presidential 
1. Assembly-elected 
President 
2. Parliamentary 
Systems with unelected 
executives get a 0. Systems 
with presidents who are 
elected directly or by an 
electoral college (whose 
only function is to elect the 
president), in cases where 
there is no prime minister, 
also receive a 0. In systems 
with both a prime minister 
and a president, we consider 
the following factors to 
categorize the system: a) 
Veto power: president can 
veto legislation and the 
parliament needs a 
supermajority to override 
the veto. b) Appoint prime 
minister: president can 
appoint and dismiss prime 
minister and / or other 
ministers. c) Dissolve 
parliament: president can 
dissolve parliament and call 
for new elections. d) 
Mentioning in sources: If 
the sources mention the 
president more often than 
Quality of 
Government 
Dataset 
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the PM then this serves as 
an additional indicator to 
call the system presidential. 
Countries in which the 
legislature elects the chief 
executive are parliamentary 
(2). If that assembly or 
group cannot easily recall 
the president (if they need a 
2/3 vote to impeach, or must 
dissolve themselves while 
forcing them out) then the 
system gets a 1. 
Regime durability Measured in 
levels and not 
change, 
therefore raw 
scores are 
measured 
Number of years since the 
most recent regime change. 
Represents the number of 
years since the most recent 
regime change and/or the 
end of transition period 
identified by the lack of 
political stability over time 
(Marshall et al., 2010). 
Polity IV 
Freedom from 
corruption index 
Measured in 
levels and not 
change, 
therefore raw 
scores are 
measured 
Freedom from corruption 
uses a 100 point scale; 
higher freedom from 
corruption score means less 
corruption; thus 1 = very 
corrupt government, 100 = 
very little corruption 
(Miller, 2015) 
The score for this 
component is derived 
primarily from 
Transparency 
International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) for 
2011, which measures the 
level of corruption in over 
183 countries. The higher 
the level of corruption, the 
lower the level of overall 
economic freedom and the 
lower a country’s score. 
Quality of 
Government 
Dataset 
Government 
effectiveness 
Measured in 
levels and not 
change, 
therefore raw 
scores are 
measured 
Scores lie between -2.5 and 
2.5, with higher scores 
corresponding to better 
outcomes. 
Combines into a single 
grouping 
responses on the quality of 
public service provision, the 
quality of the bureaucracy, 
the competence of civil 
servants, the independence 
of the civil service from 
political pressures, and the 
credibility of the 
government’s commitment 
to policies. 
Quality of 
Government 
Dataset 
Business Freedom 
(economic freedom) 
Measured in 
levels and not 
change, 
therefore raw 
scores are 
measured 
The business freedom score 
encompasses 10 
components, all weighted 
equally and based on 
objective data from the 
World Bank’s Doing 
Business study. It is graded 
from 0 to 100, where 100 
represents the maximum 
degree of business freedom. 
The business freedom score 
encompasses 10 
components, all weighted 
equally and based on 
objective data from the 
World Bank’s Doing 
Business study. It is graded 
from 0 to 100, where 100 
represents the maximum 
degree of business freedom. 
Quality of 
Government 
Dataset 
Financial Freedom 
(economic freedom) 
Measured in 
levels and not 
change, 
therefore raw 
scores are 
measured 
The financial freedom 
factor measures the relative 
openness of each country’s 
banking and financial 
system by determining: the 
extent of government 
regulation of financial 
services; the extent of state 
intervention in banks and 
other financial services; the 
difficulty of opening and 
operating financial services 
The financial freedom factor 
measures the relative 
openness of each country’s 
banking and financial 
system by determining: the 
extent of government 
regulation of financial 
services; the extent of state 
intervention in banks and 
other financial services; the 
difficulty of opening and 
operating financial services 
Quality of 
Government 
Dataset 
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firms (for both domestic 
and foreign individuals); 
and government influence 
on the allocation of credit. 
It is graded from 0 to 100, 
where 100 represents the 
maximum degree of 
financial freedom. 
firms (for both domestic and 
foreign individuals); and 
government influence on the 
allocation of credit. It is 
graded from 0 to 100, where 
100 represents the 
maximum degree of 
financial freedom. 
Robustness     
Imputed Polity2  Measured in 
levels and not 
change, 
therefore raw 
scores are 
measured 
Scale ranges from 0-10 
where 0 is least democratic 
and 10 most democratic. 
The imputed version from 
QoG used has values for 
countries where Polity data 
is missing and it is 
constructed by regressing 
Polity on the average 
Freedom House measure 
(Charron et al., 2010). It is 
constructed by averaging 
the Freedom House 
measures of political rights 
and civil liberties and 
transforming them to a scale 
from 0-10 and transforming 
Polity into a similar scale. 
Quality of 
Government 
Dataset 
Corruption 
Perceptions Index 
Measured in 
levels and not 
change, 
therefore raw 
scores are 
measured 
The CPI Score relates to 
perceptions of the degree of 
corruption as seen by 
business people, risk 
analysts, and the general 
public and ranges between 
10 (highly clean) and 0 
(highly corrupt). 
The CPI Score relates to 
perceptions of the degree of 
corruption as seen by 
business people, risk 
analysts, and the general 
public and ranges between 
10 (highly clean) and 0 
(highly corrupt). 
Quality of 
Government 
Dataset 
Political corruption Measured in 
levels and not 
change, 
therefore raw 
scores are 
measured 
The directionality of the 
Political Corruption index 
runs from less corrupt to 
more corrupt. The 
corruption index includes 
measures of six distinct 
types of corruption that 
cover both different areas 
and levels of the polity 
realm, distinguishing 
between executive, 
legislative and judicial 
corruption. 
The directionality of the 
Political Corruption index 
runs from less corrupt to 
more corrupt. The 
corruption index includes 
measures of six distinct 
types of corruption that 
cover both different areas 
and levels of the polity 
realm, distinguishing 
between executive, 
legislative and judicial 
corruption. 
Quality of 
Government 
Dataset 
Control of Corruption Measured in 
levels and not 
change, 
therefore raw 
scores are 
measured 
All scores lie between -2.5 
and 2.5, with higher scores 
corresponding to better 
outcomes. 
All scores lie between -2.5 
and 2.5, with higher scores 
corresponding to better 
outcomes. 
Quality of 
Government 
Dataset 
Controls     
Log Age Measured in 
levels and not 
change, 
therefore raw 
scores are 
measured 
Age of respondents to GEM 
survey between (18-64 
years old) in logarithm 
form. 
Age of respondents to GEM 
survey between (18-64 
years old) in logarithm 
form. 
GEM 
Gender Measured in 
levels and not 
change, 
therefore raw 
scores are 
measured 
Gender of respondents male 
= 1, Female = 0. 
Gender of respondents male 
= 1, Female = 0. 
GEM 
Education Measured in 
levels and not 
Educational Attainment: 
post-secondary. 
Educational Attainment: 
post-secondary. 
GEM 
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change, 
therefore raw 
scores are 
measured 
Business start-ups Measured in 
levels and not 
change, 
therefore raw 
scores are 
measured 
% of individuals who 
answer whether they have 
been a business angel in the 
past. 
Coded 1 = Being a business 
angel in the past 3 years. 0 
= no 
Being a business angel in 
the past 3 years. 
GEM 
Work status Measured in 
levels and not 
change, 
therefore raw 
scores are 
measured 
Working status: in full-
time/part-time work 
dummy 
Working status: in full-
time/part-time work dummy 
GEM 
Income level Measured in 
levels and not 
change, 
therefore raw 
scores are 
measured 
Income level: Middle-
income level dummy 
Income level: Middle-
income level dummy 
GEM 
GDP per capita Measured in 
levels and not 
change, 
therefore raw 
scores are 
measured 
GDP per capita in current 
$US.  
GDP per capita in current 
$US. 
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators 
Opportunity 
perceptions 
Measured in 
levels and not 
change, 
therefore raw 
scores are 
measured 
Coded 1 = Individuals that 
see an opportunity to start a 
business in the next 6 
months. 0 = not 
Coded 1 = Individuals that 
see an opportunity to start a 
business in the next 6 
months. 0 = not 
GEM 
Self-efficacy Measured in 
levels and not 
change, 
therefore raw 
scores are 
measured 
% of individuals who 
answer whether they 
believed they have the 
knowledge, skill, and 
experience required to start 
a new business. 
% of individuals who 
answer whether they 
believed they have the 
knowledge, skill, and 
experience required to start 
a new business. 
GEM 
Chapter 4     
Nascent entrepreneurs Measured as 
change over 
time (year on 
year change) 
% of individuals who seek 
to start a business either on 
their own or in 
collaboration with partners 
and have yet to pay any 
wages or salaries for more 
than three months. Coded 1 
= yes, 0 = no 
% of individuals who seek 
to start a business either on 
their own or in collaboration 
with partners and have yet 
to pay any wages or salaries 
for more than three months.  
GEM 
Opportunity/necessity Measured as 
change over 
time (year on 
year change) 
Coded 2 = the respondent 
perceives a business 
opportunity within the next 
6 months, 1 = the 
respondent perceives no 
opportunity within the next 
6 months 0 = not 
participating 
Number of individuals who 
perceive that there is a new 
business opportunity in the 
next 6 months 
GEM 
High/low growth Measured as 
change over 
time (year on 
year change) 
Coded 2 = the respondent 
have intentions to launch 
high-growth oriented 
projects (creating 10 or 
more jobs in the first 5 
years), 1 = the respondent 
does not have intentions to 
launch high growth 
Number of individuals who 
have intentions to launch 
high growth oriented 
projects (thus creating 10 or 
more jobs in the first 5 
years) 
GEM 
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projects, 0 = not 
participating 
Self-efficacy Measured as 
change over 
time (year on 
year change) 
% of individuals who 
answer whether they 
believed they have the 
knowledge, skill, and 
experience required to start 
a new business. Coded 1 = 
yes, 0 = no 
% of individuals who 
answer whether they 
believed they have the 
knowledge, skill, and 
experience required to start 
a new business. 
GEM 
Social connections Measured as 
change over 
time (year on 
year change) 
% of individuals who 
answer whether they 
personally know an 
entrepreneur already. 
Coded 1 = yes, 0 = no 
% of individuals who 
answer whether they 
personally know an 
entrepreneur already. Coded 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
GEM 
Fear of failure Measured as 
change over 
time (year on 
year change) 
% of individuals who 
answer whether fear of 
failure would stop them 
from starting a business or 
not. Coded 1 = yes, 0 = no 
% of individuals who 
answer whether fear of 
failure would stop them 
from starting a business or 
not. 
GEM 
Controls     
Education Measured as 
change over 
time (year on 
year change) 
Educational Attainment: 
post-secondary. 
Educational Attainment: 
post-secondary. 
GEM 
Gender Measured as 
change over 
time (year on 
year change) 
Gender of respondents male 
= 1, Female = 0. 
Gender of respondents male 
= 1, Female = 0. 
GEM 
Age Measured as 
change over 
time (year on 
year change) 
Age of respondents to GEM 
survey between (18-64 
years old). 
Age of respondents to GEM 
survey between (18-64 
years old). 
GEM 
Work status Measured as 
change over 
time (year on 
year change) 
Working status: in full-
time/part-time work 
dummy 
Working status: in full-
time/part-time work dummy 
GEM 
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